convince us of its folly and wickednefs. It has in that country overturned the throne of the Monarch and the altars of God: it has fanctioned murder, parricide, and regicide; and has taught every illiterate peasant to confider himself as a fit candidate for fupreme power, the fovereign of his fovereign, and the lawgiver of mankind

Ergo, regibus occifis, fubverfa jacebat

Priftina majeftas foliorum et fceptra fuperba,

Res itaque ad fummam fæcem turbafque redibat *.

I agree with a perfon juftly eminent, and for whom I entertain a very fincere respect, when he fays, that it

is dangerous in a popular affembly to state that there are points where the powers of the legislature end, and thofe of the people at large begin t.' Indeed I know of no point where a legitimate conftitutional power in the people at large begins; there may be fome very special cafes to which that of the legislature cannot reach; and in which, according to my conception, when any measure becomes neceffary and unavoidable, not the power, i. e. any rightful power of the people, but the diffolution of the conftitution and government, will begin; from which anarchy it must be left, in such cafes, to chance, to the circumstances of the times, the force of habit, the intrinfic merit of ancient inftitutions, and the prudence and virtue of individuals poffeffing influence, either perfonal or from fituation, to extricate the nation. It is indeed deli

*Lucret. lib. v. ver. 1135.

† Vide the Speech of the Right Hon. John Fofter, p. 108. 'I had not then received the correct edition, but I had feen feveral accounts of it in different newspapers. I fhall take the liberty now to refer to it according to that correct edition in some of the following pages.

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cate and dangerous wantonly to moot fuch fort of cafes: no judge of human nature who is a friend to his country, ever will; whatever may be his particular creed and party on matters fairly debateable, and open to a safe difference in opinion.

There are however cafes of another defcription, which may be more freely difcuffed, to which alfo the fupreme power of the Legislature (in our conftitution, of the Parliament) cannot extend; but which, being of a negative. kind, and not requiring any measure to be taken or act done, do not connect themselves with the notion of any neceffary diffolution of the frame of the government. They are, in truth, of fuch a fort, that, on their correct analyfis, it will be found, that the idea of the application of that power involves either physical or moral impoffibility, or a natural contradiction in the terms of the propofition.

Two examples, material for the prefent purpose, ef-. pecially the laft of them, will illuftrate the distinction to which I have withed to draw the attention of the House.

ift. Parliament cannot pass a law which a fubfequent Parliament shall not be able to repeal. The plain reafon of this is, that the fuppofition of fuch a power is contradictory to itself. It is to fuppofe the Parliament of next year lefs abfolute and fupreme than the Parliament of this *

2d. I have heard it contended, not without plaufibility, that the Parliament cannot difmember the kingdom or

Coke's Inft. part iv. p. 42, 43.

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circum.

circumfcribe the fphere of its own authority, and confequently that on that account, it cannot, diffolve any union which by treaty or otherwise has blended into one state, subject to its authority, parts which exifted, previous to fuch treaty, in a separate and distinct condition, with feparate legislatures; that to fuppofe it capable of doing this is also a contradiction in terms; that the nation and its Parliament are each indivisible integral parts, the one governed, the other governing, and forming together one indivifible aggregate or body politic; that if you detach any part of this body, what remains is no longer the fame ftate, the fame nation, the fame legislature or parliament; that the two parts may form themselves again each or either into a fimilar conftitution to what before exifted, or into other conftitutions; but that the difmemberment will have effected that fort of refolution of the aggregate into its elements, which is known to happen in our municipal law, when, by the lofs of an integral part, an ordinary corporation is diffolved, and lofes its corporate exiftence; that it is univerfally true, that the difmemberment of any legitimate. ftate cannot be a legitimate act of that state; but necef farily fuppofes, even on ceflions in virtue of conqueft, exchange, &c. a difruption of the integrity of the ftate; that it might be difficult to argue this pofition on the hiftory of thofe ill-conftructed conftitutions where difmemberment has in fact often taken place, or with regard to extreme cafes, of the ceffion of finall infignificant portions of a large dominion; but that nobody will fay that the actual ftate and conflitution of Great Britain would remain if the county of Northumberland or Cornwall, the ancient kingdom of Scotland, or the prin cipality of Wales, were detached from it.

But,

But, in the case of a union and incorporation of new parts, the incompetency of Parliament to decompose them is, I think, abundantly obvious, without adopting the foregoing opinion to its full extent, which I by no means do, with regard to the dismemberment of some original fraction, or district, of what had always conftituted one and the fame ftate. The effential condition of fuch a union is the combination of each of the conftituent parts into a new whole, in which the identical characters and qualities of thofe parts are fo loft as that they can no where afterwards be found or restored. The contracting parties cease to exist, and become incapable of being revived. It is as impoffible to replace them in ftatu quo, as it would be to recover the identical parts of two images of the fame metal, which may have been melted together, and caft into one new figure made up of both. Phyfically, or even morally and politically speaking, Scotland, as a country, might be again disjoined from England: it might again have Parliaments, as England might have; but this must be by a process exactly the fame with that which fhould feparate Cornwall, Norfolk, Caithness, or Sutherland, from Great Britain. It would not be a redintegration or reftoration of Scotland to her former ftate, as she existed before 1707: that ftate has been melted down and indiffolubly mingled with that of England, which, in like manner, can never become a feparate kingdom, as of its ancient right.

If this reafoning is as juft and correct as it appears to me, all apprehenfions and alarms must neceffarily vanish (alarms fometimes attempted to be raised when it has been thought they might affift a little dearth of argument), of Great Britain affuming a right to break through

through, and set aside, at her pleasure, any incorporation of this kingdom and that of Ireland, which the wisdom and patriotif of the two Parliaments may adopt. After a Union, Ireland may again be feparated from Great Britain, as England may be torn afunder from Scotland, by domeftic faction and civil war, or by foreign hoftility; but they never can be disjoined by any regular act of the united Government and Legislature.

of

In fhort, it appears to me that a common Parliament, fuch as was formed on the Scotch Union, and must be in contemplation now, must have the power of altering or repealing any of the former acts of either of the local Legiflatures, i.e. either English or Scotch, British or Irith, a power daily exercised in regard to English and Scotch acts made previous to 1707; but that fuch commen Parliament cannot legitimately repeal or alter any the fundamental and effential claufes, articles, or conditions of that treaty, by which the Union fhall be conftituted; fince the treaty authorized by each Legislature, concluded by commiffioners, and then again ratified by each Legislature, when carried into effect, will render it impoffible, upon any breach, for either party to resume its former fituation, and avail itself of the nullity thereby occafioned, and of course impoffible, confiftently with moral right and duty, for the united Parliament, i. e. beyond its legitimate powers, to commit fuch a breach.

Before I proceed, the House will permit me to explain what may otherwife be liable to mifreprefentation or mifconstruction. Though I have denied the ftrict right of the constituent body to deliberate and decide on political queftions, and either to limit or extend, by fpecial com

miffion