But while the conveyance by livery of seisin, is utterly incapable of being applied to the creation of a freehold in futuro, it is easily adapted to that of a freehold in remainder. For the method in this case, is to make the livery of seisin to the tenant of the particular estate; [which is effectual as a conveyance also to him in remainder, since his estate and that of the particular tenant are one and the same estate in law. Thus a man may convey to A. in tail, remainder to B. in fee; and the same livery, which conveys the estate tail to A. will also pass the remainder expectant thereon to B. The whole estate passes at once from the grantor to the grantees, and the remainder-man is seised of his remainder, at the same time that the particular tenant is seised of his estate tail (ƒ).] And the case is the same where the particular estate is for years only. [As where one leases to A. for three years, with remainder to B. in fee, and makes livery to A. Here the livery indeed is not necessary for the lessee himself, because he has but a chattel; but it enures to the benefit of him in remainder, and the freehold is immediately created thereby and vested in B. during the continuance of A.'s term of years (g). With respect to the creation of a remainder, the following rules may be laid down, which, though they amount to no more than an exposition of the different properties expressed in the very definition of this kind of estate, may yet serve to convey to the mind of the student a more precise idea of its character :— [1. There must necessarily be some particular estate precedent to the estate in remainder (h).] The necessity of this, is sufficiently indicated by the term itself; for remainder is a relative expression, and implies that some part of the thing is previously disposed of. And [as no remainder can be created without such a precedent particular estate, therefore the particular estate is said to (f) Co. Litt. 143 a. (g) Id. 49 a, 49 b. (h) Fearne, by Butler, 390, 9th edit. [support the remainder. But a lease at will is not held to be such a particular estate as will support a remainder over (i). For an estate at will is of a nature so slender and precarious that it is not to be looked upon as a portion of the inheritance; and a portion must first be taken out of it, in order to constitute a remainder.] [2. A second rule to be observed is this: that the remainder must commence or pass out of the grantor, at the time of the creation of the particular estate (k).] As where it is proposed to give to A. an estate for life, with remainder to B. in fee: here B.'s remainder in fee must pass from the grantor, at the same time with A.'s life. estate in possession; for if the estate ulterior to that for life, continues in the grantor, it is a reversion, and no remainder; and B. can take only by subsequent grant of this reversion. 3. It may also be laid down, as a third rule respecting the creation of remainders, that they must be limited to take effect in possession immediately upon the determination of the particular estate (l), and neither later nor earlier. Thus if A. be tenant for life, remainder to B. in tail, here B.'s remainder is to take effect in possession immediately upon A.'s death; or if A. and B. be tenants for their joint lives, remainder to the survivor in fee, here, on the death of either, the remainder comes into possession instantly; and therefore both these are good remainders. But if the future estate is to take effect in possession at any period later than the determination of the first, as if an estate be granted to A. during his life, and upon his death and one day after, to B. and his heirs, this is no remainder (m). So the future estate will be no remainder if it is not to await the proper and regular determination of the first, but to take effect in defeasance or abridgment of it: (i) Lord Stafford's case, 8 Rep. 75a. (k) Plow. 25; Litt. s. 721; Bac. Ab. Remainder (C). (1) 1 Sand. Us. 148, 2d ed.; Chud leigh's case, 1 Rep. 135 a; Boraston's case, 3 Rep. 21 a; Co. Litt. 298 a. (m) Colthirst v. Pejushin, Plowd. 25; Fearne, by Butler, 307, 9th ed. as where an estate is limited to A. for life; but if B. pays him a certain sum of money, then immediately to B. and his heirs (n). But though a remainder cannot be limited to take effect in possession, until the particular estate regularly determines, yet eventually it may do so before that period. Thus if the particular estate determine by act of law (as by forfeiture) before its natural expiration, the remainder limited upon it will come into immediate possession, and is not required to wait until the expiration of the period originally assigned. A remainder, when created, is subject to many of the rules already laid down with respect to reversions. Thus in the case of a freehold remainder, the remainder-man is seised as of fee (or freehold), but not in his demesne, unless the particular estate be a term of years, when seisin in demesne may be properly alleged. So dower or curtesy may be claimed of a remainder in fee, if expectant on an estate. for years, but not if expectant on a freehold; and thus, too, the wrongful feoffment of the tenant for life or years, where the estate immediately expectant is not by way of reversion but remainder, displaces the remainder, and is a forfeiture to the remainder-man, as in the other case to the reversioner; and the union of an estate in remainder with the particular estate on which it is expectant, will produce a merger in the same cases (in general (o)) and on the same principles, as if it were an estate in reversion. Hitherto our remarks have related to remainders generally considered; but it is now time to turn our attention to the distinction which exists between remainders, as being either vested or contingent. Vested remainders or remainders executed [are where the estate is invariably fixed to remain to a determinate person after the particular estate is spent. As if A. be tenant for twenty years, (n) 1 Sand. Us. 143, 149; Sugd. Gilb. 152 n.; Fearne, by Butler, 261, 9th ed. (0) As to the merger of a term of years in another term of years, where the second is in remainder, vide Bac. Leases, &c. (S) 2. [remainder to B. in fee, here B.'s is a vested remainder.] Contingent or executory remainders are those limited either to an uncertain person, or upon an uncertain event (p); that is, to a person not in esse or not ascertained (q); or upon an event which may not happen at all, or not happen until after the particular estate is determined (r). The first kind, or those limited to an uncertain person, may be exemplified by a limitation to A. for life, remainder to the first son of B., who has then no son born (s), for here the person is not in esse; or to A. and B. for their joint lives, remainder to the survivor in fee, for here the person is not ascertained (t). The second kind, or those limited on an uncertain event, by a lease to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, and if B. die before A., then the remainder to C. for life (u); for B.'s dying before A. is an event that may never happen; or by a lease to A. for life, and after the death of B. the lands to remain to another in fee (x); for though it is certain that B. must die, his death may not happen until after A.'s life estate shall be determined. It is to be observed, however, that if there be no uncertainty in the person or event upon which the remainder itself is limited, the mere uncertainty whether it (p) Blackstone says that they are where the remainder is "limited to "take effect either to a dubious and "uncertain person, or on a dubious "and uncertain event; so that the particular estate may chance to be "determined, and the remainder never "take effect." Et vide Roberts v. Roberts, 2 Bulst. 130; 2 Bl. Com. 169. Mr. Fearne enumerates four different kinds of contingent remainders: "1st. Where the remainder "depends entirely upon a contingent "determination of the preceding estate "itself. 2dly. Where the contingency " on which the remainder is to take "effect is independent of the deter"mination of the preceding estate. 3dly. Where the condition upon person to whom the remainder is "limited is not yet ascertained, or not "yet in being." (Fearne, by Butler, 5, 9th ed.) But all these may be reduced to two, as in the text, with the aid of the distinctions there stated, as to the nature of the uncertainty to which the person or event may be subject. (9) Fearne, by Butler, 9, 9th ed. will ever take effect in possession, is not sufficient to give it the character of a contingent remainder (y). Thus if there be a lease to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, here the limitation of the remainder is to a person in being, and ascertained, and the event on which it is limited is certain, viz. the determination of A.'s life estate: it is therefore a vested, and not a contingent, remainder (2); and yet it may possibly never take effect in possession; because B. may die before A. We may also remark, as an inference from what has been premised, that an estate limited to an existing and ascertained person upon the determination of an estate tail (as where there is a limitation to A. in tail, remainder to B. in fee,) is a vested and not a contingent remainder; for the failure of A.'s issue on which it is expectant, is not an uncertain event in contemplation of law, but one which will sooner or later happen, and determine the particular estate. The case falls, therefore, within the definition of a vested remainder; the estate limited to B. being one that is invariably fixed to remain to a determinate person after the particular estate is spent. It was laid down in a former place that no remainder can be limited after a fee simple (a). A contingent remainder may, however, be limited in substitution for another contingent remainder in fee simple (b); as if land be given to A. for life, and if he have a son, then to that son in fee, and if he have no son, then to B. in fee. This has been sometimes called a contingency with a double aspect (c), and it is no violation of the rule in question; for such remainders as these are concurrent, and not consecutive; and though both are remainders on the particular estate, they are not remainders on each other (d). (y) Fearne, by Butler, 216, 9th ed. (2) Ibid.; vide Doe v. Scudamore, 2 Bos. & Pul. 296. (a) Vide sup. p. 295. (b) Fearne, by Butler, 373, 9th ed.; Loddington v. Kime, 1 Lord Ray. 208; Keene v. Dickson, 3 T. R. 495; (d) Though a contingent remainder in fee is a disposition (subject to the |