unpleasant extremity, explanations are necessary; and the matter is of so high an importance, that the Executive Council did not think it proper to trust it to the ever-unacknowledged ministry of a secret agent; hence they have deemed it to be expedient in all points to charge citizen Chauvelin with it, though he be no otherwise acknowledged before his Britannic majesty, than on the late king's account. The opinion of the Executive Council was justified on this occasion, by the manner in which our negociations were at the same time transacted in Spain, where citizen Bourgoing was exactly in the same situation as citizen Chauvelin at London; yet this did not prevent the ministers of his Catholic majesty from treating with him for a convention of neutrality, the declaration of which is to be exchanged at Paris, between the minister for foreign affairs, and the Spanish chargé d'affaires. We will even add, that the prime minister of his Catholic majesty, in writing officially on this subject to citizen Bourgoing, did not forget to give him his title of Minister Plenipotentiary from France. The example of a power of the first order, such as Spain, induced the Executive Council to hope to find the same facility at London. However, the Executive Council freely own, that this de mand of negociations has not all the rigour of diplomatic form, and that citizen Chauvelin is not regularly enough authorized. In order to remove this obstacle entirely, to discard every reproach of having stopped, by the mere want of formality, a negociation, on the success of which the tranquillity of two great nations is depending, they have taken the resolution of sending letters of credence to citizen Chauvelin, which would furnish him with the means of treating in all the severity of diplomatic forms.

Now, to come to the three points which can alone make an object of difficulty at the court of London, the Executive Council observe, respecting the first, which is the decree of the 19th of November, that we have not been properly understood by the ministry of his Britannic majesty, when they accuse us of having given an explanation which announces to the seditious of all nations what are the cases in which they may previously count on the support and assistance of France. Nothing could be more foreign than this reproach to the sentiments of the National Convention, and to the explanation we have given of them; and we did not think that it were possible we should be charged with the open design of favouring the seditious, at the very moment when we declare, that it would be wronging the National Convention if they were charged with the project of protecting insurrections, and with the commotions that may break out in any corner of a state, of joining the ringleaders, and of thus making the cause of a few private individuals that of the French nation.

We have said, and we desire to repeat it, that the decree of the 19th of November

could not have any application, unless to the single case in which the general will of a nation, clearly and unequivocally expressed, should call the French nation to its assistance and fraternity. Scdition can certainly never be construed into the general will. These two ideas mutually repel each other, since a sedition is not and cannot be any other than the movement of a small number against the nation at large; and this movement would cease to be seditious, provided all the members of a society should at once rise, either to correct their government, or to change its form in toto, or for any other object.

The Dutch were assuredly not seditious, when they formed the generous resolution of shaking off the yoke of Spain; and when the general will of that nation called for the assistance of France, it was not reputed a crime in Henry the Fourth, or in Elizabeth of England, to have listened to them. The knowledge of the general will is the only basis of the transactions of nations with each other; and we can only treat with any government whatever on this principle, that such a government is deemed the organ of the general will of the nation governed.

Thus, when by this natural interpretation the decree of the 19th of November is reduced to what it truly implies, it will be found, that it announces nothing more than an act of the general will, and that beyond any doubt, and so effectually founded in right, that it was scarcely worth the trouble to express it. On this account, the Executive Council thinks that the evidence of this right might perhaps have been dispensed with by the National Convention, and did not deserve to be made the object of a particular decree. But with the interpretation which precedes it, it cannot give uneasiness to any nation whatever.

It appears that the ministers of his Britannic majesty have nothing to object to the declaration relative to Holland, since the single observation made by them on that subject belongs to the discussion of the Scheldt. It is this last point, therefore, to which we are confined.

We repeat it, this question is in itself of little moment. The ministers of Great Britain conclude that it only serves to prove more clearly, that it was brought forward merely for the purpose of insulting the allies of England, &c. We shall reply with much less warmth and prejudice, that this question is absolutely indifferent to England; that it is of little importance to Holland; but that it is extremely important to the Belgians. That it is indiffe rent to England it is not necessary to prove; and its trivial import to Holland is evinced by this fact, that the productions of the Belgians pass equally by the canals which terminate at Ostend. Its great importance to the Belgians is proved by the numerous advantages the port of Antwerp presents to them. 'Tis therefore on account of this importance, 'tis to restore to the Belgians the enjoyment of so

deprive themselves of the navigation of the Scheldt, France will not oppose it; she will know how to respect their independence, even in their errors.

precious a right, and not to offend any one, that France has declared herself ready to support them in the exercise of so legitimate a right.

After so frank a declaration, which mani fests such a sincere desire of peace, his Britannic majesty's ministers ought not to have any doubts with regard to the intentions of

If we consult public law, we shall say that it ought to be nothing but the application of the principles of the general rights of nations to the particular circumstances in which nations are placed with regard to each other; insomuch that every particular treaty repugnant to such principles can only be regarded as the work of violence. We moreover add, in relation to the Scheldt, that this treaty was concluded without the participation of the Belgians. The emperor, to secure the possession of the Low Countries, sacrificed, without scruple, the most inviolable of rights. Master of those fine provinces, he governed them, as Europe has seen, with the rod of absolute despotism, respected only those of their privileges which it imported him to preserve, and destroyed or perpetually struggled against the rest. France enters into war with the house of Austria, expels it from the Low Countries, and calls back to freedom those people whom the court of Vienna had devoted to slavery; their chains are broken; they re-enter into all the rights which the house of Austria had taken away from them. How can that which they possessed with respect to the Scheldt be excepted, particularly when that right is only of importance to those who are deprived of it? For what remains, France has too good a political creed to be afraid to avow the principles of it. The executive council declares, not with a view of yielding to some expressions of threatening language, but solely to render homage to truth, that the French republic does not intend to erect itself into an universal arbitrator of the treaties which bind nations. She will know how to respect other governments, as she will take care to make her own respected. She does not wish to impose laws upon any one, and wil net suffer any one to impose laws upon her. She has renounced, and again renounces, every conquest; and her occupation of the Low Countries shall only continue during the war, and the time which may be necessary to the Belgians to insure and consolidate their liberty; after which let them be independent and happy, France will find her recompence in their felicity.

When that nation shall be found in the full enjoyment of liberty, when its general will can lawfully declare itself without shackles, then if England and Holland still attach some importance to the opening of the Scheldt, they may put the affair into a direct negociation with Belgia. If the Belgians, by any motive whatever, consent to

cient, and if we are still obliged to hear a haughty language; if hostile preparations are continued in the English ports; after having exhausted every means to preserve peace, we will prepare for war, with a sense of the justice of our cause, and of our efforts to avoid this extremity: we will fight the English, whom we esteem, with regret, but we will fight them without fear.

A copy conformable to the original.

(Signed) F. CHAUVELIN.

No. XXV.-LETTER from Lord Grenville to M. Chauvelin, dated Whitehall, January 18th, 1793.

I have examined, Sir, with the greatest attention, the paper which you delivered to me on the 13th of this month. I cannot conceal from you that I have found nothing satisfactory in the result of that note. The explanations it contains are confined nearly to the same points to which I have already given a detailed answer. The declaration of an intention to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries is there renewed. No mention is made either of disavowal or reparation for the offensive measures stated in my letter to you of the 31st December. And the claim is still reserved of a right to annul treaties, and to violate the rights of our allies; there being only offered on this subject an illusory negociation, which is referred, as well as the evacuation of the Low Countries by the French armies, to the indefinite period, not only of the conclusion of the war, but also of the consolidation of what is called the liberty of the Belgic people.

It is added, that if these explanations should appear to us unsatisfactory; if you are again obliged to hear the language of haughtiness; if hostile preparations are continued in the ports of England, after having exhausted every thing which could lead to peace, you will dispose yourselves to war.

If this notification, or that which related to the treaty of commerce, had been made to me in a regular and official form, I should have found myself obliged to answer, that a threat of declaring war against England, because she thinks proper to augment her forces, as well as a declaration of breaking a solemn treaty, because England has adopted, for her own security, precautions of the same nature as those which are already established in France, could neither of them be considered in any other light than that of new offences, which, while they subsisted, would preclude all negociation.

In this form of unofficial communication, I feel that it may still be allowed me to tell you, without haughtiness, but also without disguise, that these explanations are not judged satisfactory, and that all the reasons which have occasioned our preparations still subsist. I have already made these reasons known to you by my letter of the 31st December, in which I have stated, in precise terms, what dispositions could alone contribute to the maintenance of peace and good understanding. I do not see that it can be useful towards the object of conciliation to continue to discuss with you, in this form, a few separate points, on which I have already made known to you our sentiments. If you had any explanations to give me in the same form, embracing all the objects which I mentioned to you in my letter of the 31st December, and all the circumstances of the present crisis with respect to England, to its allies, and to the general system of Europe, I should still willingly lend myself to it.

I feel, however, that in answer to what you say on the subject of our preparations, I ought to inform you, in the most express terms, that, under the existing circumstances, all those measures will be persisted in here which shall be judged expedient for enabling us to protect the security, the tranquillity, and the rights of this country, to support those of our allies, and to oppose a barrier to views of ambition and aggrandisement always dangerous to the rest of Europe; but which become much more so when they are supported by the propagation of principles destructive of all order and society. I have the honour to be, &c.

GRENVILLE.

No. XXVI.-LETTER from M. Chauvelin to Lord Grenville, dated Portman-square, 17th January, 1793, Second year of the French Republic.

My lord;-I have the honour of addressing myself to you, to beg of you to grant me an interview. I shall proceed to explain the motives of this request, and you will judge them to be such as will not admit of delay. I shall first desire of you, my lord, security for my communications with the French government. Whatever may be the character which you acknowledge me to possess, you have at least never doubted of the authenticity of the declarations which I have transmitted to you in the name of the French nation. I will therefore propose to you, my lord, either absolutely to refuse hearing me, or to give orders for my couriers to be respected, and the secrecy of my letters, as well of those sent as received, to be observed.

I will then, my lord, require to be informed whether his Britannic majesty will receive my letters of credence, and if he be satisfied with the declarations contained in the paper which I had the honour of transmitting to your lordship last Sunday. I have not only

received fresh orders from the Executive Council of France, to insist upon a speedy and definitive answer; but there is yet another reason which urgently presses for the decision of his Britannic majesty.-I have learnt this day, that the law relating to foreigners obliges them to make their declaration within ten days after the 10th of January; and in case of any foreigner, who is amenable to this law, neglecting or refusing to make such declaration, the magistrates of this country would be authorized not only to require him to do so, but even to imprison him. I know, my lord, and all those who understand the rights of nations know it also, that I cannot be implicated in this law: the avowed and acknowledged organ of a government which executes laws to which twenty-five millions of men have submitted themselves, my person is, and ought to be, sacred; and even under my diplomatic character, my lord, I could not be ranked among the general common class of foreigners, until his Britannic majesty should have definitively rejected the letters of credence which he knows I have received for him. But had I been implicated in this law, I owe to the government of a free and powerful nation, which I represent, this declaration, that it would be impossible for me to submit to it; and that all the persecutions which_it might please his Britannic majesty to make me endure, would fall upon the French nation, in whose cause and for whose sake it would be my glory to suffer.

After this candid declaration, my lord, thinking myself entitled to an equal sincerity on your side, I will desire of you, in the conversation which I solicit, to inform me, what is the conduct which his Britannic majesty's and with respect to the persons who compose ministers mean to hold with respect to me, my household, in consequence of the law I have the honour to against foreigners. be, &c.

F. CHAUVELIN. No. XXVII.-LETTER from Lord Grenville to M. Chauvelin, dated Whitehall, 20th January, 1793.

I have received, Sir, your letter of the 17th of this month. I have already informed you, that his majesty has reserved to himself the right of deciding, according as he shall think fit, on the two questions, of acknowledging a new form of government in France, and of receiving a minister accredited on the part of any other authority in France than that of his most Christian majesty. And in answer to the demand which you now make to me, whether his majesty will receive your new letters of credence? I am to inform you, that his majesty does not think fit, under the present circumstances, to receive those letters.→ The demand which you make to me is equally incompatible with the form of an official communication, and with the character in which you have hitherto been acknowledged, of mi