Natal Field Force, under Sir George White. What was wanted was, obviously, not the flower of the British Infantry, but a muster of hardy troops, unusually strong in Light Cavalry, abounding in Mounted Riflemen, and with an overwhelming supply of Artillery; whereas actually every one of the special arms was in the minimum proportion allowable for operations in close cultivated countries. That it should have been so is proof positive that the official mind was, up to the last, blindly optimistic, and that immediate success was taken for granted so absolutely, that the question of the moment became rather what individuals and which regiments should be accorded opportunities of distinction, than what were the special requirements of an army operating in South Africa.

It may be said in excuse that Mounted Infantry did not exist as a distinct body in the British army. Granted. But how came it that no provision was made for mounting a larger proportion of the regular infantry on arrival in South Africa, and why when accepting Colonial contingents was preference given to infantry? As for the dearth of guns, it is hard to find any extenuation whatever. Not only were there not half enough to meet the needs of the regular army, but absolutely no provision was made for giving a proportion of artillery to the many rifle corps known to be formed, or forming, among the English in Cape Colony and Natal.

Lord Wolseley has long been credited with the opinion that artillery is useless, and cavalry a foolish luxury. Like most such reports, this possibly overstates the case; nevertheless, it is notorious that he has shown persistent disfavour to these services, the latter especially. If it be true that he does depreciate the value of cavalry and of artillery in the field, the explanation may easily be found in the special circumstances of his own career as leader of exploratory and punitive expeditions-enterprises in which cavalry would have been an embarrassment only, and artillery was, in the main, superfluous. In justice to the Commander-in-Chief, however, it must be admitted that our artillery, though too small in quantity, was unequalled in quality, and that our guns were as effective,

aud of longer range, than those adopted by the other leading European Powers.

Horse and Field Artillery are obviously not intended for the attack or defence of fortified places, therefore it is a mischievous mistake to suppose that because the siege guns which the Boers, with infinite labour, dragged into position, outranged our field pieces, the latter must, ipse facto, be defective and obsolete. Unquestionably, as mat

ters turned out, some siege and position guns would have been most useful at Ladysmith and on the Modder, but so would many other appliances not just then to hand. It is plain that everything that may be desirable in exceptional cases, cannot accompany an army in the field, and it must be remembered that guns of equal destructive power and longer range that our 15 pounders would be too heavy to be manœuvred in open country-If we find ourselves checked by heavier ordnance than our own here and there, we do but experience a like difficulty to that which confronted the German armies when, arriving before Paris in 1871, they were indefinitely held off by the smooth bore guns of Mont Valerien and the other obsolete forts of the French capital, to which their rifled field guns could make no effective reply.

Reverting to the estimate given of British forces in South Africa at the outbreak of war, no account has been taken of a large number of local troops, some of whom existed as organised bodies before the war, while others had been recently created. For the moment, however, these troops may be left out of cousideration, except in Natal and the North-West, because, scattered far and wide along the whole length of the Border, they could not co-operate immediately with the Regular Army.

Thus it appears that on the eve of hostilities what we actually mustered was about 15,000 in Natal, and rather less than 9000 men in the Cape Colony. At home, there was one Army Corps almost ready to embark, and another to follow if necessary, while the British Colonies throughout the world were contributing contingents, limited in strength only by the reluctance of the Government to take advantage

of their generous loyalty. If more troops were needed there remained what then at any rate seemed ample sources of reinforcement, and behind all was the potential strength of a mighty Empire.

Of the personal qualities of our men I need say little. At heart the army remains what it always was. We all know it and are all proud of it. Nevertheless it has undergone many changes of system in recent times which it would be wrong to overlook. Thanks to Lord Card well, it possesses a reserve and a territorial connection which has worked well. On the other hand short service has brought it about that our regiments, the infantry in particular, are entirely composed of extremely young men (reservists included). This is not an advantage. Young men are just as brave as old men individually, but collectively they have not the same coolness in emergency. We have lost, too, with the old soldiers, the grand old non-commissioned officers of earlier days, and it is idle to pretend that the voice of a sergeant aged, say twenty-two, is the same to encourage and to rally, as was the leonine roar of the grim old disciplinarian in Peninsular wars. For this reason it must be recognised that our officers have much more thrown upon them in action now than formerly, and that a heavy proportion of casualties among them is only to be expected.

At length the war began. The Boers, faithful to their plan of campaign, prolonged negotiations till the early rains had fallen, and they were warned by the English papers of coming reinforcements to the Colony; then they hurled their defiance at the Empire. During the next four days they seized Laing's Nek, and the Transvaal commandoes swarmed into Natal, while on the other Border they cut the Western line, destroyed an armoured train, laid siege to Mafeking, and isolated Kimberley. An exodus from Johannesburg, most likely foreseen by them, materially aided their invasion of Natal, the local Government having kept open the railway from Charleston for the conveyance of refugees to the coast. Had Sir George White gauged the magnitude of the enemy's forces, or supposed it possible that they would be in possession of heavy

guns, he would no doubt have destroyed the line, and thus delayed their advance for days, perhaps weeks. Unfortunately, at that time the erroneous information collected by our Intelligence Branch was the key to the situation, and every step taken was on the hypothesis that the Boer army in Natal would not exceed 15,000 men, and would be practically without artillery. Ladysmith had been selected as a position unassailable by riflemen, alone or assisted by only a few small guns, and it was calculated that the enemy would be compelled to remain inactive among the hills or deliver an attack over open ground exposed to shrapnel fire and liable to the counter attacks of the English cavalry. On the same misleading hypothesis Glencoe was chosen as a suitable outpost. Ladysmith Junction is of strategic importance as commanding the use of the railway to Harrismith through the Van Reenan Pass. Glencoe Junction, on the other hand, covers the line to the near frontier via Dundee, and if it could be long held, as seemed probable, by 3 battalions of infantry, 3 batteries of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, its possession by the British would greatly impede the concentration of the Boers. Together, the two positions, strongly occupied by 13,000 magnificent troops, promised complete immunity to Southern Natal, always supposing that its superiority in artillery gave the force freedom to manoeuvre, otherwise its existence would be no hindrance to an enemy marching on Durban via Greytown. Up to the 19th October, all the conditions for a complete check to the enemy seemed realised, but the morning of the 20th brought an awakening surprise to the camp at Dundee in the form of a shower of shells from the guns of Meyer's Commando, and as day advanced it became clear that not only were the Boers in great force, but that they had guns sufficient to make the position untenable. I need not here repeat the story of Glencoe, fresh in the memories of us all. As at Salamanca, the British out-marched and strategically defeated, accepted battle, and stood victorious on a hard won field, so did our little force, suddenly threatened with extinction, wipe out for ever the reproach of Majuba, on the crest of Talama Hill. Sir

Penn Syrions gave away his valuable life, but not for nothing -a point was gained. The Boer had been tried and found wanting in open fight, and the news spread like wildfire into Basutoland and Zululand, and on to the far-off kraals of the Bechuanas and the Matabeles, with political effect of incalculable value. After this came the action of Elandslaagte, the midnight retreat from Dundee, and the flank march to Ladysmith, well covered by the engagement at Reitfontein, a series of necessary movements and of British successes.

Thus at the end of the first fortnight, in spite of the numbers and armament of the enemy, things had gone well for the British. Joubert's army in Natal had been seriously shaken. On the Rhodesian border Plumer was fully equal to the northern commando. Mafeking and Kimberley were ready for a long siege. Everywhere the natives were deaf to the voice of the Dutch charmer, and in many places burning to attack him. The great Boer programme was more or less a failure. But at this point came a turn of the tide, and our own mistakes did what the enemy had failed to effect. On 30th October, Sir George White made a grand reconnaissance in force-sometimes called the Battle of Lombards Kop-with the result, to use his own words, that he returned to camp unmolested. That he did so get back was due to the opportune arrival of a party from H.M.S. Powerful with five guns from its moveable armament. As a battle, the affair went against us, for our centre and right were nearly entrapped, and a detached flank support was cunningly cut off, surrounded, and eventually compelled to surrender. As a reconnaissance it was pushed too far, and it revealed only what must have been already perceived-viz., that the enemy were in great numbers, and that their guns were heavier and of longer range than ours.

And now came a parting of the ways for the British General. Two courses were open to him, and he had but a night and a day in which to day in which to make his choice. He might at once retire through Colenso to the other side of the Tugela, or he might await a siege at Ladysmith. The theory of war and the example of the greatest commanders