in practice merit to be honoured with the name of Art. As is the one, such is the other. It is enough for my purpose that something must be known, before any thing in this way, with a view to an end, can be undertaken to be done.

Ar the same time it is acknowledged, that, as man is much more an active than a contemplative being, and as generally there is some view to action, especially in uncultivated minds, in all their observations and inquiries, it cannot be doubted that, in composition, the first attempts would be in the art, and that afterwards from the comparison of different attempts with one another, and the consideration of the success with which they had been severally attended, would arise gradually the rules of criticism. Nor can it, on the other hand, be pleaded, with any appearance of truth, that observations derived from the productions of an art, can be of no service for the improvement of that art, and consequently of no benefit to future artists. On the contrary, it is thus that every art, liberal or mechanical, elegant or useful, except those founded in pure mathematics, advances toward perfection. From observing similar but different attempts and experiments, and from comparing their effects, general remarks are made, which serve as so many rules for directing future practice; and, from comparing such

general remarks together, others still more general are deduced. A few individual instances serve as a foundation to those observations, which, when once sufficiently established, extend their influence to instances innumerable. It is in this way that, on experiments comparatively few, all the physiological sciences have. been reared; it is in this way, that those comprehensive truths were first discovered, which have had such an unlimited influence on the most important arts, and given man so vast a dominion over the elements, and even the most refractory powers of nature. It is evident, therefore, that the artist and the critic are reciprocally subservient, and the particular province of each is greatly improved by the assistance of the other.

Bur it is not necessary here to enter farther into this subject; what I shall have occasion afterwards to advance on the acquisition of experience. and the manner of using it, will be a sufficient illustration.

Eloquence in the largest acceptation defined.....its more general forms exhibited.....with their different objects, ends, and characters.

In speaking there is always some end proposed, or some effect which the speaker intends to produce in the hearer. The word eloquence in its greatest latitude denotes," That art or talent by which the dis"course is adapted to its end *.”

* "Dicere secundum virtutem orationis.

Scientia bene dicendi."

QUINTILIAN. The word eloquence, in common conversation, is seldom used in such a comprehensive sense. I have, however, made choice of this definition on a double account: responds to Tully's idea of a perfect orator;

1st, It exactly cor

Optimus est orator

“qui

Eloquence defined....its more general forms exhibited....

ALL the ends of speaking are reducible to four; every speech being intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will.

ANY one discourse admits only of one of these ends as the principal. Nevertheless, in discoursing on a subject, many things may be introduced, which are more immediately and apparently directed to some of the other ends of speaking, and not to that which is the chief intent of the whole. But then these other and immediate ends are in effect but means, and must be rendered conducive to that which is the primary intention. Accordingly, the propriety or the impropriety of the introduction of such secondary ends, will always be inferred from their subserviency or want of subserviency to that end, which is, in respect of them, the ultimate. For example, a discourse addressed to the understanding, and calculated to illustrate or evince some point purely speculative, may borrow aid from the imagination, and admit metaphor and comparison, but not the bolder and more striking figures, as that called vision or fiction*, prosopopoeia, and the like

qui dicendo animos audientium et docet, et delectat, et permovet.” 2dly, It is best adapted to the subject of these papers. See the note on page 33.

By vision or fiction is understood, that rhetorical figure of which Quintilian says, "Quas Canarias Græci vocant, nos sane vi“siones appellamus, per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repræ"sentantur animo, ut eas cernere oculis ac præsentes habere videa"mur."