CHAP. VII.

Of the consideration which the speaker ought to have of the Hearers, as Men in general.

RHETORIC, as was observed already, not only considers the subject, but also the hearers and the speaker*. The hearers must be considered in a twofold view, as men in general, and as such men in particular.

As men in general, it must be allowed there are certain principles in our nature, which, when properly addressed and managed, give no inconsiderable aid to reason in promoting belief. Nor is it just to conclude from this concession, as some have hastily done, that oratory may be defined, 'The

art of deception.' The use of such helps will be found, on a stricter examination, to be in most cases quite legitimate, and even necessary, if we would give reason herself that influence which is certainly her due. In order to evince the truth considered by itself, conclusive arguments alone are requisite; but in order to convince me by these arguments, it is moreover requisite that they be understood, that they be attended to, that they be remembered by me; and in order to persuade me by them, to

any particular action or conduct, it is further requisite, that by interesting me in the subject, they may, as it were, be felt. It is not therefore the understanding alone that is here concerned. If the ora tor would prove successful, it is necessary that he engage in his service all these different powers of the mind, the imagination, the memory, and the passions. These are not the supplanters of reason, or even rivals in her sway; they are her handmaids, by whose ministry she is enabled to usher truth into the heart, and procure it there a favourable reception. As handmaids they are liable to be seduced by sophistry in the garb of reason, and some times are made ignorantly to lend their aid in the introduction of falsehood. But their service is not on this account to be dispensed with; there is even a necessity of employing it founded in our nature. Our eyes and hands and feet will give us the same assistance in doing mischief as in doing good; but it would not therefore be better for the world, that all mankind were blind and lame. Arms are not to be laid aside by honest men, because carried by assassins and ruffians; they are to be used the rather for this very reason. Nor are those mental powers of which eloquence so much avails herself, like the the art of war or other human arts, perfectly indifferent to good and evil, and only beneficial as they are rightly employed. On the contrary,

they are by nature, as will perhaps appear afterwards, more friendly to truth than to falsehood, and more easily retained in the cause of virtue, than in that of vice *.

SECTION I.

Men considered as endowed with Understanding.

BUT to descend to particulars; the first thing to be studied by the speaker is, that his arguments may be understood. If they be unintelligible,

the cause must be either in the sense or in the expression. It lies in the sense, if the mediums of

*"Notandum est enim, affectus ipsos ad bonum apparens semper ferri, atque hac ex parte aliquid habere cum ratione com66 mune: verum illud interest; quod affectus intuentur præcipue bonum in præsentia; ratio prospiciens in longum, etiam futurum, et “in summa. Ideoque cum quæ in præsentia obversentur, impleant "phantasiam fortius, succumbit plerumque ratio et subjugatur. Sed 66 postquam eloquentiâ et suasionum vi effectum 'sit, ut futura et "remota constituantur et conspiciantur tanquam præsentia, tum de“mum abeunte in partes rationis phantasiâ, ratio fit superior. Con"cludamus igitur, non deberi magis vitio verti Rhetoricæ, quod de❝teriorem partem cohonestare sciat ; quam Dialectica, quod sophis"mata concinnare doceat. Quis enim nescit, contrariorum eandem "rationem esse, licet usu opponantur? De Aug. Sci. L. vi. c. 3. Τα υποκείμενα πραγματα εχ όμοιως εχει, αλλ' αιει τ' ἀλήθη ες τα βελτιω τη φύσει ευσυλλογισότερα τα πιθανώτερα, ὡς ἁπλως ειπείν. SL δ' ότι μεγάλα βλαψειεν αν χρωμενος άδικως τη τοιαυτη δυναμει των λόγων, τετο τε κοινον ἔσι καλα παντων τῶν αγαθων, πλην αρετης, κα μαλιςα κατα τῶν χρησιμωταίων, όσον ισχυς, υγιειας, πλετε σρατηγίας τοις τοις Ye ἀν τις ωφελήσειε τα μέγιτα, χρωμενο δικαίως και βλαψειεν adixas. Arist. Rhet. L. i. c. l.

proof be such as the hearers are unacquainted with; that is, if the ideas introduced be either without the sphere of their knowledge, or too abstract for their apprehension and habits of thinking. It lies in the sense likewise, if the train of reasoning (though no unusual ideas should be introduced) be longer, or more complex, or more intricate, than they are accustomed to. But as the fitness of the arguments in these respects, depends on the capacity, education, and attainments of the hearers, which in different orders of men are different, this properly belongs to the consideration which the speaker ought to have of his audience, not as men in general, but as such men in particular. The obscurity which ariseth from the expression will come in course to be considered in the sequel.

SECTION II.

Men considered as endowed with Imagination.

THE second thing requisite is that his reasoning be attended to; for this purpose the imagination must be engaged. Attention is prerequisite to every effect of speaking, and without some gratification in hearing, there will be no attention, at least of any continuance. Those qualities in ideas. which principally gratify the fancy, are vivacity, beauty, sublimity, novelty. Nothing contributes

more to vivacity than striking resemblances in the imagery, which convey, besides, an additional pleasure of their own.

But there is still a further end to be served by pleasing the imagination, than that of awakening and preserving the attention, however important this purpose alone ought to be accounted. I will not say with a late subtile metaphysician *, that "Belief consisteth in the liveliness of our ideas." That this doctrine is erroneous, it would be quite foreign to my purpose to attempt here to evince †. Thus much however is indubitable, that belief commonly enlivens our ideas; and that lively ideas have a stronger influence than faint ideas to induce belief. But so far are these two from being coincident, that even this connexion between them, though common, is not necessary. Vivacity of ideas is not always accompanied with faith, nor is faith always able to produce vivacity. The ideas raised in my mind by the Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles, or the Lear of Shakespeare, are incomparably more lively than those excited by a cold but faithful historiographer. Yet I may give full credit to the languid narrative of the latter, though I believe not a single sentence in those tragedies. If a proof

*The author of, A Treatise of Human Nature, in 3 vols.

+ If one is desirous to see a refutation of this principle, let him.comsult Reid's Inquiry, Ch. ii. Sect. 5.