theretofore and remove the bar of the statute of limitations from
such claims. Pennington v. United States, 631.
2. Back pay and bounty provision of act of March 4, 1907; application of.
The back pay and bounty provision in the Sundry Civil Appropriation
Act of 1907 related to certain enumerated claims and the proviso
also related exclusively to those claims and is not to be regarded as
independent legislation. Ib.
3. Administrative action as to; intent of Congress to unsettle.
This court will not construe a provision in an appropriation act in
regard to an enumerated class of claims as expressing the intent of
Congress to unsettle past administrative action as to all claims
against the Government; such a radical intent would not be ex-
pressed in an obscure and uncertain manner. Ib.
4. Disallowed claims; effect of subsequent act of Congress to reinstate.
A claim of an officer of the United States for extra per diem rations
under the act of July 5, 1838, and which had been disallowed in
1890 by the accounting officers, was not reinstated by the proviso
in the back pay and bounty provision of the Sundry Civil Appro-
priation Act of March 4, 1907. Ib.
CLASSIFICATION FOR REGULATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16.
CLASSIFICATION FOR TAXATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15;
NATIONAL BANKS, 8, 11.
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
COMMERCE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
CUSTOMS LAW;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
COMMERCE COURT.
See JURISDICTION, F.
COMMERCIAL AGENCIES.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 26, 27;
STATES, 8.
COMMODITIES CLAUSE.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 11, 18, 19, 20.
COMMON CARRIERS.
1. Depots and freight stations; creation by contract.
Premises occupied and used by a common carrier as a depot or freight
station may become such through contract with the owners and not
necessarily by lease or purchase. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. Co., 274.
2. Status of owners of terminal as.
Because a contract for terminal facilities contemplates and provides
for the publication of joint tariffs does not make the owners of the
terminal common carriers if no joint tariffs are ever filed or pub-
lished. Ib.
Congress may not bring a community or body of people within range
United States are to be determined by Congress and not by the
courts. United States v. Sandoval, 28.
2. Indians; intoxicating liquors; validity of provision in New Mexico
Enabling Act.
It was a legitimate exercise of power on the part of Congress to provide
in the Enabling Act under which New Mexico was admitted as a
State against the introduction of liquor into the Indian country
and the prohibition extends to lands owned by the Pueblo Indians
in New Mexico. Ib.
See BANKRUPTCY, 7;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19;
CORPORATION TAX LAW, 9;
INDIANS, 5, 7, 9;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 17;
JURISDICTION, G 1; '
STATES, 3, 4.
CONSIDERATION.
See BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 2.
CONSOLIDATION OF CAUSES.
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 26.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. Commerce; state burdens on; validity of Michigan act imposing tax on
insurance corporations.
The statute of Montana imposing a tax on insurance corporations
doing business in the State measured by the excess of premiums
received over losses and expenses incurred within the State, is not
unconstitutional as a burden on, or interference with, interstate
commerce. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge Co., 495.
2. Commerce clause; due process of law; validity of order of Michigan
Railroad Commission.
An order of the Michigan Railroad Commission requiring certain rail-
roads doing an interstate business to use their tracks within the
city limits of Detroit for the interchange of intrastate traffic, sus-
tained as being within the regulating power of the commission;
and also held that such order was not unconstitutional as interfer-
ing with interstate commerce or as depriving the carriers of their
property without due process of law. Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michi-
gan R. R. Comm., 457.
3. Commerce clause; due process and equal protection of the laws; validity
of Part III of c. 490 of Stat. Mass., 1909, imposing excise tax on
foreign corporations.
The excise tax, imposed by Part III of c. 490 of the Statutes of Massa-
chusetts of 1909, on certain classes of foreign corporations, which
excise is measured by the authorized capital of such corporations
but limited to a specified sum, is not an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce, nor does it deprive such corporations of
their property without due process of law or deny them the equal
protection of the law. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216
U. S. 1; Southern Railway Co. v. Green, 216 U. S. 400, distin-
guished. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 68.
4. Commerce clause; Indian tribes; scope of power and duty of United
States.
The power and duty of the United States under the Constitution to
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes includes the duty to care.
for and protect all dependent Indian communities within its bor-
ders, whether within its original limits or territory subsequently
acquired and whether within or without the limits of a State.
(United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375.) United States v. San-
doval, 28.
5. Contract impairment; effect of subsequent state law on charter provision.
A charter provision is not violated under the contract clause by a
subsequent state law otherwise legal, if, prior to the enactment of
the latter, the chartered corporation has subjected itself to the
operation of an amendment to the state constitution reserving the
power to alter, amend and repeal charters and franchises. Louis-
ville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 298.
6. Contract clause; order of railroad commission as law of State within
meaning of.
An order of the Railroad Commission of Kentucky made under the act
of March 10, 1900, is a legislative act under delegated power and
has the same force as if made by the legislature and is for this rea-
son a law passed by the State within the meaning of the contract
clause of the Federal Constitution. Ib.
7. Contract impairment; effect on contract between bank and depositor of
state statute requiring bank to act as agent of State in collecting tax on
deposits.
A lawful state tax on deposits in bank is imposed in the exercise of a
power subject to which deposits are made, and does not impair the
contract obligation of the bank to the depositors by requiring the
bank to act as agent in collecting it. (North Missouri R. R. Co. v.
Maguire, 20 Wall. 46.) Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 120.
See INFRA, 8;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 6.
Delegation of legislative power. - See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 29.
8. Due process of law; equal protection; liberty of contract; validity, under
constitutional provisions, of Child Labor Act of Illinois of 1903.
The provisions of the Child Labor Act of Illinois of 1903 involved in
this case are not unconstitutional as denying due process of law, as
depriving the employer of liberty of contract, or of his property by
requiring him at his peril to ascertain the age of the person em-
ployed, or as denying him the equal protection of the law. Sturges
& Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 320.
9. Due process of law; effect, as deprivation of liberty or property, of state
statute requiring employers to ascertain age of employés of tender
years.
Absolute requirements as to ascertaining age of employés of tender
years are a proper exercise of the protective power of government;
and if the legislation has reasonable relation to the purpose which
the State is entitled to effect it is not an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of liberty or property without due process of law. Ib.
10. Due process of law; effect to control forms of procedure.
The due process clause of the Federal Constitution does not control
mere forms of procedure provided only the fundamental require-
ments of notice and opportunity to defend are afforded. (Louisville
& Nashville R. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230.) Torres v. Lothrop,
Luce & Co., 171.
11. Due process of law; retrospective legislation; validity of law of New
Mexico correcting irregularities in compliance with statutory provi-
sions in regard to tax sales.
A statute correcting irregularities in compliance with statutory provi-
sions in regard to tax sales is remedial in nature and unless violative
of constitutional restrictions is not a denial of due process of law as
retrospective legislation; and so held as to § 25 of c. 22 of the laws
of New Mexico of 1899, providing that sales for taxes made under
that act shall not be invalidated except on the ground of prior pay-
ment of the taxes or exemption of the property from taxation.
Straus v. Foxworth, 162.
12. Due process of law; effect of want of notice to depositor on validity of
tax on deposits paid by bank under agreement with State.
A state tax of a specified per cent. on deposits in national banks paid
by the bank under agreement with the State pursuant to statute
and which is otherwise valid, does not amount to denial of due
process of law because the depositor had no notice in advance of the
assessment, where, as in this case, the tax was recoverable by suit
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