she could repose with confidence; a peace which should bring with it the renewal of safe communication, of commercial inter course, of reciprocal trust and benefit; or, whether she should only rest on her arms in hourly expectation of being again summoned to war, in defence of her dearest interests? And did the honourable gentleman suppose, that such a peace as was alone worth having, as alone could be maintained without all the cost, and more than all the dangers of war, could rest on any other grounds than the restoration of such an order of things in France as might ensure the return of credit and stability to the government, and of security for property and of honest industry, and commercial morality amongst the people? The expression, therefore, of an anxious wish for the re-establishment of the French monarchy, did not appear to him to be either so dangerous in the effect that it might produce in France, nor so extravagant with respect to the interests of Great Britain. But here the honourable gentleman had taken a very extraordinary ground indeed; and in his zeal to combat the idea of restoring monarchy, he had far outstepped the rule of forbearance, with respect to the past conduct of France, which he had prescribed for those who differed from him upon the question, and had gone into a laboured dissertation on the dangers with which monarchy, in the House of Bourbon, had in old times threatened this country and all Europe. The mind of that man must be singularly 1 constituted, who, living in such times as the present, could overlook all the dangers actually impending, and all those a which had recently overwhelmed the world from the profligate aggressions and tyranny of republican France; and who yet trembled with apprehension at the recollection of the ambitious projects of Louis 14th. The honourable gentleman had referred to the projects of that monarch, which had threatened the independence of Europe, a hundred years ago; and had spoken of them in a tone which showed, that he thought the independence of Europe matter of concern, and the overweening ambition of France, matter of dread to this country: and he had spoken, in the manner which it deserved, of the stand made by king William in defence of the liberties of this country, and of Europe. He agreed with the honourable gentleman, in looking back with pride to that distinguished period of English history. He found in that period much to praise; wisdom and firmness in our councils, skill in our generals, valour in our armies: but he found nothing that delighted him more, or that he would rather recommend to the admiration of the honourable gentleman, and his friends, than the cordial support afforded by the Commons of Great Britain to their sovereign, in the prosecution of a war, carried on for the true interests, the ho nour and safety of their country, against the rapacious, insolent, and domineering ambition of France.[Mr. Canning here read an address of the House of Comnions to king William, in the year 1696, the 8th year of the war, containing expres sions of their determination to support his majesty to the utmost," till he should be able to obtain by war, a safe and honour. able peace."*] This example, was, in deed, he said, worthy of being quoted, and worthy of all the praise bestowed upon the exertions of that reign, by the honourable gentleman. But, after all, what did the honourable gentleman gain to his ar gument, by referring to the days of Louis 14th, and by citing the precedent of the noble struggle maintained by this country, during the reign of king William, and his successor, against France? He reminded us, it was true, what were the efforts, and what were the sacrifices which the people of England had thought themselves bound to make in that con test. What was the inference? Why, that in a contest, incalculably more arduous, and involving in its issue interests infinitely more important, we should wake, at least, equal efforts, and display, at least, equal perseverance? What was at any time the specific danger from the ambition of Louis 14th, that called forth all the energy of this country? First, generally, his unprincipled ambition; latterly, war was car ried on against him because there was a danger that France would acquire an influence, in the councils of Spain. An influence in the councils of Spain! Would to God such were the only danger that we had now, to apprehend! Yet for this, the hon. gentleman thought war was justly and nobly carried on! And now--Oh! now, there was no reason, no pretext for carrying on war at all; no danger now of French influence in Spain !-France intermeddle in the concerns of Spain now! France command the treasures, dispose of the fleets, direct the policy of the * See Vol. 5, p. 996. Spanish monarchy now! Not she; she did | If, however, there were no reason for carrying on the war, it was not, therefore, the less necessary to inquire what possibility there was of making, and what chance for securing peace. And this was a question which unfortunately could not be agitated, without touching upon the second topic, which the hon. gentleman had prohibited, the personal character and conduct of the first consul of the French republic. On what ground, indeed, the honourable gentleman had thought himself warranted in precluding such a discussion, it was not easy to conceive. The discussion was not of our seeking. The first consul voluntarily forced himself upon our observation, in a way that made it impossible for us to turn aside, and to pretend not to see him. He told us plainly, that if we had to do with France at all, we must have to do with him, as concentering in his own person all that was stable, all that was authoritative, all that was responsible to foreign countries, in the new government of France. understood to what degree the temper of France was captious and irritable, in respect to the character of its existing, or expired governments; otherwise the hon. gentleman, with that delicacy which he professed to wish to observe, and that fear of offending, which dictated his warning to that side of the House, would not have indulged himself in many parts of the speech which he had made that day. For did the hon. gentleman imagine, that it was to their government of the present hour, or to that which Buonaparte had destroyed to erect this, or to that upon the ruins of which he had erected that which he had now destroyed, or to any one of the nine or ten immediately preceding governments, that France limited the privilege and sacredness, which made it almost blasphemy to condemn their proceedings? No such thing; the hon. gentleman, himself, in reviling the ambi tion of the ancient government of France, had as much sinned against the majesty of the French nation, as if he had presumed to traduce Brissot, or Robespierre, or any of the latter tyrants who swept them to the scaffold, and were swept by their successors to the same scaffold in their turn. The hon. gentleman has, indeed, committed his country most rashly, by such intemperate language against Louis 14th. Does he not know, or had he forgotten at the moment, that Rome was sacked and pillaged the other day, to avenge the manes of Vercengetoris (or some such name), a king of the Gauls, who flourished some time before Louis If 14th, and whom Julius Cæsar was disco. vered to have aggrieved in a scandalous manner; and that to reclaim the trophies won from the Burgundians, was one of the pretexts alleged for the invasion of Swit zerland? Let not, therefore, the hon. gentleman imagine, that the lapse of neat a century, since the time of Louis 14th, would bar France, in her own good time, from avenging the wrongs done to his memory. France is not so forgetful, nul lum tempus occurrit. Her vengeance might sleep, indeed; but opportunity would awaken it, and could we be caught as fairly off our guard, as weak and as inviting as Rome or as Switzerland (which might readily be the case if we would ac cept the counsel of the honourable gen tleman opposite, and make peace, or ar mistice, without examination or delay) the honourable gentleman's abuse of Louis 14th, would be as good a plea as any other, there be power in France, it is in me; if there be faith in France, in me must you look for it; if you make peace with France, my word, my character, my personal dispositions must be your sole, and sufficient security." Such was the language of the first consul to his majesty and his government; and when, in compliance with such an invitation, it was proposed to examine the foundation and validity of the only security thus offered to us, the hon. gentleman stepped in, and told the House, that such an examination was highly indecorous and unnecessary. It might give offence, it seemed, to the first consul; it was personal and indelicate; and he knew not what other terms of fine feeling were applied to it. Now, first, as to the fear of giving offence to the first consul himself, or to France: the hon. gentleman appeared to have very ill for declaring war against us, and pursuing it to our ruin. our Forced, however, as we were, at all hazards, to sift pretty narrowly the character and conduct of the present ruler of France, it was some satisfaction that we had before-hand so much of what was the only testimony to be relied on, that of "experience and the evidence of E facts," to guide our judgment, and aid decision upon the subject. Mr. Canning said, he would not follow his right hon. friend through the detail of Buonaparte's conduct with regard to foreign states, in every transaction in which he had been engaged, from his first appearance at the head of the army of Italy, to his late disgraceful flight from the army of Egypt. The facts were before the House; they were fresh in every body's recollection. To these facts what testimony was opposed: first, the declaration of Buonaparté himself, swearing by himself, no doubt, as was the custom and the right of so transcendant a personage; and secondly, his minister, M. Talleyrand. Talleyrand, to be sure, was an admirable witness to character in matter of negotiation. Talleyrand certainly had proved, that he knew well how to make a treaty; but he seemed to be quite lost in admiration of Buonaparte's talents for keeping one. This was a thing of which he had no idea. "The old Directory and I," said Talleyrand," know pretty well how to set about concluding a treaty; there was the American treaty, which all the world knows; the Portugal treaty too; both were managed cleverly enough in the making; but as to the keeping them, that is quite another thing. There, indeed, we had no skill, nor talent: but here, here is a man, who keeps treaties as well as makes them; a perfect phænomenon in the diplomacy of France." Such was the testimony that Talleyrand could furnish on behalf of Buonaparte. For that which Buonaparté could give in favour of himself, it fortunately was not necessary to rest on conjecture or inference. Fortunately the chance of war had thrown into our hands documents, of which the authenticity could not be ques tioned, and in which the characters of fraud, perjury, treachery, and deliberate breach of faith, were written in Buonaparte's own hand against himself. He alluded to the letters lately intercepted on their passage from Egypt. And here he must take some notice of the remarks of the hon. gentleman, and of those which he understood had been made in other places on the publication of those letters. It had been argued, that there was something base and illi beral, something contrary to the rights of mitigated war, and to the practice of civilized nations, in publishing letters of an enemy, which the chance of war had thrown into our hands. He would not enter into the theory of this question, because, being a question of practical policy, it could be much better settled by a reference to the conduct of the most civilized countries in their best times. He apprehended the hon. gentlemen opposite would not dispute the claim of their own country (for it was the conduct of Great Britain that he meant to quote) to the qualification which he had bestowed upon it: and he was confident that they would agree with him as to his character of the particular period of our history, to which he referred; for it was one which they were themselves extremely fond of citing with expressions of high commendation, for reasons sufficiently obvious; it was the year 1759, the period of the glorious war carried on under the administration of the father of his right hon. friend who sat beside him (Mr. Pitt). The paper which he held in his hand, contained an extract from the London Gazette, from Tuesday, August 14, to Saturday, August 18, 1759. "Among the papers which were taken at Detmold on the 5th instant, by his majesty's light troops, an original letter is found from the marshal duc de Belleisle, to marshal Contades, dated, Versailles, July 23rd, 1759, in which there is the following passage." Then followed a passage extracted from the letter, with which it was not necessary to trouble the House. In the London Gazette Extraordinary, of Friday, October 12, in the same year, were published some intercepted letters taken in the East Indies, which were still more in point, from the substance of their contents, as well as from the precedent of publication. The first was, "Translation of an Intercepted Letter from M. Lally to M. Lerpit." Another was, "Translation of a Letter intercepted going from Pondicherry to Masulipatam:" In which there were some passages so curious, when compared with those letters from Egypt, which have lately been published, that he believed the House would forgive 5th year (some time in January, 1797), would settle this point, as completely as the London Gazette had settled the other. parté, Commander in Chief of the Army of Italy, to the Executive Directory. Verona, 1 Pluviose, 5th year. Citizens Directors; You will find enclosed some intercepted letters, which are extremely interesting; as you will see in them the obstinate bad faith of the court of Rome." Then followed the publication at length of a letter from the cardinal secretary of state at Rome, to M. Albani (the nun cio) at Vienna; and the House would remember that Rome was not then actu ally at war with the French republic, And this was the man entitled to peculiar delicacy, against whom the just rights of war ought not to be enforced! him, if he took up a few minutes of their time in reading a part of it to them; it was as follows: "Shall I mention to you our unfortunate expedition to Tanjore?" Copy of a Letter from General BuonaBad news is interesting, but painful to the writer... The army has suffered greatly from hunger, thirst, watching, and fatigue. . . . Poor French! What a situation are we in! What projects we thought ourselves capable of executing, and how are we disappointed! ... I pity our general. He must be extremely embarrassed, notwithstanding his extensive genius, without money or fleet; his troops very discontented, his reputation declining.... What will become of us?.... They say M. de Busi is coming. Let him make haste. Let him bring men, and especially money, without which he will only increase our misery. The country, being ruined, scarce affords us any provisions . . . . . . Above twenty officers of different corps have gone on board the fleet. It M. Lally had given permission to depart, the greatest part of them would have embarked: so greatly are these gentlemen disgusted with their situation!" .. Would not any person who heard this, without being told from whence it came, be persuaded that it was, in fact one of the late interceptions from Egypt; when, at least as much as at Pondicherry in 1759, the army have reason to be "disgusted with their situation." . . . . . Was there any longer any doubt as to the strict precedented propriety of availing ourselves of every information of such a sort, which came into our power? Or would a stand now be made (it was very possible) that against France, and especially against Buonaparté himself, such an advantage was ungenerous? Such, perhaps, might be the argument; for he had heard that in another place it had been gravely declared, that the publisher of Buonaparte's letters must have a worse heart than the writer of them. These were harsh words; but when he looked a little farther, and found the same orator arguing, that the scarcity proceeded from the war, he had felt that an imputation, however severe, from such an arguer was not much to be regarded. But, in truth, did Buonaparté merit for the goodness of his heart, a special exemption from the fair advantages arising out of the fortune of war? Had he so conducted himself as to deserve such a compliment? Perhaps an extract which he would take the liberty to read from the Moniteur of the 19th Pluviose, But in defiance of the proofs arising out of Buonaparte's own testimony, thus fortunately produced against himself, and in contradiction to all that had been stated by his right hon. friend, the hon. gentleman thought it sufficient to maintain that Buonaparté had not in point of fact violated the treaty of Campo Formio. Undoubtedly, the hon. gentleman was right. Buonaparté did not violate the treaty of Campo Formio. But what then? What ground for triumph did the hon. gentleman find in this concession? The hon. gentleman must have mistaken his right hon. friend's meaning, if he sup posed that the whole of his argument was liable to be overthrown by the pro duction of a single instance of a treaty not broken by Buonaparte. If, indeed, his right hon. friend had asserted that France had never broken a treaty with out Buonaparté; if the tenor of his ar gument had been that Buonaparté was a necessary ingredient in every breach of treaty; then, to be sure, to find one which had been broken by France without his agency, might be matter of high controversial triumph. But his right hon. friend had asserted no such thing. He had merely asserted that Buonaparte had never kept a treaty on his part; and that France on her's had left none unviolated; but that she had employed Buonaparté to violate them all, that she had been so poor in resources as to be able to find but one instrument for such complicated and multiplied acts of wickedness, it had never entered into his right hon. friend's head to assert.He was, however, very glad that the hon. gentleman had re called the attention of the House to the treaty of Campo Formio; because, though not affording an instance of breach of treaty on the part of Buonaparte, it was much more material to be considered as affording the instance to which Buonaparté himself referred with so much con fidence, of the dispositions already manifested by him, not for peace simply, but for a general pacification. The first consul, in his letter to his majesty, had declared, that his majesty "could only see in this overture his personal desire to contribute for the second time, to a general pacification." Talleyrand, in his reply to lord Grenville's note, had insisted upon the same topic, and the hon. gentleman on the other side, who took all that Buonaparté and Talleyrand said for gospel, had not been slow in expressing his persua sion, that it was for a general pacification that treaty was now proposed. Now, when a man talked of doing a thing for the second time, he luckily gave some clue for finding his real meaning; for as much as to form some idea how he would do it in the second time, it was only necessary to look back, and see how he had done it the first. In this point of view the treaty of Campo Formio did indeed afford an admirable test of Buonaparte's notions of general pacification. At the time when the treaty of Campos Formio was negociated, the powers still at war with France, beside Austria, were Great Britain, and as the ally of Great Britain, Portugal The preliminaries of Leoben were signed by Buonaparté, in April 1797 The treaty of Campo Formio, founded on these preliminaries (he would not here11 distract the attention of the House by noticing the wide departure in sthe treaty from the preliminaries signed at Leobeny nor by remarking on the plea by which that departure was defended on the part of France, namely, that in framing those preliminaries, advantage had been taken of the generosity of the b French republic these were shades of faithlessness scarce worth mentioning), the treaty of Campo Formio was coneluded in the course of the summer. In o the same summer Great Britain proposed oto treat for peace; and the conferences bat Lisle were opened. Portugal also, bebsides that she was included in the probposals of Great Britain, opened a sepaarate treaty for herself. What then was the consequence? Peace made with Austria, England and Portugal, the only [VOL. XXXIV.] remaining powers at war, actually engaged in negotiation; one should have imagined that the work of general pacification would have gone smoothly on; and that Buonaparté, whose interest was paramount in France at that moment, might easily have obtained his heart's de sire. But no the revolution of the 4th of September took place ;-a revolution which, be it remarked, could not be brought about without the consent of Buonaparte, which Barras, then the intimate friend and patron of Buonaparté, planned, which Augereau was sent from Buonaparte's army to Paris to conduct, and therewith ended the negotiations at Lisle, and the treaty with Portugal; the British minister was dismissed, the Portuguese minister imprisoned; and threats of renewed and interminable war, were the only answers made to the persevering offers of new negotiation on the part of this country. Such was the conduct and success of Buonaparte's first fond attempt at general pacification; and lest any doubt should be entertained of his perfect satisfaction in the issue, he shortly after pursued his favourite plan of peace, by conducting an army, destined against the British pos sessions in the East, into Egypt, the ter ritory of a partial and friendly power; and thus both secured the continuance of the war with England, and wantonly added a new enemy to the list of the enemies of France. If such was the state of the transaction to which we were so confidently referred, as containing undoubted proofs of the dispositions avowed by the first consul, and as affording the precedent which he meant to follow in the negotiation now proposed to us-whatever advantage we might have to accuse ourselves of having lost by refusing to listen to his overtures, was it reasonable to suppose, that of all things in the world, we had thrown away an opportunity of general pacification? was it not rather probable, was it not evident, that as, in the former instance, having detached Austria from the coalition, the whole force of France was bent against the interests of this country; so now it was intended merely to make sure of our inactivity by entangling us in negotiation, in order that the undivided efforts of the government of France might be directed against the court of Vienna? It was our turn now to have a truce, while the power of Austria should be exhausted; as Austria had [4 N] |