AFTERNOON SESSION 2 O:CLOCK The meeting was called to order on the veranda of the Casino at the Broadmoor, at 2 o'clock. Secretary Wadley read the report of the Treasurer. The report was referred to the Executive Committee. (For the report, see the Appendix.) The report of the Committee on Grievances was read by C. C. Butler. (For the report, see the Appendix.) On motion, the report was received, ordered spread on the minutes, and adopted, and the recommendations concurred in. The Committee on Legal Biography submitted its report, which was received and approved. (For the report, see the Appendix.) The report of the Committee on Local Bar Associations was read by the Secretary. (For the report, see the Appendix.) John H. Denison: I move that the report be accepted and adopted, and that the suggestions in it be referred back to the Committee with directions from the Association to seek to procure the organization of further local associations, and the continuance of the committee. This motion was seconded and duly carried. Report of the Committee on Law Reform was here called for. Harry N. Haynes: Your Committee on Law Reform has been somewhat scattered in its territorial location, and the entire committee has not had a meeting. The report which I will read, so far as I know, meets the approval of the majority of the committee. Two of the members of the committee have not been consulted. I had hoped to see them here, but Mr. Voorhees and Mr. Sabin, unfortunately, are not present. The Committee on Law Reform submits the following report: (For the report, see the Appendix.) President Hall: What will you do with that very interesting and important report? Mr. Manly: In order that it may be open for debate, I move that the report be received, adopted, and the recommendations concurred in. The motion was duly seconded. John H. Denison: I am not sure whether I fully understood all the recommendations with reference to the simplification of procedure, especially that referred to as suggested by Mr. Churchill concerning the setting of cases, but, if I understood it correctly, it recommended a statute on that subject. I mean by that a statute regulating the setting of cases. I should oppose such a statute, for the very good reasons stated in the address of the President this morning, that those are matters which, in all cases, should be left to the courts themselves, to be regulated by rule. The District Court of Denver can not be regulated as to the setting of cases in the same way that the District Courts of the outside counties. can be regulated. And neither can the outside courts be regulated in the same way that the Denver courts are. But if that were not so, the reasons given in the address of the President this morning are sufficient to show that that is a matter that should be regulated by rule and not by statute. Harry N. Haynes: It is the view of the committee that a statute such as is recommended at the suggestion of Mr. Churchill, providing for making up trial calendar in advance of a new term of court, will remove doubt existing concerning the power of the court on first day of term under a rule of court only to set cases for trial without notice. Moreover, a statute where applicable, ensures stricter enforcement than ordinarily results from mere rules of court which many judges are prone to ignore. So far as the rules of court recommended at the suggestion of Mr. Churchill are concerned, to be transmitted to the several judges, the report shows that the same are intended to be mere general suggestions, subject to adaptation in detail to the varied conditions in different counties. Harry C. Riddle: Will you permit an inquiry? To what statute do you refer? You say the statute requires notice to be given of the setting of cases? Harry N. Haynes: There is a provision of the Code that you must give notice. Harry C. Riddle: That is by rule of court. The statute makes no provision for giving notice after the case is at issue, does it? Harry N. Haynes: That has been a debatable question. It is intended to cover the point and thus make it specific. There have been, as I remember it, one or two Supreme Court decisions which cast some little doubt on the subject of formal notices. James W. McCreery: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Association: I listened with a great deal of interest to this very able report. has been prepared in a very painstaking manner, yet I am constrained to say that I disagree with it almost from beginning to end. Instead of simplifying procedure, it seems to me it makes the conditions more complex than those under which we labor at the present time. Let us consider the matter of terms for pleading over after demurrer or motion, as the case may be. The proposition advanced assumes that the person who files the complaint draws it in just the form that it ought to be. It assumes that the man who commences the suit is the good lawyer, and the courts, as they are disposed to maintain a complaint, even if it is incomplete or imperfect, will say it states a cause of action and will maintain the complaint. In cases of that kind, oftentimes-and I presume it is within the experience of every man here— we file demurrers, when we know absolutely from previous rulings of the court, perhaps, that the demurrer will be overruled. We desire, however, to perfect our record, with a view of appeal, and there is nobody more particular about his record, from the beginning of a case to the end of it, than is my friend, the Chairman of the Committee. Perhaps, in more cases than otherwise that is the reason we file demurrers, to complete our record, to get the matter fully before the court, as we wish. And yet we must be penalized $25. Harry N. Haynes: James W. McCreery: Not less than $5.00 nor more than $25.00-I must be penalized for taking the precaution of getting my record right from the beginning. That is all wrong. John H. Denison: It is worth the $25! (Laughter.) James W. McCreery: One of the objects of this proposed modification of procedure is to save costs, as I understand. In the very beginning of the report that was stated to be one of the abuses which it was aimed to correct, the burden of costs. But there I am confronted with a very heavy penalty for filing a demurrer in perfect good faith and for a perfectly legitimate purpose, even though I may know that the court now sitting and hearing will overrule the demurrer promptly. But I have a perfectly legitimate reason for filing it outside of that, as I have pointed out. That is wrong. I will not go into a full discussion of this report-it would take a long time to go over the report-but I want to mention two or three things. The putting of all cases on the docket in advance of the term, and the court then required, by rule or by statute, as the case may be, to go through the docket on the first day of the term and set every case that is on the trial docket for trial for a day certain. Before the gentleman got through, he spoke of our courts having perhaps a hundred cases on the trial docket; the court must go through and set all those cases necessarily, because they are on the trial docket, for a day certain, for one hundred days or two hundred days in advance, and the chances are that the first case tried takes more time than would be allowed on the first setting of the docket, and every subsequent case would be thrown out of its position on the trial docket. Then every attorney who had one of those subsequent cases in the first setting would have to dance attendance on the court for a month, instead of going ahead at the day appointed. That would make the practice of the law a very burdensome business. It would be too burdensome for me. And besides that there are costs coming in; you must subpoena your witnesses in advance, in order to have them there. You have your witnesses there on the |