given why he should be free from the errors which we immediately detect in others 3.

2. Another subject of great delicacy and difficulty which meets us at the entrance of religion, is the degree of human liberty, and its compatibility with divine foreknowledge and government. Our reason tells us that we must be

8 Dr. Hey has made a similar observation respecting the character and the miracles of Jesus. He speaks of the danger of detection when any one undertakes to draw a character of a superior; and the greater the superiority, the greater the difficulty.. "The absurdities," he adds, "into which a fictitious narrative would run, would be greater still, if the character feigned was something more than human: here the author's taste for prodigies would display itself: his deity would be sure to do nothing that a mere man could do, nothing that would be dictated by plain common sense.' With respect to miracles, he observes: "It seems undeniable, that if the Evangelists had invented the account of the miracles they related, those miracles would have been as idle and foolish as those related by some of the ancient fathers; for the fathers had many of them much better education than the Evangelists. Inventing miracles is treading on dangerous ground; I know no one, who would not in such an attempt, even with the greatest improvements the world has ever had, run into absurd pomp and ostentation, something remote from human nature and common sense."-Lectures, B. I. ch. xiii. sect. x.

free, "else how shall God judge the world?” Yet our reason assures us likewise, that the governor of the world could not maintain his supremacy, if the agency of man were subject to no restraint, or bounded by no limits. Again, we are conscious of freedom, conscious that we do of our own voluntary determination choose or refuse the evil or the good; while, at the same time, our experience convinces us of the necessity of some preventing, co-operating, and assisting influence, both to convert the soul and to keep it within the course prescribed.

These conflicting principles have embarrassed, in all ages, both those who studied natural religion, and those who believed revelation. The wisest of these have been satisfied with concluding, that there is some mode in which the prescience and sovereignty of God can be reconciled with human liberty, though we may be unable to perceive and trace it. This, I think, is the ground on which those reasoners, who are best capable of discoursing on such a subject, commonly take their stand;

for, although we find many who profess Calvinism, or call themselves predestinarians, they are but few who actually and deliberately maintain, with Edwards, on the one hand, that election is absolute and grace irresistible, or, on the other, that unbelief is morally necessary to any man.

I would not wish to assume a disputed point, when I proceed to allege that the Christian Scriptures coincide with this moderate and reasonable conclusion. But surely we are warranted in deducing this result from the acknowledged fact, that both the advocates for necessity, and the advocates for human liberty appeal to these Christian Scriptures for support to their opposite opinions. Now this is exactly what might be looked for, if our understanding and experience have really conducted us to the right conclusion: that is, if God does exert an influence over the human heart, and yet such influence is not inconsistent with human liberty. In that case, we should find certain passages addressing mankind, as if they were solely concerned in determining their own character: we

should find other passages implying, that the preparation and direction of the heart is from above. Why need the exact degree be defined in which divine influence or human nature operates? Probably it would not be possible to explain it; certainly it would not be necessary. The purpose would be best answered by leaving it indefinite. Man knows enough to make him humble, if he knows that of himself he can do nothing; and enough to make him diligent, if he is admonished to "watch," and "keep him self," and "work out his salvation."

Mohammed, on the contrary, has split upon this rock also. "The sixth great point of fate, which the Mohammedans are taught by the Koran to believe, is God's absolute decree and predestination, both of good and evil. For the orthodox doctrine is, that whatever hath or -shall come to pass in this world, whether it be good or whether it be bad, proceedeth entirely from the divine will, and is irrevocably fixed and recorded from all eternity in the preserved table: God having secretly predetermined not

only the adverse and prosperous fortune of every person in this world in the most minute particulars, but also his faith or infidelity; his obedience or disobedience, and consequently his everlasting happiness after death: which fate or predestination it is not possible by any foresight or wisdom to avoid"."

This affords a remarkable contrast to the moderation and reserve of the Christian writings on this intricate subject. While Jesus gives us clearly to understand that faith in himself as Saviour of the world, and the life resulting from it, depend upon heavenly influence; he never allows us to suppose that this influence is arbitrarily bestowed: he distinctly affirms, that it is refused to none; that none are excluded from it; that every one who asks receives, and every one who seeks shall find.

How different is this from the language of the Koran: "As for unbelievers, it will be equal

9 Sale's Prelim. Discourse, p. 101,

-P