any succeeding year of the tenancy, more than half a year elapse without a notice to quit being given by either of the parties, another year certain is thereby constantly added to that which is in progress. Upon the same principle, if the lease be "for a year, and so from year to year," it will enure as a demise for two years certain, at the outset (h); for at the expiration of the first, there is a continuation of the tenancy, which cannot be determined by a notice to quit at an earlier period than the expiration of the second year. But in other respects the law of duration is the same as in the case first supposed. It is farther to be remarked that the estate from year to year when once constituted, does not determine (like an estate at will) by an assignment of the interest of either of the parties, or by their death; but the tenancy will continue to exist between one of the parties and the assigns or representatives of the other, or between the assigns or representatives of both parties (as the case may be), until duly determined by the usual notice to quit (i).

III. An estate at sufferance, is where one comes into possession of land under a lawful demise, and, after his estate is ended, wrongfully continues the possession (k). [As if a man takes a lease for a year, and, after the year is expired, continues to hold the premises without any fresh leave from the owner of the estate. Or, if a man maketh a lease at will, and dies, the estate at will is thereby determined; but if the tenant continueth possession, he is tenant at sufferance (l). But no man can be tenant at sufferance against the king, to whom no laches, or neglect, in not entering and ousting the tenant, is ever imputed by law; but his tenant, so holding over, is considered as an absolute intruder (m). But in the case of a subject, this estate may be destroyed whenever

(h) Denn v. Cartwright, 4 East, 32. (i) Maddon v. White, 2 T. R. 159; Doe v. Porter, 3 T. R. 13; Buckworth v. Simpson, 5 Tyrw. 354.

(k) Co Litt. 57 b, 271 a; 2 Inst. 134.

(1) Co. Litt. 57 b.

(m) Ibid. And see n.14), by Harg.

VOL. I.

T

[the true owner shall make an actual entry on the lands and oust the tenant, or bring an action of ejectment (which proceeds upon a supposed entry), to recover the possession; but before entry, he cannot maintain an action of trespass against the tenant by sufferance, as he might against a stranger(n); and the reason is, because the tenant being once in by a lawful title, the law (which presumes no wrong in any man) will suppose him to continue upon a title equally lawful; unless the owner of the land by some public and avowed act, such as entry is, will declare his continuance to be tortious, or, in common language, wrongful.

Thus stands the law, with regard to tenants by sufferance; and landlords] had formerly no remedy in such cases but those we have pointed out: [and at the utmost, by the common law, the tenant was bound to account for the profits of the land so by him detained. But now, by statute 4 Geo. II. c. 28, in case any tenant for life or years, or other person claiming under or by collusion with such tenant, shall wilfully hold over after the determination of the term, and demand made and notice in writing given, by him to whom the remainder or reversion of the premises shall belong, for delivering the possession thereof; such person, so holding over or keeping the other out of possession, shall pay for the time he detains the lands, at the rate of double their yearly value. And, by statute 11 Geo. II. c. 19, in case any tenant having power to determine his lease, shall give notice of his intention to quit the premises, and shall not deliver up the possession at the time contained in such notice, he shall thenceforth pay double the former rent for such time as he continues. in possession (o).]

And to give landlords a cheap and speedy remedy against their tenants holding over, where the property is of small value, it is now provided by 1 & 2 Vict. c. 74, Barn. & Cres. 2; Messenger v. Armstrong, 1 T. R. 53.

(n) Trevelliant.Andrew, 5 Mod.384. (0) As to these statutes, see Co. Litt. by Harg. 57 b, n. (2); Doe v. Kce, 7

that where a tenant has held at will or for a term not exceeding seven years, without rent, or at a rent not exceeding the rate of £20 per annum, and such tenant, or the person occupying under him, shall fail to deliver up possession after his interest has ended, or been duly determined by notice to quit or otherwise, his landlord (or any of his landlords, where there are several,) may proceed (after giving written notice of the intention to do so) to recover possession by a summary proceeding before any two justices of the peace assembled in petty sessions for the district; who are authorized (unless reasonable cause is shown against it by the tenant) to issue their warrant accordingly. But where the person obtaining the warrant has no lawful right to the possession, the act of obtaining it is to be deemed a trespass; and execution of the warrant is in every case to be stayed if the tenant shall give security to bring an action to try the right, and to pay all the costs thereof in the event of judgment being given against him (p).

We may conclude our notice of estates less than freehold with this remark, that in the case of a lease for years, as well as that of a lease for life or gift in tail, a tenure (of the imperfect kind) is created between the lessor and the lessee, and the latter holds of the former by the nominal obligation of fealty, and by such services as are reserved; but it is otherwise as to a tenant at will or at sufferance, from neither of whom is any fealty due. The reason assigned as to the tenant at will is, that "he hath not any sure estate" (q); and as to the tenant at sufferance, he is not considered, in strictness, as having any estate at all, but a mere "possession without privity”(r).

(p) See also 6 Ann. c. 18, as to holding over by guardians and trustees of infants, and on life or lives; and 1 Geo. 4, c. 87, as to proceedings in ejectment against tenants holding

over.

(4) Co. Litt. 93 a, 93 b; 63 a, 68 b, n. (5), by Harg.; vide Denn v. Fearn

side, 1 Wils. 176. There is an excep-
tion to this, however, in the case of
copyhold, which is a species of estate
at will, for fealty is due from a copy-
holder, though respited as of course
on his admittance; ibid.
(r) Co. Litt. 270 b.

CHAPTER VI.

OF ESTATES UPON CONDITION.

[BESIDES the several divisions of estates, in point of interest, which we have considered in the three preceding chapters, there is also another species still remaining, which is called an estate upon condition (a); being such whose existence depends upon the happening or not happening of some uncertain event, whereby the estate may be either originally created, or enlarged, or finally defeated (b). And these conditional estates have been reserved till last, because they are indeed more properly qualifications of other estates, than a distinct species of themselves; seeing that any quantity of interest, a fee, a freehold, or a term of years, may depend upon these provisional restrictions. Estates then upon condition, thus understood, are of two sorts: 1. Estates upon condition implied: 2. Estates upon condition expressed: under which last may be included, 3, Estates held in vadio gage, or pledge: 4. Estates by statute merchant or statute staple: 5. Estates held by elegit.

I. Estates upon condition implied in law, are where a grant of an estate has a condition annexed to it inseparably from its essence and constitution, although no condition be expressed in words. As if a grant be made to a man of an office generally, without adding other words; the law tacitly annexes hereto a secret condition, that the

(a) As to this estate, vide Co. Litt. 201 a-237 a.

(b) Co. Litt. 201 a; Lord Stafford's 8 Rep. 73 b.

case,

[grantee shall duly execute his office (c), on breach of which condition it is lawful for the grantor, or his heirs, to oust him, and grant it to another person (d). Franchises also, being regal privileges in the hands of a subject, are held to be granted on the same condition of making a proper use of them; and therefore they may be lost and forfeited, like offices, either by abuse or by neglect (e).

Upon the same principle proceed all the forfeitures which are given by law, of life estates and others, for any acts done by the tenant himself, that are incompatible with the estate which he holds. As if tenants for life or

years enfeoff a stranger in fee simple: this is, by the common law, as we have seen, [a forfeiture of their several estates; being a breach of the condition which the law annexes thereto, viz. that they shall not attempt to create a greater estate than they themselves are entitled to(ƒ).

II. An estate on condition expressed in the grant itself,] is of two kinds. The first is [where an estate is granted, either in fee simple or otherwise, with an express qualification annexed, whereby the estate granted shall either commence, be enlarged, or be defeated, upon performance or breach of such qualification or condition (g), which is described in the books as a condition in deed (h). [These conditions are therefore either precedent or subsequent. Precedent are such as must happen or be performed before the estate can vest or be enlarged: subsequent are such, by the failure or non-performance of which an estate already vested may be defeated.] Thus, [if a man grant to his lessee for years, that upon payment of a hundred marks