That is to fay, the legislative power is not lodged exclufively with a single perfon,-a select affembly,or the people at large, but, (ftill poffefling its effential character of omnipotence, unabated,) is diftributed in portions, amongst some or all of these various interefts in the ftate.

Thus the merits of the measure being admitted,it being affumed to be a good one,-the question is, whether our Parliament be competent to obtain it ? or in other words, (if Archdeacon Paley be right,) whether that omnipotent, uncontrollable, defpotic legiflature, which conftitutes the fovereign power of our ftate, be poffeffed of authority fufficient to attain the ends for which it was established,-by procuring the happiness of its fubjects;-that primary object of all political inftitutions? To fuch a question, I am not afraid to answer in the affirmative.

*

But let us, with reference to the prefent queftion, proceed to see what further has been faid by this fame writer, of the British Conftitution: "The Government of England," he defcribes, as "formed by a combination of the three regular fpecies; the monarchy, refiding in the King; the ariftocracy "in the Houfe of Lords; and the republic being re"prefented by the House of Commons." He afterwards proceeds to enquire in what manner the "Conftitution has provided for its own prefervation; "that is, in what manner each part of the legislature

"

is fecured in the exercife of the powers affigned to "it, from the incroachment of the other parts. This fecurity is called the balance of the Conftitution; "and

change, unlefs by the occafional juxta pofition of fentences, which are feparate in the work.

and the equilibrium confifts in two contrivances, "a balance of power; and a balance of interest.

By the former is meant, that there is no power pofεσ felfed by one part of the legislature, whofe abuse, or "excefs, is not checked by fome antagonist power, refiding in another part." With refpect to " the House "of Lords, the proper use and design of this part "of the Conftitution, are" (amongst others)" the ❝ following. Large bodies of men are fubject to "fudden phrenzies. Opinions may be circulated "amongst a multitude, without proof or examina"tion; acquiring confidence and reputation merely ແ by being repeated from one to another and paf"fions founded upon thefe opinions, diffusing them"felves with a rapidity that can neither be accounted

for nor refifted, fometimes agitaté a country with "the most violent commotions. Now the only way to stop the fermentation, is to divide the mafs: that is, to erect different orders in the community, with feparate interefts. And this may, occafionally, e become the ufe of an hereditary nobility, invested "with a fhare of legislation;—namely to ftem the progrefs of popular fury. Averfe to those prejudices, which actuate the minds of the vulgar,-accuf"tomed to contemn the clamour of the populace,

they will oppofe refolutions, which are founded in "the folly and violence of the lower part of the "community. Was the voice of the people always "dictated by reflection, I fhould hold the interfe"rence of a fuperior order, not only fuperfluous, "but bad. But when we obferve what is urged as the

public opinion, to be in truth the opinion only, or per

" haps

"haps the feigned professions of a few crafty leaders; "that the numbers who join in the cry, ferve only "to fwell and multiply the found, without any ac"ceffion of judgment, or exercise of understanding; " and that oftentimes the wifeft councils have been thus "overborne by tumult and uproar,-we may conceive "occafions to arife, in which the common-wealth 66 may be faved by the reluctance of the nobility to "yield to the vehemence, or adopt the caprices, of "the common people.

66

"The Conftitution is one principal divifion of the "code of public laws; diftinguished from the reft, only by the particular nature, or fuperior importance of the fubject of which it treats. Therefore "the terms conftitutional and unconftitutional mean "legal and illegal. The diftinction, and the ideas, " which these terms denote, are founded on the fame "authority with the law of the land upon any other fubject; and to be afcertained by the fame en

66

quiries. The fyftem of English jurifprudence is "made up of acts of Parliament, decifions of courts of "law, and immemorial ufages: confequently thefe" (legiflative acts, &c.)" are the principles of which

the conftitution it felf confifts: the fources, from which "all our knowledge of its nature and limitations is "to be deduced; and the authorities to which all

appeal ought to be made, and by which every conftitu“tional doubt and question can alone be decided. This 66 plain and intelligible definition is the more necef

fary to be preserved in our thoughts, -as fome "writers upon the fubject abfurdly confound what is "conftitu

conftitutional with what is expedient: pronouncing forthwith a measure to be unconftitutional, which "they adjudge in any respect to be detrimental. An "act of Parliament, in England, can never be un"conftitutional, in the ftrict and proper acceptation of the

I fhall make no apology for the length of an extract, which contains fo many just and applicable reflections, and which is highly pertinent to my general fubject; befides fuggefting the following obfervations, more peculiarly belonging to the topick which

we are upon.

First, if the government, under the theory of which we live, be British,-and if we be to look to acts of Parliament for the principles of our constitution, making them the authorities to which in doubtful cafes we should appeal,-and if no statute can, properly speaking, be unconftitutional,-then the queftion of parliamentary competence has been repeatedly decided, by various acts which have paffed: acts operating as material, (though not fimilar) changes on the conftitution, as thofe projects of reform would have produced, which you fupported, without expreffing any doubt that Parliament was perfectly competent to adopt them: and laftly, the Scotch Union fupplies us with a determination fo accurately in point, that the Anti Unionifts fhould now follow the advice of Mr. Paley.

They should oppofe the measure to which they are fo hoftile, on the mere ground of its impolicy; and abandon

* Ibid. c. 7.

abandon their objections to it as unconftitutional, leaving his Majefty in quiet poffeffion of his crown, and renouncing that vile doctrine of Parliamentary incompetence, which robs the peers of their fhare of legislation, and appeals from the deliberations of the legislature, to the opinion of a few crafty demagogues, echoed by an ignorant and tumultuous populace. Indeed thus to retract is the more incumbent on them, because strange as it may seem, it is very certain, that while they are refifting those legitimate prerogatives of the legislature, the exercife of which may bring about an Union, they are at the same time (in order to defeat this ufeful measure) attempting to push the authority of Parliament beyond the only limit, which has been fet to it by the conftitution. A legiflature may do every thing but encroach on the omnipotence of that which is to fucceed it: but in fetting up the acts of the Irish Parliament in 1782, to control the powers of that which is now affembled, they make this vain and unconftitutional attempt; acting in the very teeth of my Lord Coke's pofition, that though Parliaments have attempted to restrain fubfequent Parliaments, yet they never could effect "it" for "acts against the power of the Parlia"ment fubfequent, bind not."*

16

I have now done with this fubject, I truft for ever; and probably thould not have faid fo much upon it, if it were not for my hearing, what it is very difficult to believe, that an eminent Member of that profeffion to which I belong, (and which is fuppofed