This goodly array of names promises more than the work fulfils, for the authors are spoken of superficially, and except Locke and Kant, with a brevity which is provoking. Either these men should not have been introduced at all, or they should have been more satisfactorily handled.

The second part, that is the real business of the work, then opens. The first chapter begins with James and John Mill, is followed up with Paley, Bentham, the socialists and phrenologists, who are succeeded by Cabanis, Garat, Volney, Tracy, Broussais, and Comte. By this arrangement John Mill, now living, a younger man than his contemporary Comte, is historically made to precede Paley and Cabanis! and Comte again is made to precede Stewart, Brown, Fichte, Hegel, owing to the happy arrangement which makes Mr. Morell exhaust all the names of the sensational school before proceeding to the idealists.

The second chapter being devoted to the Idealists, exhibits this arrangement, Stewart, Brown, Young, Abercrombie, Sir J. Mackintosh (who died before Abercrombie wrote), and Sir W. Hamilton, now living. Then follow Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, and contemporary writers; to them succeed Dr. Payne, Isaac Taylor, B. Smart, Professor Whewell, Carlyle, &c., who are followed by De Maistre, La Mennais, Ballanche, Baron d'Eckstein, Kant, and Schulz. The confusion becomes "worse confounded" as we proceed. Coleridge, Taylor, Greaves, Sewell, Wardlaw, St. Simon (!), Fourier, Jacobi, Bouterwek, Krug, Fries, Calker, Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Novalis, Schubert, Baader; then Laromiguière, Royer-Collard, Biran, Cousin, Jouffroy, Damiron, B. Constant, De Staël, and De Gerando.

Such a pellmell of dates and systems-such a violation of all historical order, was never seen before. He tells us in the preface that his desire was not to be original, but useful he thought it would be

"Of very important service to one who should be anxious to travel, as I had done, over the broad field of European metaphysics. How eagerly should I have welcomed such a directory myself while I was toiling to get some clear light upon the conflicting systems of Germany --

how highly should I have valued a simple and definite statement of the founda. tion principle of the different schoolshow intensely rejoiced in a work which would shew the relations of the one to the other! It was with a view, therefore, of supplying the want which I had myself felt, that I began the sketch which has now swelled into these two volumes; and it is in the hope that it may afford to others what I myself vairly sought for, that it is now ushered, with all its imperfections, before the public."

If he imagines any one will be "intensely rejoiced" in the exhibition he has given of the "relations of the one system to the other," he has a very singular conception of relations. No one can possibly gain any idea of the "relations of systems" from his work; he has taken care to destroy all trace of such. It is very evident that each system of philosophy must be very greatly influenced, directly or indirectly, by all the speculations which have preceded it. No man can escape the influences of his age. He inherits a vast amount of that which the labour of generations has stored up. But Mr. Morell writes as if a man were wholly isolated from such influences, as if, so long as he belonged to one class of thinkers, according to an arbitrary classification, he was only to be considered as a sensationalist absolute, and not the "heir of time." Mr. Morell will perhaps imagine he has answered this objection when he says that the arrangement he adopts is a "philosophical" arrangement. Perhaps so; it is not, however, "historical." Nay, more. Granting him his arrangement of schools, it is at once apparent that his subdivision is ludicrously imperfect. For, let us suppose him to have undertaken the history of each school by itself, the "sensationalists" of France ought to have preceded the "sensationalists" of England, simply because they did so in time, and because, also, they notoriously and avowedly influenced the English school.

We will not assert that Mr. Morell framed this arrangement with a consciousness of its somewhat better disguising his wholesale obligations to the manuals; but we must say that it has the look of it. Had edi the French writers formed one distinct portion of his book, it would have been too apparent that Damiron

was the only source of his knowledge. Be this as it may, we cannot hesitate in condemning his arrangement as very unphilosophical, very unhistorical, and destructive of that utility which the work otherwise might have had.

We repeat it, the work is a bulky review article, a plethora of twaddle. It has not information precise enough to be very useful, and it has no philosophical acumen. A vast amount of philosophical talk is doubtless to be found there-talk about great names and potent systems; but when we add that, in the first volume of of this "History," there are only eight references to authorities, and those to such works as Brougham's Natural Theology, Herschel's Discourse, Whewell's Inductive Sciences, Christian Reformer, &c., and not one to the manuals to which he is so indebted, the reader will estimate the amount of research employed, and the means afforded him of following the authors' footsteps.

And now, reader, for a specimen of Mr. Morell's criticism. Many curious specimens might be selected, but it would seem, perhaps, invidious to dwell upon his blunders upon foreign systems since he is so little acquainted with them. Therefore, to give him the benefit of his own countryman, we will select Locke; firstly, because Locke he must have read at college, and is as plain and intelligible as ever philosopher can hope to be; secondly, because the critic before alluded to, who admired Mr. Morell's extensive learning and grasp of mind, quoted the passage as a specimen. We believe, then, we are acting with tender consideration in quoting this critique on Locke :

"Now, in order to point out where and in what manner Locke departed from the principles which he at first laid down for his guidance, let us for a moment consider what the new organum of philosophy, as derived from Bacon and employed by Locke himself, really is. It contains, as we have shewn, two movements: first, the observation of phenomena just as Nature gives them; and then the explication and recomposition of them, in such a manner as to bring to view general laws. Now fidelity to these principles imperatively demanded of Locke, when he applied them to the subject of his essay, to commence by a thorough induction of all the phenomena

of the human understanding, as they are given to us in our own consciousness; having done this, he might safely have proceeded either to classify them, or to draw any conclusions that seemed warranted. But what plan does he actually pursue? Instead of commencing by such a careful induction of facts, he makes in the outset no induction at all; he determines neither the number nor the characteristics of our ideas, but starts at once by searching for their origin. This was the point in which he first of all departed from the true method of philosophising, and which led him on many occasions, as we shall soon see, into no little inaccuracy and confusion.

"There is not, in fact, a single branch of inductive science in the world which would give correct results, if pursued in the same manner as Locke pursued the study of mind. Suppose, for example, that the illustrious astronomer of the same age had investigated the architecture of the heavens on the same principle as Locke did the construction and powers of the human understanding; suppose that, instead of commencing by a diligent induction of the phenomena of the heavens, he had first applied all his energies to search into the origin of those few which presented themselves confusedly and in the aggregate to his mind,-what, we ask, would have been the result? He must, in that case, necessarily have formed hypotheses unwarranted, or, at least, unproved by facts; and, instead of casting a lustre upon his name, his age, and his country, would have, probably, taken his rank amongst those ingenious speculators, who had before him beaten the path to oblivion. The method which Newton followed taught him, before he sought the origin of any phenomena, to examine what they really were, what characteristics they bore, and how many of a similar nature might be ranged side by side to throw light upon each other. He knew that to neglect one fact, or to imagine one, were both fatal errors in in. ductive science, which might lead us in the end far away from the truth.

"Precisely of this nature, however, was Locke's first deviation from the true Baconian principles. In commencing by seeking for the origin of our ideas he was actually investigating the source of phenomena, of which he had not yet determined either the character or the number. The result was that his conclusion upon this question was necessarily a guess; or, if we would name it philosophically, an hypothesis which might be true or might not. Instead of classifying all our ideas as they exist in their present mature condition in the mind, and then drawing from such an extensive and complete view of the case, a valid conclusion as to their primitive state or origin, he drew

his inference before he had examined his data, and thus made his observations square to his theory, instead of drawing his theory from the observations. To lay a firm basis for mental science by such a method was and ever must be absolutely impossible; for when once we have an hypothesis ready formed we soon become too prejudiced in its favour to judge impartially of any facts which may seem to militate against it; and even, if all the facts we may happen to observe do agree with it, yet, until we have made a systematic induction of them all, and brought them one by one to the proper test, it is impossible to regard our position as proved beyond the danger of being overturned by some hitherto unheeded phenomenon. But it is not an uncertain position which will do for the corner-stone of a whole system of philosophy."

On this we first beg leave to remark, that it is taken from Victor Cousin, and, secondly, that it is a blind and blundering confusion of what Locke professed to do with what the Eclectics think he ought to have done. Cousin and Mr. Morell think that Locke's departure from his own principles was his seeking after the origin of our ideas. Let them open Locke. He tells us, as plainly as language can tell it, that his design was "To inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge." "I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever you please to call them, which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished by them." Can any thing be more positive? Now it certainly may be a question whether Locke gave the true explanation of this origin, but not as to whether he sought the origin in accordance with his own principles. We may have ideas in our mind which came there in a very different way from that explained by him. This is now generally admitted to be the fact: Locke's psychology is indeed incomplete. But to say that he departed from his own principles in the endeavour to ascertain that origin-to say that he should have classified all ideas as he found them to exist in the mind, and from that classification have deduced their origin, is a double blunder; first, a miscon

ception of Locke's purpose, secondly, an ignoratio elenchi.

We will endeavour briefly to exonerate Locke from this charge of unscientific investigation, which is foolishly compared to Newton's investigation. Newton had before him certain permanent and unvarying facts; from these he was to deduce the laws of their operation. But Locke had before him not simply a problem in mechanics, but a problem in physiology; and a different investigation was forced upon him. The mind, as he well knew, lires and grows. It is not in its maturity what it was in its infancy. The developement of its faculties changes it no less than the body is changed in the progress from the cradle to the grave. The mind of the babe is no more to be compared with the mind of the man than its body is. Locke knew very well that if he would ascertain the "original certainty and extent of our knowledge" he must investigate the minds of infants and savages, as well as of civilised and matured men; just as if he had desired to know the real nature of the body he would have been led to examine it at various stages of its growth and progress. He would find in the bones of a child more cartilage than in those of a man, whence he would conclude that men were not born with bones such as they possessed at maturity. In like manner, he found that in children's minds there was an absence of certain abstract ideas that their ideas were mostly concrete; whence he concluded that men are not born with abstract ideas; and, pushing the inquiry farther, that men are not born with any innate ideas at all. This conclusion seems perfectly absurd to M. Cousin and Mr. Morell; and certainly, upon their psychological methods, it could never have been arrived at.

For

what do they but examine the bones of a grown man and declare that they find them free from cartilage; ergo (the facts being duly collected to establish this), in human osteology cartilage plays no part? And if you point out the cartilage in the infant they reply, "Very true; but, you see, this becomes bone at last. The germ of bone is there, give it

but time to grow." Time to grow? Yes, and lime to assimilate. But this is the very point asserted by your adversaries. What was really Locke's purpose? To prove that we were not born with any innate ideas. To which the conceptualists reply. "Ah! but these ideas are necessarily evolved by experience; but, not being given in experience, are antecedent and superior to it." In other words, the question being, Are our bones such at our birth as they hereafter become? M. Cousin would reply, "With proper food, in time, the infant bones necessarily become the same as those of a man; yet, inasmuch as lime itself is not bone, we must say that the bone existed antecedently to it; ergo, we are born with bones similar to those of maturity!" Such is the difference between these antagonists. The miserable ignoratio elenchi which the comparison with Newton exhibits will now be apparent. Newton's object was to discover laws, not an origin; Locke's object was to discover an origin and not laws. With Newton the data were precise and unvarying; with Locke they were to be sought, and due notice taken of their variations. Ilad Newton's object been to inquire into the constitution of the heavenly bodies instead of into the laws of their operation, he would have been forced to proceed upon Locke's plan, and, like recent speculators, to have deduced from known facts the nebulous origin of the planets.

This extraordinary blunder, this total misconception of the aims and means of scientific procedure, arises partly, no doubt, from ignorance of the scientific methods, but partly also from identifying the method of the Scotch psychologists with that far truer and more efficient method opened by Locke. Reid and Stewart accept the mental phenomena as they present themselves, and, classifying them (in no very scientific manner), proceed to furnish an inventory of the mind. What results they attained thereby let their own disciples proclaim. Enough for our present purpose that their method was not that of Locke, as their object was not his object.

After reading Mr. Morell's eulogy

of Newton's method, which he opposes in such triumph to that of Locke, after hearing him lay such stress upon the plain observation of facts and deduction from them of general rules, conceive our surprise at finding him dismiss Ferguson in this summary manner :

"Ferguson at once cuts off the approach to a higher metaphysical science by laying down as the very principle of all science, that human knowledge is con. fined entirely to the observation of facts, and to the deduction from them of general rules. In doing so, he overlooks altogether the great truth, that there are conceptions by which alone the facts are intelligible, and axioms upon which the very process of induction rests; while in holding up experience as marking the limits of our philosophical knowledge, he forgets that there are laws of thought which are assuredly prior to all experience."

We had thought of exposing the blunders Mr. Morell commits respecting Bacon and Descartes; but as they are all derived from Victor Cousin, who certainly never understood, if indeed he ever read Bacon, we may let them pass, for our readers must be getting weary of this subject.

To sum up our verdict on this history we may say that a weaker book has seldom come before us; but yet, in spite of its wholesale "appropriations," numerous errors, and general feebleness, it may not be without its use to such as are entirely ignorant on the subject, and cannot read French and German. Of Mr. Morell himself we would fain speak kindly. He seems a very amiable, gentlespirited person, fond of wandering in the groves of Academe, a mild antagonist and a willing admirer. There is, indeed, such a soft, quiet tone spread over the whole work, that one wonders how so moral a gentleman could be so deficient in literary conscience. As this is a coup-d'essai, we trust no subsequent work will betray the same laxity. Cheap fame" may be had, indeed, by any one who cares to purchase it; but it runs terrible risk of being found out and becoming dear infamy. "Nam gloriam, honorem bonus et ignarus æque sibi exoptant: sed ille verâ viâ nititur; huic quia bonæ artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit.”*

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