each Legislature, though for the time it centred in the fame perfon, was fo far from being infeparably mixed, fo as to form one indivifible whole, that a law actually exifted*, by which its feparation, at no diftant period, into two diftinct fovereigntics, was exprefsly established.

It were to be wifhed that Gentlemen would explain what that effential part of the conftitution of Ireland is, which the incorporation of its Lords and Commons with ours will annihilate. It has always appeared to me that in two principles is comprehended the effence of ours and of the Irish conftitution, which, with the exception of certain abuses, real or imputed, of different forts, to be found in each kingdom, is one and the fame. How often have I heard Gentlemen in the Irish Parliament boaft that they enjoyed, how often read in the published harangues and effays of Irish politicians, their exultation in the poffeffion of the British conftitution! I fay, I have always conceived that the most effential principles of that conftitution are two: 1. That it is compofed of three independent eftates or branches, forming checks each upon the other two. 2. That no law can pass, affecting the life, the liberty or property of the fubject, without the concurrence of a reprefentative body chofen from among the people, in a mode formed on the confideration of property and franchife, and confifting of an adequate number of perfons; and of fuch a mixed defcription, as to bring to the legiflative affemblies competent knowledge, both of general and local concerns, and a fympathy of intereft in regard to every thing that can affect their conftituents and the nation at large.

• The Scotch act of Anne, called the Act of Security, ift Parliament of Queen Anne, 2d fef. c. 3. p. 723.

Now, Sir, if this description is in any degree true, how can it be faid, that the combining into one fupreme Imperial Council a just number of the representatives of both nations for one Houfe, and of the Peers for the other, will be the annihilation of the conftitution? The Legislature of the empire may, in my opinion, in one point of view, and that perhaps the most enlarged and the foundest, be confidered as one great political machine; confifting of one and the fame fupreme head, both executive and legislative; to which are attached, or linked and knit, two separate members, while each of those two is fubdivided again into two analogous parts: the one member, the Lords and Commons of Great Britain, empowered to prepare for the Sovereign's deliberation, fanction, or rejection, whatever may feem neceffary for Great Britain, and for the empire at large: the other, the Lords and Commons of Ireland, poffeffing only, but exclufively-as far as fuch exclufion is confiftent with the idea of an unity of empire, either on the present or any other poffible frame of such a machine—the same power as to the kingdom of Ireland. Let me afk, whether this machine, confidered theoretically at least, would not be fimplified, its ftructure improved, and the two effential objects I have pointed out, better fecured, by blending and incorporating, in a fit proportion, the two separate members into one?

But, Sir, after making the best stand they can on this quickfand of incompetency, the Gentlemen proceed to the real merits of the question, and expressly deny that Ireland will reap any benefit from the measure; meaning, I fuppofe, alfo to deny, that it will prove beneficial to this country, or to the empire at large. I fuppose they mean this, because I cannot think that any man of good fenfe, or who is a real friend to Ireland, can difjoin her interefts from those of this kingdom, and of the other parts of the British dominions, or contend that any great arrangement is unadvisable and unjust, which fhall tend to the general advantage of those other branches of the empire, merely because no particular advantage may accrue to Ireland, provided that country is not thereby expofed to fome detriment or danger.

Let us therefore examine a few of the most prominent circumstances of advantage which may be reasonably expected to flow from a Union, in the first place, to Great Britain, and to the rest of his Majesty's dominions; but, fecondly, to Ireland ;-considering the subject in a general view of legiflative and executive government, of commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, of internal peace, civilization, and profperity: under which heads we may also discuss fome of the principal objections which have been relied on, either here or in the fifter country.

With regard to this country, its legislative and executive councils would no longer be liable to be perplexed in confequence of the distinct machinery of a separate

Irish Parliament, nor the general government continue in conftant danger of mifapprehenfion and difputes, and fubject to the inconveniences which inevitably arife from circuity of communication, and the impediments and embarraffing modifications to which jealoufy or ignorance on the one fide or the other will fo often give occafion (while things remain as they are, in many of the most important concerns of the empire.

In other refpects it may be difficult to forefee any immediate advantage to Great Britain; to her manufactures, her agriculture, her trade, or general profperity. Some people, indeed, rather apprehend danger to British commerce and manufactures; and that fuppofed migration of capital and skill to a cheaper country, to a country poffeffing a fuperiority of fituation as to many branches of bufinefs which has been often the fubject of public dif cuffion, is argued upon as a too probable confequence of a Union*. To this it might be a fufficient answer for the statesman to fay, that if what one part of the united kingdom shall lofe another will gain, there will be no public detriment to the whole. But that anfwer, I own, founds harfh to my ears. I think you ought nat, on fuch general confiderations of policy, to overlook the feelings and interefts of the numerous individuals and claffes of men, who have, as it were, localized their ingenuity, their industry, their wealth, and their habits of life, under the countenance and implied faith of preexisting laws and inftitutions. There is a better anfwer, I believe, in the fact, that capital and industry fo localized are not eafily influenced at once to change their fituation, by fuch temptations. The attempts which have been made, at various times, to transfer, by some sudden effort of speculation and enterprise, Eng*Mr. Peele's Speech.

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lih money and credit, and English art and fkill, to cheaper and more eligible places in Scotland, Wales, and even Ireland, have rarely been fuccessful, or perfevered in; and it is no inconfiderable illuftration and proof of this pofition, that, even with regard to external trade, which is certainly more locomotive than manufac tures, thofe towns and ports where accident at first, and a long series of causes afterwards, have operated to establish it, are feldom or ever out-rivalled, or their com merce drawn off, by any exertions however powerful in favour of fituations better adapted by nature for carrying it on.

Gradually, however, after a Union, Ireland will undoubtedly attract much wealth, capital, and credit from this country, not only by the circumstances of advantage to which I have alluded, but also, more especially, because an uniformity of laws and legiflature will give greater confidence to those who may be difpofed to embark in enterprises of speculation, or place their money on commercial or landed fecurities in that kingdom. This, one fhould think, would be a strong and reasonable argument with Ireland (of which afterwards); but fuch gradual benefit to be reaped by her, will not affect the interefts of individuals now engaged in business here, and will unquestionably, from the known principles and history of public wealth, tend in its progrefs, by multiplying intercourse, and the returns of profit in and between both countries, to increase the riches of both, and of the whole empire.

Let us now give a moment's confideration to the effects of the proposed Union on that empire, as an aggre

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