The honourable gentleman has had the goodness to give me intimation, that he has some serious charges to prefer against me. Of course, I shall probably have opportunities enough in future of explaining my own conduct; and with the decision. of the house I shall most willingly abide, whatever that decision may be As this is not the subject of discussion on this night, perhaps it is improper in me to say any thing upon it. I would only beg leave to observe, that the printed papers, upon which the honourable gentleman commented, contain the written representations of the bank, and, it is added, my answers. These answers, however, were not given in writing, and what is there printed under this title, is merely minutes of what passed between me and the governor and deputy-governor of the bank, reported for the perusal of the bank directors, without having been previously submitted to my examination; nor did I so much as see them till just before they were printed. The honourable gentleman argues, that advances to the emperor were calculated to produce ruinous consequences, that ruinous consequences did ensue, therefore that the advances made to the emperor were productive of ruinous consequences. This is very short logic but if he will not believe it to be false upon my authority, if it is not too much to ask, let him compare it with information. In order to make his conclusion good, he must shew that the remittances made to the emperor actually did diminish the cash in the bank, and that the issue of the order in council was occasioned by the diminution produced by these remittances. If it should appear that these advances did not occasion diminu tion of cash at the time that they were made; on the contrary, that the balance of cash rather increased, and that the mischief so much and so justly lamented arose from the operation of causes widely different, then, in justice as well as prudence, the house ought not to ascribe an evil to a cause different from that in which it originated,

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The honourable gentleman preferred another charge against me, which I heard without much dismay that I had persisted in sending money to the emperor when I was aware that the bank, from the line of conduct I was pursuing,

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was approaching to a state of insolvency. This, again, he takes for granted without any information upon the subject. If it should turn out that, during the whole period that these remittances were made, so far was I from being aware of the approaching difficulties of the bank, that by the successful operation of cominerce, the balance of exchange for all that time was in favour of this country, insomuch that, if these circumstances had continued, the state of the bank would at this day have been growing better, the honourable gentleman will surely not persist in the accusation, when he finds that the ground on which it was preferred is wholly and completely fallacious. The premises the honourable gentleman may wish to be taken on trust; but to this I object, not wishing to supersede his position by any assertion of my own, but merely because the house are not in possession of materials from which they can infer whether it be true or false. When these materials are before them, perhaps it may be found that the mischief arose from remittances of cash, which were sent to Ireland to a greater extent than usual, and to local alarms in this country, which caused a great run upon the bank for some time before the order in council was issued. This is all the answer which I think I need give to the honourable gentleman's charge of misrepresentation.

I have only a word more to say respecting an expression in the speech from the throne at the opening of the present session. In that speech his Majesty was advised to state, that the resources of the country were equal to every exertion-an expression founded certainly not upon a knowledge of the balance of cash or bullion at that time in the bank, but upon the survey of the general state of trade and manufactures of the kingdom. Our trade and manufactures certainly depend in a considerable degree upon the stability of public credit, which is interwoven. with the independence of the country. To preserve that independence, then, is necessary above all things to the restoration of public credit; and, next to the preservation of this independence, is the prevention of the danger of a future run upon the bank. And here we may look at the question in two points

of view. Let us first look at the best way to procure the greatest quantity of cash; and, if the subject is fairly viewed, I do not despair of convincing the house that the remittance of a sum to the emperor, instead of obstructing and impeding the influx of cash into the kingdom, will accelerate and increase it. I will grant that, if collateral circumstances did not vary, the balance in our favour would be diminished precisely in proportion to the sum sent abroad. But will it be contended, that abandoning an ally would have no effect upon the markets of Europe, and that such a step, were it taken by this country, would not influence any of the avenues of her commerce? Such a position is so absurd and untenable, that it would be an insult on the good sense of the house to spend their time in combating it. But a profitable trade depends not only on the state of the purchaser to receive, but of the seller to send. And need I ask what effect it would have upon the zeal, the spirit, the industry, and consequently the trade and manufactures of the country, were our coasts to be incessantly threatened by the whole concentered force of France, which would be the case were the emperor obliged, in consequence of our refusing to aid him with money, to conclude a separate peace with our common enemy? When the subject, therefore, is viewed in this light, who is so short sighted as not to see, that the inconvenience which may arise from present exertion would be much more than counterbalanced by the pressure of subsequent events? If the argument be admitted in one case, there is no possible case to which it may not be applied. In short, it may be argued upon the same grounds, that, as soon as you experience the difficulties arising from a drain of cash, you must give up all your foreign connections, and upon this principle you ought to withdraw your protection from all your possessions in the East and West Indies. Of these possessions, for instance, it might be said, True, they have been accounted extremely valuable, they have yielded great profits, the produce of them has formed a great article of commerce, and been the cause of a vast influx of wealth into the country, but in time of war they put us to an

expense; we will save therefore in future the expense of protection." But how? By sacrificing all the present and future advantages which might flow from the possession of them. Precisely the same argument will apply to an ally.

But if the reasoning is just in the view of procuring an influx of cash from abroad, how much stronger is it in the view of promoting circulation at home, which is fully as necessary for the restoration of the credit of the bank as the other! If our foreign commerce would be affected by the abandonment of an ally, how much more would our internal situation be affected by the pressure which would naturally result from an enemy encreasing in strength in a direct ratio to our inability to resist his efforts! Would not the natural consequence be a new alarm, accompanied with a disposition to hoard? And thus the immediate cause of the mischief would be renewed. I trust that, though there might be some cause for the late alarm, it is now almost gone by; and I am convinced, that the more the state of the country is enquired into, the less ground there is for despondency, or the apprehension of any danger which Englishmen may not boldly meet with the fortitude which belongs to the national character. While our object is however to remove alarm, and to restore the public credit, is it wise or prudent to court a greater alarm? Can it be expected that the effects of the greater would be less serious than of the slighter alarm, or that even the same effects would not do much more harm? Those, then, who look to the restoration of public credit in the bank of England as their favourite object, should be the last persons to counteract a measure which has an obvious tendency to produce that event to which their wishes and their endeavours tend: and how the honourable gentleman can claim the benefit of the argument drawn from his subject, I have yet to learn, nor can I even guess.

There is still another topic left, upon which I feel myself impelled to say a few words, namely, the additional security that would be given to credit by the restoration of peace. Whether the best mode of obtaining peace is to run the risk of losing the

aid of the emperor, is a question upon which there exists but little doubt. We have seen long ago that the uniform object of the enemy's policy has been to disunite us from our ally. This 'design has manifested itself in the course of several negociations and discussions, and we have seen a similar policy too successfully practised with other powers who were formerly leagued with us against France, and who have been seduced, some into a neutrality, others into open hostility against us. She has publicly and repeatedly declared her wish to make a separate peace with Austria, that she might be enabled to dictate terms to us, or to carry on the war against this country with greater effect. It is but very lately that we have heard that France has, a short time ago, made distinct overtures of peace to the emperor to the exclusion of this country, and that he, with his accustomed honour and good faith, instead of accepting of them, communicated them to the court of St. James's, and renewed his declaration to the enemy, that he would not conclude a peace except in conjunction with Great Britain, justly persuaded that no peace can be concluded on a permanent foundation, but one founded upon a due regard to the individual claims, and the common interests of the different powers of Europe.

Putting apart, therefore, the obligations of gratitude and honour, it must be obvious to every one whose views are not confined within the narrowest and most contracted limits, that the best mode of attaining the desirable object of peace is, to persevere in making a common cause with the emperor, and aiding him with those means which his own dominions do not furnish, but with which the resources of this country enable us to supply him. It is for this house to determine whether they will give success to the intrigues of the enemy, which have hitherto been frustrated by the fidelity and magnanimity of our ally, or whether they will persevere in those measures, which are most likely to bring the contest to a safe and honourable issue. To their judg ment and their spirit I leave the decision, convinced that they will act in a manner becoming the representatives of a great and powerful nation. On these grounds I think there is no use in