Of the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogising.

regard to the things signified. Now by suggesting the different attributes comprised in the definition of the term, as so many mediums in the proof, an appeal is made to the adversary's practice in the language. In this way such mediums may be presented, as will satisfy a candid adversary, that the application he makes of the term in question, is not conformable to the usage of the tongue.

On the other hand, it is certain, that in matters of an abstract and complex nature, where the terms are comprehensive, indefinite, not in frequent use, and consequently not well ascertained, men may argue together eternally, without making the smallest impression on each other, not sensible all the while, that there is not at bottom any difference between them, except as to the import of words and phrases. I do not say, however, that this is a consequence peculiar to this manner of debating, though perhaps oftener resulting from it, on account of its many nice distinctions, unmeaning subtleties, and mazy windings, than from any other manner. For it must be owned, that the syllogistic art has at least as often been employed for imposing fallacies on the understanding, as for detecting those imposed. And though verbal controversy seems to be its natural province, it is neither the only method adapted to such discussions, nor the most expeditious.

To conclude, then, what shall we denominate the artificial system, or organ of truth, as it has been cal

Of the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogizing.

led, of which we have been treating? Shall we style it, the art of reasoning? So honourable an appellation it by no means merits, since, as hath been shewn, it is ill adapted to scientific matters, and for that reason never employed by the mathematician; and it is utterly incapable of assisting us in our researches into nature. Shall we then pronounce it the science of logomachy, or, in plain English, the art of fighting with words, and about words? And in this wordy warfare, shall we say that the rules of syllogising are the tactics? This would certainly hit the matter more nearly; but I know not how it happens, that to call any thing logomachy or altercation, would be considered as giving bad names; and when a good use may be made of an invention, it seems unreasonable to fix an odious name upon it, which ought only to discriminate the abuse. I shall therefore only title it, the scholastic art of disputation *. It is the schoolmen's science of defence.

WHEN all erudition consisted more in an acquaintance with words, and an address in using them, than

In answer to that branch of logic which Lord Verulam styles Doctrina de elenchis bermenia, concerning which he affirms, "De"dimus ei nomen ex usu, quia verus ejus usus est plané redargu«tio, et cautio circa usum verborum. Quinimo partem illam de prædicamentis, si rectè instituatur, circa cautiones de non con "fundendis aut transponendis definitionum et divisionum terminis, "præcipuum usum sortiri existimamus, et huc etiam referri malu"mus." De Aug. Sci. L. v. c. 4.

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Of the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogizing.

in the knowledge of things, dexterity in this cxercitation conferred as much lustre on the scholar, as agility in the tilts and tournaments added glory to the knight. In proportion as the attention of mankind has been drawn off to the study of Nature, the honours of this contentious art have faded, and it is now almost forgotten. There is no reason to wish its revival, as eloquence seems to have been very little benęfited by it, and philosophy still less.

NAY, there is but too good reason to affirm, that there are two evils at least which it has gendered. These are, first, an itch of disputing on every subject, however uncontrovertible; the other, a sort of philosophic pride, which will not permit us to think that we believe any thing, even a self-evident principle, without a previous reason or argument. In order to gratify this passion, we invariably recur to words, and are at immense pains to lose ourselves in clouds of our own raising. We imagine we are advancing and making wonderful progress, while the mist of words in which we have involved our intellects, hinders us from discerning that we are moving in a circle all the time*.

* How ridiculous are the efforts which some very learned and judicious men have made, in order to evince, that whatever begins to exist must have a cause. One argues, "There must have been

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a cause to determine the time and place," as though it were more evident that the accidents could not be determined without a cause, than that the existence of the thing could not be so determined. Another insists very curiously, that if a thing had no

CHAP. VII.

Of the consideration which the Speaker ought to have of the Hearers, as Men in general.

RHETORIC, as was observed already, not only considers the subject, but also the hearers and the speak

cause, it must have been the cause of itself; a third, with equal consistency, that nothing must have been the cause. Thus, by always assuming the absolute necessity of a cause, they demonstrate the absolute necessity of a cause. For a full illustration of the futility of such pretended reasonings, see the Treatise of Human Nature, B. I. Part 3 Sect. 3. I do not think they have succeeded better who have attempted to assn a reason for the faith we have in this principle, that the future wilt resemble the past. A late author imagines, that he solves the difficulty at once, by saying, that “what is now time past, was once future; and that

though no man has had experience of what is future, every man "has had experience of what was future." Would it then be more perspicuous to state the question thus," How come we to "believe that what is future, not what was future, will resemble "the past?"" Of the first he says expressly, that no man has had experience, though almost in the same breath he tells us, not very consistently, "The answer is sufficient, have we not found it to "be so?" an answer which appears to me not more illogical than ungrammatical. But admitting with him, that to consider time as past or future, (though no distinction can be more precise) is only puzzling the question; let us enquire whether a reason can be assigned, for judging that the unknown time will resemble the known. Suppose our whole time divided into equal portions. Call these portions A, B, C, D, E, F, G. Of these the three first have been experienced, the remaining four are not. The three first I found to resemble one another, but how must I argue

Of the consideration which the speaker ought to have

er*. The hearers must be considered in a twofold view, as men in general, and as such men in particular.

I

with regard to the rest? Shall I say, B was like A, therefore D will be like C; or, if you think it strengthens the argument, shall say, C resembled A and B, therefore D will resemble A, B, and C. I would gladly know what sort of reasoning, scientifical or moral, this could be denominated: or what is the medium by which the conclusion is made out? Suppose, further, I get acquainted with D, formerly unknown, and find that it actually resembles A, B, and C, how can this furnish me with any knowledge of E, F, and G, things totally distinct? The resemblance I have discovered in D to A, B, and C, can never be extended to any thing that is not D, nor any part of D, namely, to E, F, and G; unless you assume this as the medium, that the unknown will resemble the known; or, which is equivalent, that the future will resemble the past. So far is this principle, therefore, from being deduced from particular experiences, that it is fundamental to all particular deductions from experience, in which we could not advance a single step without it. We are often misled in cases of this nature, by a vague and popular use of words, not attending to the nicer differences in their import in different situations. If one were to ask me, "Have you then no reason to believe that the "future will resemble the past?" I should certainly answer, "I "have the greatest reason to believe it." And if the question had been concerning a geometrical axiom, I should have returned the same answer. By reason we often mean, not an argument, or medium of proving, but a ground in human nature on which a par ticular judgment is founded. Nay further, as no progress in reason. ing can be made where there is no foundation, (and first principles are here the sole foundation) I should readily admit, that the man who does not believe such propositions, if it were possible to find such a man, is perfectly irrational, and consequently not to be argued with.

* Chap. IV.