ing, are extremely interesting events in the history of the philosophy of science. But, in the present work, we are to confine ourselves to the history of science itself; in the hope that we may thus be able hereafter, to throw a steadier light upon that philosophy by which the succession of stationary and progressive periods which we are here tracing, may be in some measure explained. We are now to close our account of the stationary period, and to enter upon the great subject of the progress of physical science in modern times.

In

5. Subjects omitted. Civil Law. Medicine.-My object has been to make my way, as rapidly as possible, to this period of progress; and in doing this, I have had to pass over a long and barren tract, where almost all traces of the right road disappear. exploring this region, it is not without some difficulty that he who is travelling with objects such as mine, continues a steady progress in the proper direction; for many curious and attractive subjects of research come in his way: he crosses the track of many a controversy, which in its time divided the world of speculators, and of which the results may be traced, even now, in the conduct of moral, or political, or metaphysical discussions; or in the common associations of thought, and forms of language. The wars of the Nominalists and Realists; the disputes concerning the foundations of morals, and the motives of human actions; the controversies concerning predestination, free will, grace, and the many other

points of metaphysical divinity; the influence of theology and metaphysics upon each other, and upon other subjects of human curiosity; the effects of opinion upon politics, and of political condition upon opinion; the influence of literature and philosophy upon each other, and upon society; and many other subjects-might be well worth examination, if our hope of success did not reside in pursuing, steadily and directly, those inquiries in which we can look for a definite and certain reply. We must even neglect two of the leading studies of those times, which occupied much of men's time and thoughts, and had a very great influence on society; the one dealing with notions, the other with things; the one employed about moral rules, the other about material causes, but both for practical ends; I mean, the study of the Civil Law, and of Medicine. The second of these studies will hereafter come before us, as one of the principal occasions which led to the cultivation of chemistry; but, in itself, its progress is of too complex and indefinite a nature to be advantageously compared with that of the more exact sciences. The Roman Law is held, by its admirers, to be a system of deductive science, as exact as the mathematical sciences themselves; and it may, therefore, be useful to consider it, if we should, in the sequel, have to examine how far there can exist an analogy between moral and physical science. But, after a few more words on the middle ages, we must return to our task of tracing the progress of the latter.

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CHAPTER V.

PROGRESS OF THE ARTS IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

1. Art and Science.-I shall, before I resume the history of science, say a few words on the subject described in the title of this chapter, both because I might otherwise be accused of doing injustice to the period now treated of; and also, because we shall thus have, brought under our notice, some circumstances which were important as the harbingers of the revival of progressive knowledge.

The accusation of injustice to the state of science in the middle ages, if we were to terminate our survey of them with what has hitherto been said, might be urged from obvious topics. How do we recognise, it might be asked, in a picture of mere confusion and mysticism of thought, of servility and dogmatism of character, the powers and acquirements to which we owe so many of the most important inventions which we now enjoy? Parchment and paper, printing and engraving, improved glass and steel, gunpowder, clocks, telescopes, the mariner's compass, the reformed calendar, the decimal notation, algebra, trigonometry, chemistry, counterpoint, which was equivalent to a new creation of music;-these are all possessions which we inherit from that which has been so disparagingly termed the stationary period.

Above all, let us look at the monuments of architecture of this period; the admiration and the despair of modern architects, not only for their beauty, but for the skill disclosed in their construction. With all these evidences before us, how can we avoid allowing that the masters of the middle ages not only made some small progress in astronomy, which has, grudgingly as it would seem, been admitted in a former Book; but also that they were no small proficients in other sciences, in optics, in harmonics, in physics, and, above all, in mechanics?

If, it may be added, we are allowed in the present day, to refer to the perfection of our arts as evidence of the advanced state of our physical philosophy;-if our steam-engines, our gas-illumination, our buildings, our navigation, our manufactures, are cited as triumphs of science;-shall not prior inventions, made under far heavier disadvantages,-shall not greater works, produced in an earlier state of knowledge, also be admitted as witnesses that the middle ages had their share, and not a small or doubtful one, of science?

To these questions I answer, by distinguishing between art, and science in that sense of general inductive systematic truth, which it bears in this work. To separate and compare, with precision, these two processes, belongs to the philosophy of induction; and the attempt must be reserved for another place: but the leading differences are sufficiently obvious. Art is practical, science is specu

lative: the former is seen in doing; the latter rests in the contemplation of what is known. The art of the builder appears in his edifice, though he may never have meditated on the abstract propositions on which its stability and strength depends. The science of the mathematical mechanician consists in his seeing that, under certain conditions, bodies must sustain each other's pressure, though he may never have applied his knowledge in a single case.

Now the remark which I have to make is this:in all cases the arts are prior to the related sciences. Art is the parent, not the progeny, of science; the realization of principles in practice forms part of the prelude, as well as of the sequel, of theoretical discovery. And thus the inventions of the middle ages, which have been above enumerated, though at the present day they may be portions of our sciences, are no evidence that the sciences then existed; but only that those powers of practical observation and practical skill were at work, which prepare the way for theoretical views and scientific discoveries.

It may be urged, that the great works of art do virtually take for granted principles of science; and that, therefore, it is unreasonable to deny science to great artists. It may be said, that the grand structures of Cologne, or Amiens, or Canterbury, could not have been erected without a profound knowledge of mechanical principles.

To this we reply, that such knowledge is manifestly not of the nature of that which we call science.