church of the Resurrection, fire is worshipped after the ex ample of the Magi. On Easter Day Russians put the new fi in their mouths, under their arms, and about their legs, t cure rheumatism. In their excitement they forget Christ and like the Magi of old, adore the Holy Fire.'

Thus, from the Emperor Julian's disaster, through 400 years, back to fire-worshipping Chaldea and on to the presen day, has been traced the sacred mystery of Naphtha the cleanser. It is the history of the secret knowledge of a special substance, the gift of their God to his chosen people, and therefore, as they not unreasonably supposed, free to be used by his people in any way which might make for the glory and dignity of their Guardian. *

J. M. CAMPBELL.

ART. VII. THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Parliamentary Blue-Books on South Africa from June to October, 1899. C. 9404. C. 9415. C. 9507. C. 9518. C. 9521. C. 9530.

IT

T is surely impossible to over-rate the importance of ascertaining the exact cause and origin of the present war in South Africa-a war which has assumed such gigantic proportions that a terrible responsibility rests on those who

* The renewal of Fire, whether from oil as at the Sepulchre at Jerusalem, or from flint and steel as at St. Peter's at Rome, fits well with a death rite which passes into resurrection. But the need of a fresh fire, either at regular intervals or on special occasions, is a widespread belief apart from any question of resurrection. The Guardian Fire exposed to evil influences, taking Guardian-like evil into itself, becomes tarnished and loses its guardian virtue. Till lately over Northern Europe, to scare pestilence among man or beast, new, or need, fire had to be produced from friction. In the Chinese Spring Festival of the Tombs (Emerson's Masks, Heads, and Faces, p. 68), all fires are put out, and new fire is kindled from a burning glass.

initiated it. It is no doubt true that the war having been begun must be finished, even if we were not absolutely right in commencing it. But that patriotic duty does not cancel our other duty of considering and determining whether we were justified in entering upon, and in our conduct of, the negotiations which culminated in war. It is not sufficient to say that we were bound to take up arms in our own defence, after the invasion of our territory, and as soon as the Boers issued their highly insulting ultimatum, for the ultimatum was merely the end of the negotiations, and showed that the Boers rightly or wrongly had come to the conclusion that no settlement satisfactory to them could ever be arrived at by peaceful means, and if that was their opinion, they were probably justified in entering upon warlike operations before we had time to bring our troops from this country. Nor is it relevant to say that subsequent events have proved that war was inevitable, and that the enormous warlike preparations of the Boers coupled with their alliance with the Free State and the issue of the ultimatum, show that they had from the beginning determined certainly to assert their own complete independence, and possibly to expel the British entirely from South Africa. All this may or may not be wholly or partially true, and of course, if it be true, it is certain that the Boers were merely playing with us all through the negotiations, but we are not entitled to make that assumption without proof, and definite proof we are not likely to obtain. Moreover, the Boers are as much entitled to reply that the disastrous crime of the Jameson raid, and our treatment of those responsible for it, show that from the beginning we had determined to seize the Transvaal for our own purposes. We know of course that this accusation is utterly false, but unfortunately circumstances have given a certain amount of colour to it. In any case, neither side is entitled to impute evil motives and sinister designs to the other in the negotiations which preceded the war. The simple and all-important question in allocating responsibility for the war is (1.) Were we right in entering upon the discussion of the matters in dispute with the Boers,

and (2.) Were we to blame in the negotiations which terminated in the issue of the ultimatum ?

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It seems to us that the first of these questions is more open to argument than the second, yet curiously enough it is as regards the second that the Government are chiefly attacked, even Mr. John Morley, for instance, admitting that we were bound to do what we could to have the grievances of the Uitlanders redressed, and that we could not turn a deaf ear to their petitions. But if that be admitted, the Government win their whole case, for it is impossible in studying the bluebooks on the long correspondence and negotiations which took place after Sir Alfred Milner had put his hand to the plough,' to resist the conclusion that the Government were at last placed in this position-that they must either retire from the contest which they had begun for redress of the grievances of the Uitlanders, having obtained no concession of any value, and having made the position of British subjects in the Transvaal much worse than before by the public exhibition of the Government's impotence to help them, or they must face the alternative of war. We despatched Sir Alfred Milner as High Commissioner to South Africa-and his appointment was hailed with acclamation on all sides-with the difficulties in the Transvaal expressly in view. Our Commissioner reported in strong terms as to the unjust treatment of Uitlanders and more especially of British subjects, and he was authorised to enter on a Conference with President Kruger as to how these grievances might be removed. Were the Government to blame up to this point? We are not aware that even the most violent opponent has said so, though in the light of the wisdom which comes after the event, it is perhaps a question whether, if we had known the terrible struggle before us, we would have considered that the game was altogether worth the candle.' But assuming that we were justified in authorising Sir Alfred Milner's interference on behalf of the Uitlanders, could we possibly have meekly acquiesced in President Kruger's refusal to give us any concession worth having? The fifth day of the Conference terminated on June 5th, 1899, Sir Alfred Milner declaring that

'His Honour (i.e. President Kruger) and I are unable to agree on the subject which has formed the principal topic of discussion between us. According to my view of the case, the effect of what has happened is, that we are in the status quo ante this meeting.. This conference is absolutely at an end, and there is no obligation, on either side, arising out of it.'

It is evident from the Blue-book on the Conference (C. 9404) that the High Commissioner was of opinion that an attempt was being made to entice him into acceptance of proposals which were worthless to attain the object in view, and accordingly he was careful to state that, the conference having failed, both sides returned to the status quo. Up to this point no blame can attach to Her Majesty's Government, except in the technical sense that they are responsible for the action of the High Commissioner. But from that point Mr. Chamberlain took up the thread of the negotiations.

The next step in the proceedings was that the Government of the Transvaal introduced into the Volksraad, without consultation with Her Majesty's Government, certain proposals for alteration in the franchise. Mr. Chamberlain accordingly telegraphed to Sir Alfred Milner on 11th July, 1899, as follows (Blue-book C. 9415, p. 43):

'You are authorised, having regard to the uncertainty which still exists as to the exact nature of the latest proposals, to inform the Government of the South African Republic, through Greene, as follows

'If they desire that their proposals shall form any element in settlement of differences between the two Governments, Her Majesty's Government request that full particulars of the new scheme may be furnished to them officially, and hope that, until they have had an opportunity of considering it and communicating their views, the Transvaal Government will not proceed further with it.'

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To this a reply was sent, through the British Agent in the Transvaal, dated 13th July, (C. 9415, p. 45). It declares that, at the Bloemfontein conference, Sir Alfred Milner, while not discouraging President Kruger from laying his franchise proposals before the Volksraad, had declared that he must do it of his own accord, and not as part of an undertaking with Her Majesty's Government, and the conference

was entirely ended. The Transvaal Government were, therefore, obliged to treat the franchise question of their own accord, and not as part of an understanding with Her Majesty's Government.'

The reply goes on to state that they have endeavoured to assimilate their proposals so far as possible with those of H.M.'s Government, and that the new draft law indicates the farthest limit at which people and Volksraad could arrive. As this draft had now been taken over by a Commission of the Volksraad, the whole matter had passed out of the hands of the Transvaal Government, and it was no longer possible to meet Mr. Chamberlain's request.

The draft franchise law above referred to was passed, and came into force on the 26th of July, 1899. Of this measure it is sufficient to say that, although it conferred the franchise after seven years' residence, that privilege was alleged by the Uitlanders and those interested to be so surrounded with difficulties and qualifications as to be absolutely worthless. Accordingly, Mr. Chamberlain made the following very reasonable request, conveyed to Sir Alfred Milner by telegraph on 31st July (C. 9518, p. 29):—

'I now authorise you to invite President Kruger to appoint delegates to discuss with ours question whether reforms, which Volksraad has passed, will give immediate and substantial representation to the Uitlanders, and if not, what additions and alterations will be necessary in order to secure this result. If invitation is accepted, our delegates would not be precluded from raising any point calculated to improve measure.'

This was followed by a supplementary telegram, dated August 1st (C. 9518, p. 29), as follows:

'We must confine proposed joint inquiry in the manner suggested in telegram of 31st July, to question of political representation of Uitlanders. You should, however, let President Kruger know, through Greene, that you will be ready, after conclusion of enquiry, to discuss with him not only the report of the inquiry and the franchise question, but other matters as well, including arbitration without introduction of foreign element.'

- The substance of these telegrams was delivered by Sir A. Milner to the Transvaal Government,