Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

power over his volitions and actions is, that he is capable of carrying on wisely and prudently a system of conduct, which he has before conceived in his mind, and resolved to prosecute. If man has the wisdom to plan a course of conduct, and the power over his own actions which is necessary to carry it into execution, he is a free agent. Should it be said, that this course of determinations was produced by motives, it may be replied, that motives have not understanding to conceive a plan, and intend its execution. We must therefore go back beyond motives to some intelligent being who had the power of arranging those motives, and applying them in their proper order and season, so as to bring about the end.

The principles which I have now stated are admitted alike by the advocates of the two great doctrines maintained concerning the freedom of the will. They decidedly differ, however, as to the following characteristics (as some call them) of free agency:-namely, a power in the mind by which it can control and determine its own volitions; liberty of indifference, or that state of the mind in which it is said to be in equilibrio; and contingence. The arguments by which the Necessarians attempt to prove that these are not properties of free agency will be noticed in a following chapter.

448

CHAPTER XII.

NECESSARIANS DISTINGUISHED INTO TWO CLASSES.

Ir should be carefully noticed, that there are two classes of Necessarians, whose opinions are extremely different. The doctrines of the one are avowedly at variance with man's accountableness, and are, consequently, most dangerous to society; while those of the other, however inconsistent they may appear to some with moral agency, are believed, by those who hold them most perfectly, to harmonize with this principle.

Of the former description are those who maintain that man acts by a physical necessity; and that as he only does what he is physically impelled to do, his conduct is neither virtuous nor vicious. They cannot accuse themselves of doing wrong, because they only yield to an irresistible impulse. They have nothing to do with confession, repentance, and pardon, since these are adapted to a fallacious view of things.

There are others, usually denominated Necessarians, who view this doctrine with abhorrence; and who, though they are classed with Necessarians, in consequence of their holding moral agency and accountableness to be compatible with moral necessity, or, as I would call it, moral certainty, contend that every accountable creature has physical power to the extent of his accountableness. Whether their opinions

on this subject are right or wrong, they are, at least, perfectly harmless; as will appear from the brief review which I shall take of them in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XIII.

A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE NECESSARIANS.

WHAT is the immediate cause of determining the mind's volition? To this question it is answered, on the one hand, that it is solely the self-determining power residing in the mind itself; on the other, it is affirmed, that the will is influenced in its determinations by what appears to be the greatest apparent good. But it is admitted that the apparent good may be different from the real good. The question returns, What is the cause of this difference? Few will deny that this is owing, generally, to the state of the mind. The elections of the will are always according to the existing dispositions of the heart. A mind in a pure and holy state perceives the objects that are presented to its moral choice as they really are, and its volitions will be accordingly. A mind fallen from its original rectitude will see objects as different from what they really are, in proportion to its deviation from the line of purity and holiness.

The question, What is the cause of the mind's departure from a sinless state? leads us directly to the origin of moral evil; but it would divert us too much from our subject to enter on that inquiry at present.

I may, however, remark, that some persons, from the acknowledged fact of much evil existing, and the high improbability that God should determine those volitions that are wicked, or, rather, the highest certainty that he could not, and perceiving no medium, between ascribing all determinations to God or to ourselves, have strenuously maintained, that the mind is determined by its own power, or by its own sovereign pleasure. According to them, we become criminal and wretched by a wrong choice.

A recent divine maintains, that man is possessed of liberty, but that this liberty is the cause of the mind's deviation from the line of perfect rectitude; and that the immediate cause of its maintaining its rectitude is, necessity. According to this hypothesis, all natural and moral good flows from the decree of God, which decree renders it necessary. He contends that the evils of imperfection and of sin are not of God, more than a shadow is an effect of the light, or a falsehood of truth; and that a tendency to defection is inseparably connected with the nature of every contingent existence; that this tendency to defection exists physically as to being, and morally as to well-being; and that this tendency, unless counteracted by the immediate agency of the Deity, gives rise in the creature to physical and moral evil. According to this author, the inclination in an intelligent being, to exercise his liberty between good and evil, indicates a deviation already begun from the line of perfect rectitude. A being perfectly pure wishes not the knowledge of evil as well as of good; and, according to this divine, the moment he begins to entertain such wishes, that is, to

exercise his liberty, he brings sin and ruin on himself. He conceives that it derogates not from his moral agency to believe that he is influenced in willing and in doing good by the over-ruling agency of God.

On this theory of the late Dr. Williams I shall here offer no opinion; but proceed to notice some of the arguments adduced, to prove that the characteristics of moral agency formerly alluded to, and which constitute the chief ground of difference in the inquiry concerning the freedom of the human will, are unfounded.

In the first place, it is said, that human liberty respects only the actions that are subsequent to volition; and that power over the determinations of the will is inconceivable, and involves a contradiction. To say that the will is possessed of a self-determining power is absurd, since will is an attribute of mind, and, as such, cannot possess power of any kind. kind. What can we mean by the will but the mind itself, acting in a particular way; or, by a power over its determinations, but the control which the mind is capable of exercising over its affections. That which has the power of volition is the man, and not the power of volition itself. He that has the liberty of doing according to his will, is the agent who is possessed of the will; and not that which he is possessed of. We say with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly; but not that the bird's power of flying has a power and liberty of flying.

If the will determines itself, either the will is active in determining its volitions, or it is not. If active, then the determination is an act of the will, and so

« ZurückWeiter »