"devolved on the two Houses of Parliament, as the furviving eftates."* I accede to this incontrovertible principle; and call on you, in return, to admit these inevitable deductions, viz. that the two eftates are competent to regulate the powers which they confer; and that it is a found and loyal exercife of this privilege, to bestow merely as much authority, as may be requifite to give due vigour to the Government, and to form the powers which they referve, into an entrenchment round the throne of their rightful Sovereign, during his temporary incapacity: fo that whenever it shall be the will of Heaven to restore him, he may refume his royal functions, without difficulty or obftruction,may find the conflitutional balance undisturbed, and the juft prerogatives of his crown undiminished, and unimpaired.

Thefe

maxims are as obvious, as they are found. They do not compofe the theory of a metaphyfical refiner, but form a plain and practicable doctrine, which every honeft member of parliament, who recollected the oath of allegiance that he had taken, would feel himfelf bound to act upon :, and to those who troubled him with the jargon of "preferving the monarchical principle," he might reply, first that he was preferving it for his King; and fecondly that they were fhallow politicians, who could not fee that the fame portion of prerogative, which would be inadequate, as a permanent attribute of royalty, to protecting

* Irish parliamenry debates.

the

the third eftate from encroachment, and maintaining through a courfe of ages the conftitu tional balance undisturbed,-might yet be fully fufficient for the temporary purposes, and provifional administration of a Regent.

That this destruction of the unity of executive power, which you extol as a chef d'œuvre of Irish policy and affection, went to contravene the principles of our imperial establishment, and manifeftly to endanger the connexion,-appears to me to be a truth, too self evident for argument. I shall therefore only add, that as we offered the Regent a greater power here-than he was to poffefs in England, so we might have given him lefs: the mifchiefs of fuch a reverfal of the distinction are too apparent, to need being pointed out: yet this difference would have caused a lefs anomaly in our conftitution, than that which the oppofite proceeding was calculated to produce. For with the maxims upon our statute book staring us in the face, "declaring that this kingdom juftly and rightfully "belongs to, and for ever depends upon, the imperi"al crown of England," we gave the superior power to the fubordinate executive; and prepofterously made the greater depend upon the less. *

I close here, my view of a transaction, which you not only confider as a proper subject for eulogium, but as entitled to the last praise to which

I do not overlook, what I forbear repeating, that we also acted in direct violation of these fundamental laws, by affecting to elect an Irish Regent; when in fact his Irish prerogative must be derived to him from his being appointed executive of Great Britain.

which I fhould have fuppofed it could make pretenfion, viz. that of having conduced to preferving the connexion: a transaction, which Mr. Foster, on the contrary, deems to have been fo indefenfible, that he replies its nullity to those, who urge its mischiefs a tranfaction, the feparating tendencies of which, Mr. Fitzgerald has admitted,-and has recommended the application of a preventive, which would affuage the fymptom, without removing the disease: and lastly, a tranfaction, which Mr. Pitt, because he agrees with thefe latter gentlemen, therefore holds to be no contemptible argument for Union.

The events of 1785 you pass over in complete filence; nor can I blame you for avoiding a subject, which no difcreet anti-unionist would wish to introduce: a fubject the more embarraffing at the present moment, because it cannot be dif cuffed, without expofing that difcordance, which fo eminently diftinguishes the heterogeneous oppofition to which you belong ;-rendering the connexion between its members as precarious, and infirm, as that of these islands would be, without an union.

It would be ungenerous to address to your friend and fellow. labourer in the chair, those invectives against the bill brought in by Mr. Orde, of which you were fo liberal at the time of its introduction. Should you tell him now, as you told his predeceffor then, "that in a commer"cial point of view, the propofed arrangement "was injurious to this country,-and that if look

ડે

ed at in a conftitutional light, it put an end to "the liberties of Ireland," his fituation would preclude him from replying, as he did then, that he could dwell for hours on the many "benefits of that fyftem: that it did not vio"late our liberties, or involve our conftitution; "and that this country must be infatuated if she gave up the offer."*

In noticing those inteftine diffenfions, which render you a truly anti-union party, I must do you the justice of doubting, whether your conduct be not more confiftent than that of the very refpectable perfon, to whom I have taken the liberty of alluding. He at that time, (and I accede to his opinion,) did not deem the mere difcretion of Parliament a fecurity of fufficient force; but thought that where there was fo much at ftake, a folemn compact was required-to preclude thofe diffenfions, to which two independent legiflatures were liable. He feared that collifion, in cafes of mere commerce, to which he would expofe us on queftions of Conftitution. The connexion he would truft to the good fellowship of the two Parliaments; affured (and the Regency has fhewn with how much reason,) that even if a momentary intoxication should take place, they would not fo juftle, as to overturn the Empire. But matters of trade being of more delicate, and high concern, he would fecure by compact, and not confide to their good understanding, or good will. This undoubtedly must be the way in which he reafons, fince otherwife thofe paffages which have been

See the parliamentary debates for $785.

been cited from his fpeech by the British Minister, would amount to arguments for Union; which he affures us they do not. Collating therefore his conduct in 1785, and 1789, I arrive at two very recondite truths, which feem, for their abftrufenefs, to be worth publishing to the world,-on the high and refpectable authority of that gentleman: first, that diftinct and co-ordinate Parliaments may diffent alarmingly from each other on commercial Subjects; but that on thofe imperial questions, in which their rival claims to power are more intimately involved, the most perfect harmony and concord may be expected: Secondly, that to bind the legislature of this country to adopt the laws prefcribed to them by the British Parliament, is not to violate our liberties in the smallest degree;t but that to admit Ireland to a full participation in British freedom, and subject her to laws enacted by an affembly in which the is adequately reprefented, is to annihilate our independence, and fubvert our conftitution!

*

You, Sir, (in my opinion,) are more confiftent: To Mr. Orde's Bill, and to the proposed Union, you have made the fame objection, (viz. that both measures are attacks on our independence ;) and have, in both cafes, given a pretext to your enemies for doubting whether the independence which you defend, be compatible with the connexion which we are determined to maintain.

Which would have been the Effect of the Propofitions. See the Speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 12th of August 1785.