country again to attempt the recovery of Holland. Another reason is this, that from the very nature of the thing, the instructions must contain much conditional matter. Would it then be wise to expose the plan of our future operations; for that, to a given extent, would be the result of giving up these instructions? of York, on the 19th, offered the Russian general d'Hermann to delay the attack, if he thought his troops were not sufficiently recovered from the fatigues of their voyage; but the general earnestly requested the attack might be made, and did it with a promptitude which reflected the highest honour upon him. This ardour led that general to the field full two hours sooner than the time appointed. The army was, however, completely successful till a late hour in the day. General d'Hermann and his troops were in possession of the village of Bergen, and crowned with victory, till his ardour led him beyond a given point, and turned the fate of the day.— When the attack was made, the French army amounted to 7,000 and the Dutch to 12,000 men; yet, notwithstanding this superiority, our troops fought and beat them with a bravery that did them the highest honour. But French reinforcements continually arriving, the duke of York was advised by general Abercromby, and all the other officers, to accede to an armistice. The officers volunteered their advice (but not till after the 2nd of October), to fall back to the first strong position. The duke yielded to this advice; and in so doing, consulted the dictates of reason and humanity. And here, once for all, allow me to advert to those various parts of the hon. gentleman's speech, in which he bestowed encomiums on the character of the commander in chief. Upon those parts of his speech, I need say nothing more, than that every thing he has said, is richly deserved by the object of his praise. I am sure I say so with equal sincerity; and certainly with more means of judging than the hon. gentleman possesses. I shall now proceed to show you that this expedition was wisely undertaken. Sir Ralph Abercromby sailed for the Helder on the 13th of August. A more prosperous commencement was never known. On the 14th came on the most extraordinary hurricane that ever blew from the heavens. It was impossible to land a single sailor on any part of the coast of Holland, and this continued, with the exception of one day, until the 27th. What was the effect of all this? It enabled the enemy to know where we must land, and their troops came in shoals to oppose us: 7,000 men were collected to oppose us; so that sir Ralph could not land his men to advantage: the ardour of the men, the zeal and gallantry of the commander, which were never excelled on any occasion were put to the severest trial. Without any thing but their muskets and bayonets, they made their landing good; and by it the Dutch fleet was secured. I state these things chiefly to show how easy it is to censure both soldiers and their generals unjustly, upon an event depending on the temper of the elements. The hon. gentleman says, the troops had no horses to draw their waggons. They had no waggons; and could not possibly land them under such circumstances, if they had intended it. But he will recollect, that instantly on their landing they did not want them; for all they had immediately to do was to secure a Sir, the hon. gentleman has said a great landing place, and a port of communica-deal of the disgrace which attached to the tion. Till the 1st of September, sir Ralph end of the expedition; but, for my part, had to consider what position he should I can see nothing disgraceful in it. Where, take, when reinforcements were to arrive. I ask, is the disgrace? I will venture to There is no complaint against sir Ralph say, that no nation was ever more struck for the disposition of his army; he judged with the gallantry of our troops, than the wisely. The delay arose from causes which French soldiers themselves who fought no human wisdom could foresee. Had against them. Our army returned home he been able to land when he expected, with as much honour, as they first entered he would not only have struck the bril- Holland. I think the duke of York was liant stroke he did; but, in all probability, perfectly right in signing the convention; have commanded complete success to all nor could he be wrong in giving up 8,000 the objects of the expedition. The same lumber of French troops, from our overwind which prevented our landing on the loaded prisons. He did not recede from coast of Holland, prevented the Russian any one article in which national honour troops from arriving to reinforce ours. was concerned. He resisted with firmThey did not land till the 18th. The duke mess and indignation every proposition for delivering back the fleet. The hon. gentleman has attempted to influence the feelings of the House by dwelling on the blood that has been shed, and the immense treasure expended on the occasion. He has stated that expense to be at six or seven millions; a sum equivalent to the Income tax; but there is no occasion to leave this point to conjecture: the expenditure actually amounted to 1,142,000l.; and computing by debtor and creditor, there can be no objection to it. I have a right to consider the ships that were taken, and to state the reduction for the maintenance of a fleet in the North Seas, to check a Dutch fleet. If you take the value of the Dutch fleet, the decrease of expense in the maintenance of the North Sea fleet, and the saving in the pay of 10,000 seamen voted less than last year, the balance is greatly in our favour. In the article of prisoners, what have we given up? Why 8,000 French troops; in lieu of which we have gained 6,000 Dutch seamen to man our fleets, which, whether they fought under Orange or English colours, would be found a great addition to the strength of our navy. The objects gained by the expedition were, the ships, the reduction of expense, and the great diversion in the French forces, which facilitated the victories of the combined armies. It has been said that the expedition was attended with the loss of 10,000 lives. To remove this impression, will be to state what the loss really was. I will state, in detail, the returns made during the whole of the campaign:-Sick and wounded admitted into the hospitals 4,088; sent home out of these 2,993; the whole, who died, amounted only to 185; and the whole of the killed to 846. Upon a review, therefore, of the whole affair, I must object to all public military criticism on any part of military operations, and I feel it my duty to resist a motion of inquiry, which could not be productive of any actual benefit; and at the same time, might considerably clog and harass the measures of government. Mr. Bouverie thought that an inquiry should be instituted into the causes of the failure of the expedition. After the constitutional force of the country had been demolished to fit it out, it had failed, under circumstances disgraceful to the British name. Was it not the duty of the House to investigate the business, and ascertain whether blame was to be attached to the projectors of the expedi. tion, or to those to whom the execution of it had been entrusted? Mr. Tierney said, that no part of the right hon. gentleman's most extraordinary speech surprised him so much as that in which he objected to an investigation taking place, because it might offend our allies, the Russians. If, before this enterprise was begun, a measure had been proposed which might lead to jealousies being excited between the two nations, the right honourable gentleman might have opposed it with some show of reason. But these jealousies already exist; each party ascribes the failure of the enterprise to the misconduct of the other. An enquiry into the true state of the affair, is the only way to restore cordiality between them. Our brave army have a right to insist upon an inquiry. The Russian general casts the most foul imputations upon them. An enquiry is the only method by which his aspersions can be wiped off, and the faultless conduct of our countrymen displayed to the world. For this glorious expedition, which has neither been disastrous nor expensive, which has been rather lucrative in a commercial point of view, and which has raised our military character, the right hon. gentleman stated that the grounds were threefold. Its first object, was, to gain possession of the Dutch fleet; but this, I believe, was a very subordinate one; secondly, the deliverance of Holland from the yoke of France; and, thirdly, to make a diversion in favour of our allies. A diversion may often be attended with excellent effects, and perhaps this one was of service; but surely there was little merit in saving an Austrian army by the sacrifice of a British one. What are the benefits which resulted to the allies from our landing on the coast of Holland? We are told that it operated at Novi. I wonder it is not said that it was the cause of the capture of Seringapatam. But, Sir, this battle was fought on the 15th of August, and on the 10th of September there was scarcely a French soldier in Holland. General Massena defeated the Austrians when our troops were on the continent; and when the supplies were sent him which had been assisting the Dutch, he was unable to make much greater progress. Thus, out of the three objects proposed by the expedition, one only had been successfully pursued. The fleet we have gained we cannot employ: it surrendered to us only in the hope of can determine, and the House is bound to examine officers, that they may discover the truth: 45,C00 men were six weeks in Holland, and were unable to advance above twenty-five miles. Yet there is nobody to blame! If the duke of Marlborough had commanded the army, its operations would, I believe, have been equally unsuccessful. But whether the duke of York concluded the capitulation from instructions he had received, or of his own accord, he, in my opinion, should have demanded an enquiry. The matter rests between him and and the right hon. gentleman. Ministers refuse an enquiry; he therefore should have insisted upon one. This is the only way in which he can shift the disgrace from himself and the gallant officers who served under him, to those upon whom it ought to lie. The capitulation fixes an indelible stain upon the national character. A king's son, commanding 40,000 men capitulated to a French general who had only 31,000. We owe it to our sovereign, and we owe it to our constituents to inquire strictly into the causes of this unheard of disgrace. soon serving under the stadtholder; and the sailors testified the utmost dissatisfaction on being brought to this country in the manner in which they were. The right hon. gentleman does not go quite so far as to say that we delivered Holland, but he contends that ministers had sufficient reason to believe that they would be able to deliver it. We ask what these grounds were which justified the attempt; but the right hon. gentleman shrinks from the inquiry: it would be improper to disclose them; and all that he tells us is, that he is a follower of lord Burleigh, the prime minister of queen Elizabeth. I do not contend that it would not be of advantage to this country that Holland should be rescued from the dominion of France; but I contend that government were not justified in making so arduous an attempt, without being assured of the good will of the natives, and that if they had any such assurances, they did not avail themselves of them as they ought to have done. What objection can there be to lay before us the favourable intelligence they had from Holland, if any such existed. If we were invited to the Helder, we were soon shown that we have nothing to expect from the Dutch, and ought instantly to have given up the enterprise. If we were invited to other parts of the coast, what did we do at the Helder? Let ministers justify themselves if they can, by producing the documents upon which their conduct was founded. On the 22nd of August, sir Ralph Abercromby, with 10,000 men, got possession of the Helder. On the 27th, he was reinforced by General Don's detachment, which placed him at the head of 15,000 men. Is it not strange that 15,000 men headed by an able general, and going by invitation, should think it imprudent to advance? If the Dutch were well af fected, why did they not instantly declare themselves? No French troops were in Holland to keep them in awe. Yet no one testified the smallest attachment to our cause, and from that moment the enterprise was hopeless. On sir Ralph's account I wish for an enquiry. I am sure it would turn out to his honour. There are questions which he alone can answer. Why did not the duke of York sail at the same time with general Don? Why were all our forces sent to one place; and 43,000 men cooped up in a narrow peninsula, where but few could act at a time? This is a point which only military men Mr. Perceval said, that the material object of the inquiry moved this evening, was, to ascertain if there was any blame imputable for the partial failure of the expedition, and to whom that blame was imputable. It had been conceded, that the object of the expedition was British, that the conduct of our commanders and soldiers had been glorious, and that one great object of the expedition had been gained by the surrender of the Dutch fleet. An hon. gentleman had said, that if the expedition had terminated with the capture of the Dutch fleet, it would have conferred immortal honour on this country. But if the expedition had terminated here, he thought that it would have brought immortal disgrace on the country. It would have been a swindling trick, a shameful attempt to cheat the Dutch out of their fleet. The difficulty of an inquiry had been endeavoured to be obviated, by alleging that the business might be conducted in a secret committee; but he doubted much of the secrecy which would be the result of such a plan. He allowed that capitulation, abstractedly considered, was not a very honourable conclusion to a military expedition; but that was a mere abstract consideration. Two of the three grand objects of the expedition were attained; the Dutch fleet was captured; and a powerful diversion was effected in favour of our allies. The third was found not attainable. The consideration then was, how the return of our troops to their own country could be best effected. And the expedient that had been adopted for this purpose, appeared to him to be the best that could be adopted. It was not disgraceful, because it was merely an adaptation to circumstances, which were countenanced by the attainment of the other objects of the expedition. Mr. M. A. Taylor hoped that parliament would inquire into the miscarriage of an enterprise, upon which so much of the blood and treasure of the nation had been expended to no effect. To a certain degree it had succeeded; but when an army of above 30,000 men had entered Holland without being able to accomplish any thing like the object they had in view, some satisfactory reason should be adduced for so marked a miscarriage. Mr. Sheridan replied. After which, the House divided: reason for inquiry. It is fit that the public should learn this consolatory fact in some more authentic manner.-But it is said, the expedition succeeded as a di version of the enemy's forces, and in the capture of the Dutch fleet. It must be observed, however, that whatever policy, whatever advantage there may be in cre ating a diversion of the enemy's forces, this forms no justification of a par. ticular expedition, and of a specific attempt. It is quite a different thing to say, that it is good to distract the ene my's attention, and to say that you have done it in the best and most effectual manner. Doubtless the expedition occa. sioned some diversion of the enemy's troops, but not so much as might have been produced had the attempt been made in some other quarter; for our army was opposed, in a great measure, by Batavian forces, who, in all probability, would not have been employed in any other operations. The capture of the Dutch fleet too, we are told, is of itself a sufficient justification of the expedition, and a sufficient reward for our exertions. Whatever may be the value of this cap45 ture, it is not to be admitted as a set-off for the expense and the bloodshed which the enterprise has occasioned. If the expedition was undertaken to rescue Holland from the dominion of France, and to restore the stadtholder to his authority, how can the Dutch fleet be a compensation for the absolute failure of these objects? But the Dutch fleet was in our possession before our army was put in motion to carry into effect the other objects which ministers professed to have principally in view: the Dutch fleet, therefore, was not the cause of prosecut ing the attempt; it can form no justification for our farther attempt in that quarter. We are told that the people of Holland were favourable to our cause: be it so? What is the inference? If, with the Dutch in our favour, an army of 45,000 men was obliged to purchase its escape, what stronger argument can be conceived for inquiry? Let us then examine the wisdom of the design, and the execution. Before any man of sense engages in an undertaking, he considers how far the object is desirable, how far he is likely to succeed in it, and what will be the consequences of failure. To rescue Holland from French dominion, to restore the Dutch to their ancient alliance with this country, to reinstate the stadtholder, certainly are ob 216 Debate in the Lords on the Failure of the Expedition to Holland.] Feb. 12. Lord Holland rose and said:-My lords; I should have rejoiced, had the task I have imposed upon myself fallen to the lot of another; for I am fully aware of all the difficulties I have to encounter. Till within these very few days, I did indeed imagine, that though we might differ as to the propriety of an inquiry, the fact of failure was one which would not be disputed. But I find that it is to be contended, that the result of the expedition has been glorious, that it has been profitable, that it has been satisfactory! I ask, however, what every plain man must and does think of an army of 45,000 men buying permission to evacuate a country they came to conquer, and from an inferior force? Is this glorious? Is this honourable? Is this a failure, or is it not? Can any man doubt whether disgrace has been incurred? It has been stated, that the loss of the British in this expedition was only 800. I am happy to hear it. This alone, if it be true, would be a good jects which, provided they are practicable | the manner in which we acted? The emand just, are desirable to the interest of ployment of Russian troops was not calGreat Britain. I say, provided they are culated to conciliate the people of Holjust; for even the claims of the stadt- land.-But the Dutch are said to be holder upon this country, strong as they averse to the yoke of France. I believe are, would not justify the attempt in oppo- they are; but it does not follow that they sition to the sense of the people of Hol- prefer the dominion of England, and the land. I come now to the unavoidable authority of the stadtholder. I believe inconveniences, which, though I allow that, of the two, the Dutch would rather they are not sufficient to deter one from be as they were in 1792, than as they are an undertaking, are of no inconsiderable now; but I suspect that the difference of weight in the balance of a doubtful pro- their situation is not, in their minds, so ject. Among these the expense should great as to warrant the risk of a war. have been considered, and the great dis- The Dutch have many and crying grievtress of the season. Did not the situation ances against the French; and he must of Ireland also form an objection? Was be a bad Dutchman who does not feel not the defenceless state in which these that they have: nevertheless, all that has exertions left that country, a hazardous been said about French tyranny in Halexperiment? Was not the breaking down land is not true. We call them plunderers, the militia system a great inconvenience? murderers, atheists, and all the hard But another circumstance to be examined names we can invent; but have they exeris, whether, in case of failure, you do not cised any extraordinary severities in Holincur disadvantages greater than the ad- land? Have there been any great political vantages you reap from success. Now, persecution? Has there been any reliexamine it in that way, what have been gious persecution whatsoever? And even the consequences of our failure? Has it as to plunder, the Dutch have less to not thrown Holland more than ever into complain than most nations dependent on the power of France? What reason had one more powerful than themselves.-But ministers to suppose that the Dutch were I would ask, have the Dutch no grievwell disposed to our cause? Did they ances against us? For many years they evince any such disposition? But it may have been estranged from our interest and be said, that they had no opportunity. connexion. The proceedings in 1787 Take this either way: if they had an op- proved, that a great party was hostile to portunity of joining our cause, it is evi- the influence of this country, and favourdent by their backwardness that they able to that of France. They may be were not inclined to support it. If they averse to the dominion of France; but had no opportunity, how did it came to would they prefer a stadtholder, suppass, that with an army of 45,000 men, ported by Russian armies, and under the we never could hold out that hope of pro- guidance of British counsels? We ought, tection which could induce men to flock in this last attempt, to have been peculiarly to our standard? If the place of landing careful, to say nothing, and to do nothing, was ill calculated to display our strength, that could excite the suspicions of the and to entice partisans, is not this a people in Holland. But were we so? In glaring proof of the misconduct of those a public paper of lord Duncan's, the who contrived the plan of the expedition? Prince of Orange is called “legitimate From the first action at the Helder, we sovereign," an expression sufficient to had reason to despair of any co-operation excite alarm throughout Holland. I menfrom the Dutch soldiers. Then the action tion not this with any intention of imputwas sustained entirely by Batavian troops. ing blame to the gallant admiral; God On the 2nd of September, indeed, these forbid! but I impute blame to those who had been joined by French troops, but employed him, for not instructing him they displayed the same obstinate resist- carefully in the language that it was neance. We ought, from that moment, to cessary to hold; for I do say, that it gave have despaired of any advantage from a plausible pretence on which to raise the prosecution of the attempt in this alarms in Holland that more was inquarter. But if the disposition of the tended than the mere restoration of the inhabitants was really favourable, we ought office of stadtholder.-I come now to the to have employed such means as were military operations. Of these I speak calculated to conciliate their confidence, with the greatest diffidence. One cirand obtain their co-operation. Was this cumstance, indeed, it is pleasant for me |