mounted enemy with a force mainly composed of infantry. At last in attempting a night attack upon a commando in the hills (Dec. 10th) he was misled by guides, himself surprised in a hopeless position, and with difficulty able to make good his retreat, leaving two guns and six hundred men in the hands of the enemy.

While these most unsatisfactory operations were in progress in the Cape Colony, affairs were no brighter in Natal. Sir Redvers Buller found his advance towards Ladysmith hampered by every possible obstruction put in his way by the Boers, who disputed every inch of ground without committing themselves to a general engagement, and who took care, as they retreated, to wreck the railway and destroy the bridges behind them. Reaching the Tugela at Colenso during the extreme of the rainy season, the British had to wait in camp at Chieveley until the floods had somewhat subsided, and even then could scarcely find an available ford, every known point for crossing having been rendered impracticable by the enemy, who occupied a set of peculiarly strong natural positions commanding the river, the bank of which they had entrenched, and honeycombed with concealed rifle pits. On the 15th December the British, with three brigades, endeavoured to force a passage, but the attempt sadly miscarried, and had to be abandoned for the time being, with a loss of over 1100 officers and men and 10 guns, after which check the expedition had to settle down and wait for reinforcements in identical circumstances to those of Lord Methuen's army at Kimberley; the result of identical causes.

The repulse on the Tugela River, following two other severe disasters in the same week, may be said to have ended the initial period which has given a title to this article. Immediately on receipt of the news in London, a Cabinet Council was held (Dec. 16th), at which it was decided to call out the remainder of the Reserve, and to mobilise the seventh and eighth Divisions. Four divisions were already in South Africa, the Fifth was on its way out, and the sixth in course of mobilisation. It was decided at the same time to ask for the services of a large body of British Yeomanry and Volunteers, to raise

more local corps in South Africa, and to accept a second series of contingents from the other Colonies. Lord Roberts was appointed to the supreme command at the seat of war, with Lord Kitchener as his chief staff officer. These steps conveyed no censure whatever on Sir Redvers Buller, but were the acknowledgment by the nation that the war was a serious undertaking not to be rushed through by one impulsive effort, but by patience and perseverance, soberly and systematically.

The day of political and military optimism was over at last, and the transition in public feeling, which then took place, was in every respect a healthy sign; nevertheless, it was attended by unnecessary discouragement. As a matter of fact, nothing extraordinary had occurred; nothing indeed half so unfavourable as we might have expected, had the facts of the situation been known from the first. Other nations in less difficult circumstances have experienced far more serious reverses. In the last Russo-Polish War, for instance, the Russian army was held at bay for nearly a year by a half armed peasantry, and later on, in the war of 1877, the repulses it suffered at the hands of the Turks were so many and so severe as to become text book examples of the losses which small armies well posted can inflict upon great ones. Yet in neither of these wars was there the slightest doubt of the ability of the Russians to bring matters to a successful issue; and they actually did so in both cases.

To take another example:-The Federal States of America, in the year 1861, having decided to coerce the Southern Confederacy, did so with absolute confidence that the war would not last three months. An army of 90,000 men was accordingly enlisted for ninety days, and it was calculated that long before the expiration of that period, the stars and stripes would float in triumph over Richmond, the Confederate capital. Everything seemed in favour of the North-numbers, wealth, manufacture, and access to European markets, and to European recruiting grounds; also entire command of the coast; yet at the end of seven months the Federals had been defeated in six great battles, and the question seemed not how soon Richmond would be taken, but for how long could Washington be saved. During the first eighteen months of the war the Northeners put a million and a

quarter of men into the field against armies rarely exceeding a hundred and twenty thousand all told, yet for two whole years, scarcely a single success were they able to score against the vast array of Confederate victories-army after army was destroyed, thousands of their troops fell in battle, and thousands more were prisoners down South. In the battle of Chattanooga alone the Confederates captured 8000 prisoners, 51 guns, and 50,000 stand of small arms; but the Northeners never faltered, never once doubted their ultimate success; and they were right; for, despite the expectations of European experts, the Confederate power collapsed suddenly, and in April, 1865, after just four years war, the Southern States accepted honourable conditions, and returned to the political union they had so long repudiated.

And surely if the Northern Americans could impose their will upon the great and proud confederacy of their own most famous States, we, with a united empire, need not shrink from the cost of overcoming a handful of obstructionists, whose numbers are to the subjects of the Queen in the proportion of one to three thousand. Still less need we amuse the world by croaking of the great national calamity that has overtaken us, because the course of events for nine weeks has not gone quite as smoothly as usual. The British public has had nearly half a century of unbroken good luck, enlivened by little campaigns, rich in episodes of the Piper Findlater order, so dear to war correspondents, and so seldom true. A generation has grown up that remembers nothing of the great mutiny, and to whom the story of Badajos conveys no message. We have had an agreeable sleep, a dream of diamonds and gold, of easy victories, and of Jubilee reviews, and our senses have been lulled by the music of 'Rule Britannia.' An awakening has long been overdue. It has come at last, and better now than later.

We began the war at a disadvantage. The Boers outwitted us in diplomacy, and tricked us by secret preparations. Our Intelligence Branch, never given the wherewithall to purchase information, supplied us with false information. The head of our military system stinted us in guns and cavalry. Our plans were mere makeshifts, and all disclosed by the newspapers,

as were also the movements of our troops and the details of our armaments. The Boer Republics were like a great wedge in the midst of our scattered Colonies, and at the very outset of the war, their armies secured possession of a natural fortress in North Natal, having sally ports equi-distant from Pretoria and Bloemfontein, from which they could operate against Natal and Cape Colony simultaneously, and reinforce either of their armies by shorter routes than were open to their opponents. With superior numbers and superior transport for the first six weeks at least, they were enabled to take the initiative at the points peculiarly favourable to themselves, and by laying siege to Ladysmith and Kimberley, they succeeded in compelling the British to attack them in their chosen positions. Their spies and sympathisers were in every British garrison and camp, so that they were never without full information of what was about to be done, whereas the most absolute secrecy was maintained as to everything relating to their own movements and intentions.

The Boer armies were moved at the will of one old man who had devoted many years to the study of how best to embarrass the British in South Africa, and had secured the best European advice. The British, on the contrary, were subject to many masters, themselves the servants of superiors, having conflicting ideas of political and military expediency. Generals and men were, for the most part, alike strangers to the country, and new to the tactics of the enemy.

And yet, with every advantage on the side of the Boers, the balance of actual fighting at the end of nine weeks remained in favour of the British. Seven times we defeated them in open combat, and drove them from their kopjes; and our little garrisons, times without number, repelled their most resolute attacks. They could count on their side some good strategy and really excellent tactics, but in the way of battles no positive victory; only the doubtful action at Lombard's Kop, two repulses from prepared positions at Magersfontein and Colenso, and two guerilla-like surprises at Nicholson's Nek and at Stormberg.

This was to them but a miserable record of a period during which they had the theatre of war all to themselves, and if it represents, as it may, the high water mark of Boer success, then indeed must the Republics be in a bad case. President Kruger no doubt still hopes for foreign intervention, but that need scarcely be feared if only our press will cease to speak of a crisis which does not exist, and of disasters which have never occurred. The editors of our London newspapers should take it to heart that it was they who by their cheap Imperialism and vulgar boastings before the war, roused against us the jealousy of every nation in Europe, and they also who, when the war began, by indiscreet disclosures enabled the Boers to anticipate and counteract the efforts of our Generals in the field. It would be well if they would deign to learn a little reticence from our enemies at Pretoria whose dignified silence has all along been well worth an extra ten thousand men present with their armies. Lord Roberts has now reached South Africa, and we may be sure he will not let the grass grow under his feet. If therefore he should refrain from sending reports home, we may reasonably take the hint, and moderate discussion.

On landing at Cape Town, January 10th, the Field Marshal found matters much as they were when he left England. Kimberley and Mafeking still held out, Buller, Methuen, and Gatacre maintained their own. White had vigorously repulsed a general attack and assault at Ladysmith (Jan. 6th), and French had gained some advantage over the mixed Free Staters and rebels about Colesberg, though not without a hitch.

The general military situation, however, had been changed for the better by a substantial increase of our forces, which were then approximately as follows: