within this realm de jure (not meaning, "power to enforce by law"); and that the oath, in consequence, must be untrue even upon the interpolators' terms.

The second also was a similar mode of reply to the plea -"In any dictionary, jurisdiction will be found defined as legal authority". As the self-evident intent of the oath had been not merely questioned but ridiculed, the first portion of this argument was devoted to proving the true sense upon the narrow ground of this plea; the second part contained new evidence of the spiritual effect of the Act of '29. Five hundred copies were privately distributed.

Being now convinced that the de jure mode of interpreting the oath must be utterly untenable, and other important points having risen to my view, I resolved to treat the question more fully. A better apprehension of the immense moment of the issue I had raised was one reason why the result of this labour was not published. Nine hundred and ninety-five copies of my argument were privately and gratuitously distributed. The entire Episcopate of the United Church; every Dean, every Archdeacon, and also every Proctor of the Clergy in Convocation; nearly all the Clergy of our English Cathedral Chapters, of the parishes of our English Cities, and specially of that ancient arena of anti-Papal struggle-the City of London; the Clergy of our towns whence the Popish hierarchy stole its titles in 1850; the Clergy who were more publicly associated with the religious activity of the day; and a large number of Laymen, were the recipients of these copies. This elicited such private communications as proved the doctrines not to be such folly as some had tried to represent them: beyond this, all was-silence.

The Divorce and Oaths' Bills were now under discussion; and the opinions thus called forth showed but too plainly that the Clergy should be acting more decidedly. I had hoped that my part was completed; but events seemed to render it my duty again to bear witness. I entered, therefore, on the subject a fourth time, and the issue was such as led to the resolve to make it public; and to do this by placing it, as I may be said now to do, in the hands of those members of the united Communion who are best fitted to take due interest in it.

It is unnecessary to speak of the sources of information which have been consulted. Let it suffice to say, that my argument is sent forth with a confident persuasion that there are no historical facts in reserve, by which either Lawyer or Divine may shake my position; it may be neglected, or even again ridiculed, but not overthrown. Such a service will be rendered to me should this ever be done, that in the event of its accomplishment I shall feel it my duty publicly to recant.

The first and second parts of the argument maintain the points of the three pamphlets; but there is a change as respects the mutual relation, and precise force, of the words "hath or ought to have": the third part was necessitated both by the debates on the oath, and those on the Divorce Act; and it is quite of equal importance: the fourth part was inevitable as a general conclusion.

Here let me guard against the impression, that the work is little more than a reprint of the former publications. The subject has been entirely recast; and though some of my former matter re-appears, it bears but a small propor

tion to the additional information. My aim has been, as far as possible, to make others speak rather than myself. The information adduced is not a tithe of that which might be brought forth. For convenience, the line of argument has been limited to facts connected with England; though the case might be even more glaringly established as respects Ireland.

The length of the argument must not be ascribed to a sense of weakness in the proof. Nor does it need the least apology as though it were in excess of the importance of the subject. As a point of convenience, I should have been glad could it have been less. But, if Senators challenge appeal to history, there is no resource but to quote it: and, if high legal authorities erroneously interpret some statutes. which they partially quote, and pass by a multitude of others, there is no course open except to produce the statutes which they overlook, and so convince them of error as regards those which they profess to interpret. To these reasons add, that for the sake of thousands who have deep interests at stake, but have no opportunity of research, it was necessary to make the case as complete as might be in itself. With all this, perusal will not be an arduous task; it should be one of deep interest.

But, the importance and truth of the argument being granted, it may be replied, By what authority doest thou this? It is no answer to say, Others were not disposed to canvass the subject; for why did you at all move it? In answer, let me freely concede that it is absurd in any man presumptuously to step out of his peculiar province: but, in the present case, this is not the fact. I am I am seeking duty; my eyes are opened to see that the oath in question

is false; in obedience to the State this oath is placed before me with the demand-You must accept this, or you cannot be allowed to officiate: the question, therefore, rises directly in my path. Yet, were the case but a scruple properly so called, a question on some point clearly indifferent, such scruple would not warrant the course I adopt; but the question is one of the highest moment as a point of Christian morality, and in respect of its general issues one of life or death to our polity.

Further, some have affirmed that I am wholly disabled from ministration: now, one motive for my recent researches was to ascertain the exact nature of my position; and one motive, perhaps the chief, of making the result public is to make this position the subject of special attention among the members of our Communion. An unbeneficed Presbyter may be sacrificed without sensible effect on the Church; his disappearance may excite as little attention as would that of a pebble cast in the ocean: but, as the matter must be of some consequence at least to himself, he may ask to be heard in his own defence. This, I doubt not, my readers will grant.

I reject the oath as being absolutely false; I repudiate the usurped spiritual action of the Common-Law and of the Parliament; I now hold that the alternative Re-action or Separation should be proposed to the State: do these opinions disqualify me as to the exercise of my office within our Church?

The rejection of the oath does not require special remark.

As to my doctrine of separation from the State, it must

not be confounded with the Dissenter's objections to the abstract principle of the Union. It admits the idea of such an Union to be a Scriptural principle; it implies that the terms of our Union ought to have been kept inviolate; it is grounded solely on the fact that the State has departed from the contract; and it is a refusal to abandon the high functions of the Church to the usurped powers of her antagonist. This forms the best evidence of attachment to our Communion; and is but the expression, upon personally ascertained grounds, of a long current and daily extending opinion.

The refusal to sign the 3rd clause of the XXXVIIth Article, and the XXXVIth Canon, constitutes the highest title to be licensed to officiate. Subscription is not to be limited to the bare mechanical act of guiding the pen, it has reference to opinion; it is to express an ex animo assent and consent to the doctrines subscribed. Does my refusal proceed from denial of the doctrines? Have I any sympathy with those who advocate the utter abolition of all oaths and subscriptions? Most assuredly not. My objection rests on the truth that certain statements as to mere matters of fact in the said Canon and Article are now by facts absolutely untrue. I refuse to assent to these actual facts because the very demand of subscription requires that such an assent be not given. This refusal, therefore, is a perfect response to the very spirit of the original demand of subscription; it proceeds upon the resolve to carry out the principles of those who drew up the Articles and the Canons; it constitutes me in the highest sense of the terms a consistent Clergyman of our Church, and as such I claim to be licensed to officiate.

Quite another turn may be given to this question of dis