[feiture, and the like. For which reason, if I grant a lease to A. for the term of three years, and after the expiration of the said term to B. for six years, and A. surrenders or forfeits his lease at the end of one year, B.'s interest shall immediately take effect; but if the remainder had been to B. from and after the expiration of the said three years, or from and after the expiration of the said time, in this case B.'s interest will not commence till the time is fully elapsed, whatever may become of A.'s term (d).]

As an estate for years was not created, at common law, like a freehold, by livery of seisin, so the tenant, in proper technical language, is not said to be seised, but to be possessed. Neither for the creation of this estate is it proper to limit it to a man and his heirs, as in the case of a freehold of inheritance. The correct limitation is to a man and to his executors and administrators; though it is sufficient if it be granted to himself only, without mention of his personal representatives; for in these the law will vest it, without any special words of limitation, on his death.

Again, as it required no livery of scisin, so at common law this estate, for whatever length of duration, might be constituted by mere agreement, verbal or written, if followed up by the entry of the grantee. But by the statute of frauds, 29 Car. II. c. 3, no lease shall now be effectual for more than three years, unless put into writing and signed by the party or his agent, duly authorized (e).

It is also to be remarked that the bare grant or agreement does not in itself vest a complete estate for term of years in the grantee: it only gives him a right of entry on the tenement, which right is called his interest in the term, or interesse termini (f). But when he has actually so entered, the estate is then, and not before, completely vested in him. However the interesse termini is so far in the nature of an estate, that even before entry, the lessee

(d) Co. Litt. 45 b.

(e) As to this provision, vide Edge v. Strafford, 1 Tyrw. 295; Lord Bolton v. Tomlin, 5 Ad. & El. 856.

(f) 2 Bl. C. 144; Plowd. 198; Doe v. Walker, 5 Barn. & Cress.111; Co. Litt. 338 a, 270 a; Neale v. Mackenzie, 1 Mee. & Wels. 747.

may grant it over to another; though, on the other hand, a lessee before entry, is not in a condition to maintain an action of trespass for an injury to the land (g).

[Tenant for term of years hath incident to and inseparable from his estate, unless by special agreement, the same estovers which we formerly observed (h) that tenant for life was entitled to; that is to say, house-bote, firebote, plough-bote, and hay-bote (i); terms which have been already explained (j).

With regard to emblements, or the profits of lands sowed by tenant for years, there is this difference between him and tenant for life: that where the term of tenant for years depends upon a certainty, as if he holds from Midsummer for ten years, and in the last year he sows a crop of corn, and it is not ripe and cut before Midsummer, the end of his term, the landlord shall have it,] in the absence of any special contract or custom to the contrary; [for the tenant knew the expiration of his term, and therefore it was his own folly to sow what he never could reap the profits of (k). But where the lease for years depends upon an uncertainty, as upon the death of the lessor, being himself only tenant for life, or being a husband seised in right of his wife; or if the term of years be determinable upon a life or lives: in all these cases, the estate for years not being certainly to expire at a time foreknown, but merely by the act of God, the tenant, or his executors, shall have the emblements in the same manner that a tenant for life, or his executors, shall be entitled thereto (l). Not so, if it determine by the act of the party himself; as if tenant for years does anything that amounts to a forfeiture in which case the emblements shall go to the lessor, and not to the lessee, who hath determined his estate by his own default (m).

(g) As to the nature of the interesse termini, vide Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 Brod. & Bing. 248; Edge v. Strafford, 1 Tyrw. 302. (h) Vide sup. p. 241.

(i) Co. Litt. 41 b.

(j) Vide sup. p. 241.
(k) Litt. s. 68.
(1) Co. Litt. 56 a.
(m) Ib. 55 b.

[II. The second species of estates not freehold, are estates at will (n). An estate at will is where lands and tenements are let by one man to another, to have and to hold at the will of the lessor; and the tenant by force of this lease obtains possession (o).] It may be constituted by written or verbal agreement without farther ceremony, if followed by entry; and may in some cases arise by mere construction of law. [Such tenant hath no certain indefeasible estate, nothing that can be assigned by him to any other, because the lessor may determine his will, and put him out whenever he pleases. But every estate at will is at the will of both parties, landlord and tenant; so that either of them may determine his will, and quit his connections with the other, at his own pleasure (p). Yet this must be understood with some restriction. For, if the tenant at will sows his land, and the landlord before the corn is ripe, or before it is reaped, puts him out, yet the tenant shall have the emblements, and free ingress, egress, and regress to cut and carry away the profits (g). And this for the same reason upon which all the cases of emblements turn, viz. the point of uncertainty; since the tenant could not possibly know when his landlord would determine his will, and therefore could make no provision against it; and having sown the land, which is for the good of the public, upon a reasonable presumption, the law will not suffer him to be a loser by it. But it is otherwise, and upon reason equally good, where the tenant himself determines the will; for in this case the landlord shall have the profits of the land (r).

What act does, or does not, amount to a determination of the will on either side, has formerly been matter of great debate in our courts. But it is now settled, that (besides the express determination of the lessor's will, by declaring that the lessee shall hold no longer; which

(n) As to an estate at will v. Co. Litt. 55 a-57 b.

(0) Litt. s. 68.

(p) Co. Litt. 55 a.

(q) Ibid. 56 a.

(r) Ibid. 55 b.

[must either be made upon the land (s), or notice must be given to the lessee (t)) the exertion of any act of ownership by the lessor] without the lessee's consent, [as entering upon the premises and cutting timber (u), or taking a distress for rent and impounding it thereon (x);] the lessor's making a feoffment, or lease for years of the land to commence immediately (y); any act of desertion. by the lessee, as assigning his estate to another, or committing waste, which is an act inconsistent with such a tenure (2); or which is instar omnium, the death or outlawry of either lessor or lessee (a); puts an end to or determines the estate at will.

The law is, however, careful that no sudden determination of the will by one party, shall tend to the manifest and unforeseen prejudice of the other. This appears in the case of emblements before-mentioned; and, by a parity of reason, the lessee, after the determination of the lessor's will, shall have reasonable ingress and egress to fetch away his goods and utensils (b). And, if rent be payable quarterly or half-yearly, and the lessee determines the will, the rent shall be paid to the end of the current quarter or half-year (c). And upon the same principle, courts of law have of late years leaned as much as possible against construing demises, where no certain term is mentioned, to be tenancies at will; but have rather held them to be tenancies from year to year so long as both parties please, and will not suffer either party to determine the tenancy, without reasonable notice to the other; which reasonable notice is now fixed, by general usage, at half a-year, at the least, ending with the current year of the tenancy (d); though where the tenancy commenced at

one of the quarterly feast days, the half-year may be computed from one feast day to another, whether there be 182 days between them or not (e).

This tenancy from year to year has in modern times. almost entirely superseded the old tenancy at will, and prevails so much that it may be proper to enlarge a little more upon its character. It belongs properly to the first species of estate which has been noticed in this chapter, viz. the estate for years; though from the degree of uncertainty to which its duration is subject, it partakes also in some measure of the nature of an estate at will. It may be created not only by the express agreement of the parties (verbal or written), but also by construction of law. Thus, if a man demise land to another at a yearly rent, no length of time being expressed, the law will construe this as a demise from year to year (ƒ). So the law will in every case imply a tenancy from year to year where land is occupied at an annual rent; and there is no evidence that the occupier's estate is of a different description. And the case is the same if a man is let into possession under a verbal demise for a term of more than three years, which by the statute of frauds ought to be in writing; for though by the provisions of the statute, the lease will not be effectual for the term intended, yet the lessee will be considered as holding from year to year (g).

With respect to the duration of the interest, it is to be observed that as the half-year's notice to determine the estate (or notice to quit as it is called) is always for quitting at the end of some particular year of the tenancy, a lease "from year to year" will necessarily confer an estate for a year certain, at the outset; and if in that, or

Blackstone remarks that this kind of lease was in use as long ago as the reign of Hen. 8, when half a year's notice seems to have been required to determine it. T. 13 H. 8, 15, 16; 2 Bl. Com. 147.

(e) Doe v. Watkins, 7 East, 551; Roe v. Doe, 6 Bing, 574.

(f) Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128; Shirley v. Newman, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 266; Doe v. Hazell, ib. 94; Doe v. Donovan, 1 Taunt. 555; Wilkinson v. Hall, 3 Bing. N. C. 508.

(g) Doe v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471; Clayton v. Blakey, 8 T. R. 3.