[the other inheritances of the crown. And in 1 Hen. VII. another act was made to resume such part of the duchy lands as had been dismembered from it in the reign of Edward IV., and to vest the inheritance of the whole in the king and his heirs for ever, as amply and largely, and in like manner, form and condition, separate from the crown of England and possession of the same, as the three Henries and Edward IV. or any of them, had and held the same (q).]

The isle of Ely was never a county palatine, though sometimes erroneously called so. It was, however, a royal franchise; the bishop having been formerly entitled, by grant of King Henry the First, to jura regalia within the isle of Ely, whereby he exercised a jurisdiction over all causes, as well criminal as civil (r). But by a recent act (s), this secular authority of the bishop is taken and vested in the crown.

away

[There are also counties corporate, which are certain

(9) Some have entertained an opinion (Plowd. 220, 1, 2; Lamb. Archeion, 233; 4 Inst. 206;) that by this act the right of the duchy vested only in the natural and not in the political person of King Henry VII., as formerly in that of Henry IV.; and was descendible to his natural heirs, independent of the succession to the crown. And, if this notion were well founded, it might have become a very curious question at the time of the Revolution in 1688, in whom the right of the duchy remained after King James's abdication, and previous to the attainder of the pretended Prince of Wales. But it is observable, that in the same act the duchy of Cornwall is also vested in King Henry VII. and his heirs, which could never be intended in any event to be separated from the inheritance of the crown. And indeed it seems to have been understood very early after

the statute of Henry VII. that the duchy of Lancaster was by no means thereby made a separate inheritance from the rest of the royal patrimony, since it descended with the crown to the half-blood in the instances of Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, which it could not have done, as the estate of a mere Duke of Lancaster, in the common course of legal descent. The better opinion therefore seems to be that of those judges, who held (Plowd. 221,) that notwithstanding the statute of Hen. VII. (which was only an act of resumption) the duchy still remained as established by the act of Edw. IV., separate from the other possessions of the crown in order and government, but united in point of inheritance.

(r) 4 Inst. 220; Grant v. Bagge, 3 East, 128.

(s) 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 87.

[cities and towns, some with more, some with less territory annexed to them; to which out of special grace and favour the kings of England have granted the privilege to be counties of themselves, and not to be comprised in any other county; but to be governed by their own sheriffs (t) and other magistrates, so that no officers of the county at large have any power to intermeddle therein] (u). As they constitute no part of the counties at large in which they are locally situate, so they had formerly, in general, no share in voting for the members to serve for those counties in parliament (x). But thirteen of the number are now expressly included within their respective counties, so far as regards the right of election for knights of the shire (y). To which we may add that by 38 Geo. III. c. 52, all causes of action arising and offences committed in counties corporate may be tried in the next adjoining county; a regulation from which certain towns and cities indeed were at first excepted, but almost the whole of these exceptions have been since repealed by the late act for regulating municipal corporations (z).

Thus much of the countries subject to the laws of England; the consideration of which involves, in a general point of view, that of the persons also, to whom these laws are applicable. For all persons found within these territories fall under the operation of these laws, though in different degrees: British subjects (that is persons born within any part of the dominions of the crown, and in some cases their descendants also, though born in foreign parts) being in a full and absolute sense entitled to the rights conferred by these laws, and liable to the obligations they impose; but aliens (or those who are not British subjects) in a limited sense only; as we shall have occasion more particularly to explain hereafter.

(t) As to the appointment of their sheriffs, see 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 61.

(u) Their names are given in Russell's Reform Act, p 5; and in the Population Abstract of 1831, vol. i. p. XIV. Et vide 3 Geo. 1. c. 15; 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 61, 109.

(a) Russell's Reform Act, p. 5. (y) 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 17.

(2) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 109. Some farther provisions as to counties corporate are contained in 51 Geo. 3, c. 100; 60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, c. 4, s. 6; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 72.

NEW COMMENTARIES

ON

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK I.

OF PERSONAL RIGHTS.

In a disquisition of such extent and variety as that on which we are about to enter, it is obviously of the first importance to lay down a proper preliminary arrangement of the subject; and the plan of division which appears to be most suitable to a treatise of this description, is one founded on a consideration of the nature of municipal law in the abstract, and of the objects or purposes towards which it is directed. It will be necessary, therefore, to recur for a moment to the views taken of this subject in a preceding part of the work.

We have seen that the municipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in the state(a), whose authority to prescribe it has been referred to the contract implied in civil society, that its members should submit to certain restraints of their natural freedom, in order to secure to each the enjoyment of defined liberties and advantages; and these we have comprehended under the general name of rights (b). It results from these considerations, that in every country, the true and proper objects of the law consist in the establishment and maintenance of the rights severally due to the different members of the community.

(a) Sup. p. 25.

(b) Sup. p. 29.

The idea of rights, however, naturally suggests the correlative one of wrongs; for every right is capable of being violated. A right to receive payment for goods sold (for example) implies a wrong on the part of him who owes, but withholds, the price; a right to live in personal security, a wrong on the part of him who commits personal violence. And, therefore, while in a general point of view the law is intended for the establishment and maintenance of rights, we find it on closer examination to be dealing both with rights and wrongs. It first fixes the character and definition of rights, and then, with a view to their effectual security, proceeds to define wrongs, and to devise the means by which the latter shall be prevented or redressed.

These considerations form the most convenient basis upon which to construct the principal division of the laws of England; and we shall therefore sever them (like former writers (b)) into two portions, one of which regards Rights, and the other Wrongs.

But, again, if rights be analyzed, they will be found to consist of several kinds. For first they are such as regard a man's own person; secondly, such as regard his dominion over the external and sensible things by which he is surrounded; thirdly, such as regard his private relations, as a member of a family; fourthly, such as regard his social state or condition, as a member of the community; the first of which classes may be designated as personal rights, the second, as rights of property, the third, as rights in private relations, and the fourth, as public rights.

In these divisions of rights, it is to be observed, that we everywhere mean to include the converse or reciprocal consideration of duties. For whatever is due to one man or set of men, is necessarily due from another. Thus the right of one man to receive from another the price of a commodity sold, casts upon the latter the duty of paying Laws of England, and Blackstone's Comm. vol. i. p. 122.

(b) Hale and Blackstone; vide the Preface to Hale's Analysis of the

that price; and the general right of each individual to live in personal security, implies the converse duty on the part of others not to subject him to any violence. The party too, who possesses the right, is in general himself subject to some resulting duty. Thus the people have a right to live under the form of government established by law, and are under a corresponding duty of submission to that government. In the discussion of rights, therefore, it is often necessary to speak also of duties. Indeed, it is under the aspect of duties principally, that some rights require to be considered.

To avoid, however, any misapprehension from the use of the term duties, we may remark that there are some duties which have no connection with rights in the sense which we have affixed to the latter expression; and of such duties our law consequently takes no cognizance. These are, such as the law of God or conscience prescribes, but the violation of which by the individual, is attended with no direct mischief to others. Thus public sobriety is a duty recognized by the law, having regard to the right of each citizen to be protected from disgusting or contaminating exhibitions of vice; but private sobriety is not enforced by any legal sanction, because secret intoxication, though equally opposed with open drunkenness to conscience and the law of God, is no violation of any human right, nor its commission, if by any means detected, a fit subject for human punishment.

Wrongs also may be subdivided; but as regards these, we are necessarily led to adopt a different principle of distribution. For the leading distinction here depends not on the character of the right violated, but on the party who is supposed to sustain injury from its violation. According to the view which our law takes of this subject, the violation of a right may in some instances amount to an injury to the particular individual only, but in others it may take the character of an injury to the public at large(c).

(c) Vide 4 Bl. C. pp. 5, 6.