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Government. If, however, such were the objects intended, a more effectual mode to accomplish them could not be adopted.

DECEMBER, 1811.

force to be resisted or subdued was not known or believed to be considerable, nor such as to require the number of troops ordered to be raised; but that a majority of Congress took upon themselves, without sufficient cause, to raise this large army, incur this immense expense, and consequently require those new burdens to be imposed. For all this, therefore, and the consequences that may flow therefrom, such majority, and not the Executive, must and will be responsible to the people.

If war becomes indispensable, you ought not to calculate that it will be of short duration. You can make war, but it does not rest with you alone to make peace. Every effort ought to be made to bring it to a speedy termination, and all the means that could be usefully employed afforded for that purpose. But you ought not, in the beginning, to waste unnecessarily your treasures, which are the sinews of war; your exertions Mr. C. said, be would now notice more parshould be proportioned to the resistance to be ticularly some of the arguments adduced by the overcome and no more of your energies and re- honorable member from Virginia, (Mr. GILES.) sources exhausted than the occasion requires; al-He did not propose following him through the ways reserving the residue to meet a more urgent emergency. War once commenced, you ought to calculate on supporting it, on at least the same, if not on a more extended scale, not only for one, but for many years, as it cannot be known how long it may be continued.

various course of his reasoning, much of which, however ingenious, did not appear to him relevant to this subject, and although on that account would not now be answered, he did not subscribe to. The honorable gentleman said, in case of war, your present military force of 10,000 men The American people, said Mr. C., will, with- would be required to protect your Western frontout a murmur, support any expenditures they be- iers, and prevent New Orleans and Florida being lieve necessary to maintain the rights and avenge taken by the British, &c.; and, therefore, that the wrongs of their country. But they will ex- 25,000 additional regulars would be necessary, and pect you to restrict those expenditures to such little enough, to effect your purposes in the North, only as the emergency shall require; and that be- &c. Mr. C. said no object could be more interfore you call on them for new contributions, you esting to the Western country than the security will be prepared to show you have disposed of of New Orleans; no one could feel more sensibly the means already in your hands to the best ad- than he did the importance of affording effectual vantage. Your Government has, no doubt, esti- protection to that place, as well as to Florida and mated the probable amount of force that would the Western frontiers; and he believed no one be required to accomplish the objects in view; was more anxious than himself, or would go fur-! they have probably made arrangements, so far as ther to provide the most ample means, and such rested with them, to meet the expenses of such as could be most usefully employed for those purforce; they would also, he conceived, be in a poses. He trusted the gentleman's professed regreat degree responsible that it was competent gard for the protection of that quarter of the for the purposes for which it was raised, should be Union was sincere and would long continue. He employed to effect those purposes, and that your would not, however, suffer himself to be induced finances could be rendered adequate to its sup- by his anxiety for even those favorite and highly port. But what are you about to do by this bill? important objects, to abandon his solemn duty, Derange all those plans and change the respon- by raising a force so much larger than, in his sibility. Instead of twenty or twenty-five thou-opinion, the occasion required. He was inclined sand, the number deemed sufficient, you force upon the Government thirty-five thousand regular troops. You thereby take upon yourselves the responsibility of raising a force much larger than was required, or can be usefully employed; of occasioning a great unnecessary expenditure, which will drain your Treasury, embarrass your finances, and probably compel you to impose new burdens on the people. Will they not inquire into the causes of those extraordinary measures, and ask wherefore were those new taxes imposed, those expenditures incurred? What occasion was there for so large a regular army? On what great emergency were they to be employed, and what numerous force was to be resisted or subdued? Those will be natural inquiries, and the answers will, no doubt, suggest themselves, that a great portion of these expenditures was incurred contrary to the views of the Executive, and for which he would in no respect be responsible; that little more than half the regular force raised was deemed competent to effect all the practicable objects within your reach; that the

to believe 5,000 regular troops, with the aid of volunteers and militia, would be competent to protect New Orleans and its neighborhood. The number of forces necessary to protect the Western frontiers would depend upon circumstances, and the disposition of the neighboring Indian tribes. But a considerable proportion of the force requisite for that purpose might consist of volunteers, or corps raised for a limited time, whose services would be equally useful, and would enable the Government to dispense with the employment of any large portion of your reg ular troops in that quarter. We have as yet, said Mr. C., taken possession of that part only of West Florida, to which our territorial claim extends, and there appears no ground, at present, to be alarmed for its safety. The employment, therefore, of so large a regular force as 10,000 men in that quarter, does not appear necessary, and can furnish no good ground for raising so large an additional army as that contemplated by this bill.

But the gentleman inquires, what you would think of New Orleans and New York being taken

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by the British? and observes, if this should take place, you would not remain in power, or be the men who would end the war, &c. It might not be very important, said Mr. C., to the nation, whether the men now in power should long continue to enjoy it or not; or whether, in case there should be war, they or their successors should terminate it. Measures and not men is the maxim by which we ought to regulate our conduct; and if their successors should be equally or more competent to execute the important trusts reposed in them the nation would have nothing to apprehend from the change. It was, however, a doctrine to which he could not subscribe, that they were to act contrary to what they believed their duty, in order to avoid losing their places. But why this attempt, said Mr. C., to exaggerate the dangers and raise the fears of the citizens of New York and New Orleans? and to excite in the public mind apprehensions for the safety of those places? This could answer no valuable purpose; its only effect would be to produce groundless alarms, and inflame, for a while, the public sensibility. There appeared no substantial grounds to be alarmed for the safety of either of those places. The position of New Orleans is such as renders it difficult of approach to an enemy, and, by the employment of proper means, capable of being successfully defended. The fortifications of New York are stated by those best informed on the subject to be in such a state of completion as would enable that place to resist any attack likely to be made upon it; and there is no rational ground to doubt that Government will employ the best means they possess for the security and protection of those places.

SENATE.

here it might seem natural to inquire, if the gentleman was, at the time, informed of designs entertained by the Administration, so derogatory to the character, as well as dangerous to the dignity of the nation, and so evidently ruinous to the Western portion of the Union, why he did not make them known to the public, or at least to those who were so deeply interested in guarding against their consequences? But, said Mr. C., in 1808-9, the time it is presumed alluded to, when some apprehensions were entertained for the safety of New Orleans, I was a member of the other House. It became my duty to ascertain, so far as circumstances rendered it proper, the measures intended to be adopted, and the means that were to be used for the protection of that place, whose safety was so important to the people I represented; and if confidence could be placed in the declarations of those who then composed the Administration, (and their veracity, it is believed, has hitherto never been justly questioned,) it was their intention and solemn determination to defend it to the last extremity, in case it was attacked, by all the disposable force and means in their power. That this was their real intention appears sufficiently established by their subsequent conduct, in sending a considerable number of troops, as well as gunboats, to that place for the object alone of protecting it; and who were ordered to take such position as should be best calculated for that purpose. The destructive calamity experienced by those troops from the insalubrity of the climate, must be fresh in the recollection of all. But the uniform conduct of the late Executive, during the whole course of his administration, (of which unreserved canThe gentleman did indeed make a statement, dor was a distinguishing characteristic,) and in said Mr. C., which, at the time, very much sur particular, the just regard he paid on all proper prised me. It was, (as I took his words down,) occasions to the best interests of the Western that he did know it was the intention of the people, are of themselves more than sufficient to former Administration in case of war. not to shield him against the imputation of the views protect New Orleans, but let Great Britain take now ascribed to him. I cannot, however, but it; and that the Western people would be left to express my regret that this statement, made at retake it themselves;"" that he did not know the this time, should have the appearance of throwintention of the present Administration on this ing a censure on the conduct of the late venerasubject, but believed it to be the same with that ble President. He has retired, accompanied by of the former." This appears to me, said Mr. the plaudits of his fellow-citizens, and the high C., a charge of the most serious and alarming na-respect of the real friends to civil liberty throughture, and, if well-founded, would merit the most out the world, to the shades of private life. Why severe reprehension. But to establish it, under not suffer him to repose there undisturbed? I existing circumstances, would require strong and can hardly persuade myself it was intended by incontestable proofs. That the Government should, this statement to impeach the purity of his mowithout any known inducement, abandon one of tives; but I cannot omit observing, that it appears the most important places in the nation, and, to me a melancholy proof of the malignity of without attempting its defence, suffer it to pass the human mind, that so many attempts should into the hands of an enemy, is, in itself, so im- be made to sully the well-earned reputation of probable, and would argue so great a weakness, that illustrious statesman, whose fame will suror what is worse, such political depravity, that if vive the lapse of ages, and glide down the tide I had no knowledge of the transaction alluded to, of time unimpaired, while that of his enemies or of the persons then composing the Govern-will vanish like the fleeting smoke, or descend ment, I could not, without the most convincing evidence, persuade myself to believe it. I should be forced to conclude that however sincerely the gentleman might believe what he stated, he must have been misinformed on the subject, or have mistaken the views of the Administration. And

with themselves to the tomb of oblivion.

With regard to the present Administration, Mr. C. said, he did not know their particular views on this subject; he had, however, no reason to believe that they were such as the gentleman seemed to consider them. He could not for

SENATE.

Additional Military Force.

DECEMBER, 1811.

a moment entertain the idea that they intended are, with little variation, consistent with the stateto abandon the protection of New Orleans, and ment, termed inofficial, said to be made by the he did not believe there was a single act of the Secretary of War. They are, to fill up the ranks Executive that would justify such a conclusion. of the present regular troops, for which a bill bas The honorable member asserted this motion already passed; to raise an additional (or auxiliwas in opposition to the spirit of the President's ary) force of nearly 17,000 men; and also, to auMessage, and the measures therein recommended, thorize bringing into service such volunteer corps &c.; he observed, the Secretary of War did in- and portions of the militia as the occasion may deed state, in conversation, to him, that ten thou- require. This will make the auxiliary force much sand additional regular troops might answer the larger than the principal force, in aid of which it present purpose, but that he differed entirely in is required; and it would seem a fair construction opinion with the Secretary on this subject, and of the words of the Message, as already stated, gives you to understand that this inofficial state- that the auxiliary force, as said to be suggested. ment, (as he chooses to call it,) which he consid-by the Secretary of War, should be equal only to ers as coming from the Executive, was at variance with his official communication in his Message, &c.

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Mr. C. said he could not admit the correctness of the conclusions which the gentleman drew from his premises. It did not appear to him that this motion, or the statement alleged to have been made by the Secretary of War, was in opposition to, or at variance with, either the spirit of the Message, or the specific measures recommended therein. It is true, the honorable gentleman differed in opinion from the Secretary with regard to the number of regular troops necessary to effect the purposes intended; and it would seem the principal question was, whether on this subject the opinion of the former, who professed to have no knowledge on military affairs, or that of the latter, as the organ of the Executive, (as he was alleged to be,) deserved most weight, and ought to be most relied upon. Mr. C. said he had already stated the sense in which he understood the Executive recommendation on this subject, and endeavored to show the force proposed to be raised by this motion, connected with the other measures he wished adopted, was in conformity to the views presented by the Message. He would now, however, again recur to the words of the Message itself, and see if they furnished any just grounds for the gentleman's deductions and satirical strictures. The parts particularly alluded to are in the following words: "With this evidence of hostile inflexi'bility, in trampling on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, Congress will 'feel the duty of putting the United States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations. I recommend, accordingly, that adequate provision be made for filling the ranks, and prolonging the enlistments of the regular troops; for an auxiliary force to be engaged for a more limited term; for the accept ance of volunteer corps, whose patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services; for detachments, as they may be wanted, of other 'portions of the militia," &c.

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Here we see, said Mr. C., the specific measures officially recommended by the Executive, and may form an opinion of the spirit of his Message, to which allusion has been made. Let us now examine the measures proposed to be adopted by those in favor of the present motion, and which

the principal force; the whole regular force thus provided would be nearly 27,000, which, with the volunteers to be authorized, (who were undoubt" edly considered by the Executive as an efficient part of the troops to be employed.) would put in the power of the Government a disposable force, exclusive of the militia, of at least 40,000 effective men. This force, which might be increased as circumstances should require, is certainly competent to accomplish all the attainable objects the most sanguine can have in view. In what respect, then, can these measures be considered in opposition to, or at variance with, either the spirit or language of the official communication? If the forces furnished be fully competent to effect the purposes for which they were required, will you not, then, have put the United States "into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations?" And will not all the objects of the Executive recommendation be complied with?

There does not, therefore, appear any ground whatever, except in the imagination of the gentleman, for the alleged variance between the official and responsible communication of the Executive, and that which has been termed inofficial and irresponsible. Nor was he able to perceive what public good could arise from statements evidently calculated, if not intended, to misrepresent the views of the Administration. He was himself convinced, from sources to him entirely satisfactory, the views of the Executive were really such as had been presented to the public by his Message; such as they ought to be, and such as would, if supported and promptly carried into effect by Congress, maintain the rights and vindicate the honor of the nation.

It seems, however, you must raise the number of troops contained in the bill, whether they can be usefully employed or not; for the honorable gentleman says, if you raise less, Great Britain will not believe you are in earnest, or that you mean to use physical force, &c.; and further observed, she had in Canada seven thousand regular troops and fourteen thousand militia, &c. I cannot, said Mr. C., subscribe to the doctrine that we are to raise a force greater than is competent to accomplish the substantial objects we have in view, for the purpose alone of convincing that nation we are in earnest-that is, that we mean what we say. This would appear to me beneath the dignity of the Legislature, and derogatory to

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the national character. Besides, there is no reason to believe it would have the proposed effect; it would only waste unnecessarily your resources, without producing the least public advantage. There are some of your own citizens who pretend to believe you are not seriously determined to prosecute the avowed objects of your preparations; and the British Government, as usual, may probably take its tone from theirs. The use you make of your troops, as well as the decision and energy with which you act, and not the number you raise, will best prove your sincerity, and will alone probably convince that nation that you are not only in earnest in your preparations, but that you know and will maintain your rights; and that you feel your wrongs, and will avenge them. With regard to the forces Great Britain has in Canada, said Mr. C., there is no reason to believe, as already stated, the regular troops there exceed six thousand, or that there could be more than ten thousand militia brought into actual service. Suppose, however, the statement of the gentleman correct, would not double the number of your regular troops be sufficient, under all supposable disadvantages, to oppose the seven thousand British troops? And could not your volunteers successfully encounter Canadian militia? No one, it is presumed, would be willing to deny this. Upon what solid ground, then, can it be contended that twenty-five thousand regular troops would be necessary for that service?

SENATE.

cial talents; but he inquired what evidence he had ever given of a capacity to devise ways and means to bring money into the Treasury, and said he believed none; and added, that his (the Secretary's) talents had induced us to get rid of the direct tax, and of the salt tax, &c. The financial talents of the gentleman at the head of the Treasury Department are too well known, said Mr. C., to be made at this time the subject of investigation, or require new proofs to support them. Every man, in any tolerable degree conversant with the proceedings of your Government for the last fifteen or twenty years, must possess sufficient data to enable him to form an opinion for himself on this subject. He must, however, be permitted to declare, Mr. C. said, this was the first time he had heard the talents or financial capacity of that officer, since he came into the Government, brought into question by any gentleman of known standing and information. The sources from which your revenue must arise, are in their nature neither numerous nor very complex, and must be obvious to most, if not all men of any tolerable information. Duties on importations, and the proceeds of your public lands, constitute the sources on which you must principally rely, unless you resort to internal taxation, which the course pursued by gentlemen will probably require. The Secretary had no power to draw money from any other sources than those provided by law. He could not create new sources But the honorable gentleman says he has not of revenue; he could recommend the imposition much confidence in volunteers; that they will of new taxes, in order to bring money into the melt away like a ball of snow, &c. This doc- Treasury; but the extent of your expenditures trine, said Mr. C., is, as has been already stated, hitherto, it appears, did not require it; and Mr. of modern date among those professing to be Re- C. said he sincerely wished, as did, he believed, publicans; it was once considered rank Federal the great majority of the nation, that this might doctrine, which gave alarm to the friends of lib-long be the case-that there might be no call for erty, and contributed in a great degree to destroy their confidence in those avowing it. The militia have always been considered, by the most distinguished advocates of sound principles, the bulwark of our liberties, and, on emergencies, the guardians of our rights, Volunteers are the better sort of militia, and at least equally to be relied upon; they have, on many occasions during the Revolution, distinguished themselves by their patriotism and bravery. Why should we now place no confidence in them, or insinuate they would desert their posts? Will they not serve out the time for which they may engage; and cannot then their places, if necessary, be supplied by others?

the exertion of his great financial talents to invent new modes of squeezing money out of the people's pockets without their being sensible of it, to replenish your exhausted Treasury; for, whatever may be the nature of taxes, they must be ultimately paid by the people; and the inquiry can only be with regard to the mode in which they may be induced most willingly to make the required contributions. This is the art that would, above all others, answer the gentleman's idea of great financial capacity-that is, the capacity to bring money into the Treasury. But it is believed that the only opportunities afforded that officer, according to our present fiscal arrangements, of exercising financial capacity, consist in skilfully conducting the collection of the revenue from the sources created or established by law, and managing it afterwards with correctness and economy to meet the public demands; and those important duties, it seems admitted, have been satisfactorily performed; for the gentleman says, that that officer has annually made you very lucid reports on your finances, showing the receipts and expenditures, &c.

Mr. C. said, it was difficult to perceive how some of the arguments adduced by the honorable member could be reconciled; for, at the same time that he insists upon increasing your expenditures much beyond what he states to be the views of the Government, he gives you to understand that the person who has the direction of your revenue is not well qualified to provide the means necessary to meet such expenditures. If this be the case, it would seem a strong argument for In relation to the repeal of taxes ascribed to the circumscribing your expenses as much as practi- Secretary of the Treasury, the honorable gentlecable. He told you the Secretary of the Treas- man must have labored under a mistake. He ury had the reputation of possessing great finan-stated, the repeal of the direct tax; he probably

SENATE.

Additional Military Force.

DECEMBER, 1811:

it was understood to be the opinion of the Executive, that war ought then immediately to succeed, and substitute the embargo. The nation then would have been prepared for the event; its forbearance would have been sufficiently evinced; it would have possessed all its own resources unimpaired, and had also within its power more than twenty millions of the property and treasures bemight justly be made to contribute to support the war that should be thus forced upon us. The spirit of the nation was not only unbroken and firm, but rising with the growing danger of the crisis, and its character stood high at home and abroad; but the fatal proposition to repeal the embargo, like a demon, or the evil genius of the nation, presenting itself, paralyzed, as if by en

meant of the indirect taxes; the former was imposed for a year only, and the law expired before that officer came into the Government; the indirect taxes were repealed afterwards; and though from the information he, Mr. C., had obtained on the subject, that officer had no agency whatever in such repeal, he believed the measure was very generally approved of by the Republicans throughout the Union. He could speak with more cer-longing to one of its expected enemies, whichtainty relative to the repeal of the salt tax, being then a member of the other House, and in a situation that made it his particular duty to attend to that subject; and it was then distinctly understood, the Secretary of the Treasury did not approve of the measure, (as will sufficiently appear from his official reports;) that he considered that tax not an oppressive one, at the same time that it was productive and collected without any ex-chantment, the best concerted measures, and dissitraordinary expense; the Executive, however, recommended the repeal of it, and after several unsuccessful attempts, the measure at length succeeded. The Secretary of the Treasury cannot, therefore, be considered in any respect whatever responsible for the repeal of those taxes; and it must appear very extraordinary that, after a great majority of the nation has so long unequivocally approved that measure, it should now be brought forward as evidence of the incapacity or misconduct of that officer.

pated all those fair prospects. It always appeared to him, Mr. C. said, as placing the National Legislature (he would not say the nation) in the same situation that the unwarrantable desertion of his post, in the day of danger, would place an individual. He had often been surprised at the numerous attempts made, in and out of Congress, by some of those very persons who voted for the repeal of the embargo, to charge unjustly, in his opinion, the whole responsibility of that measure on the Administration. But he could not comprehend upon what ground the honorable gentleman from Virginia, who himself introduced and supported the measure, could at this day expect to transfer the odium of it to the Executive and Treasury Department.

The honorable gentleman says, the inexecution of the embargo produced its repeal, &c. ; and that this was occasioned by the Executive refusing to accept the means offered him by Congress to enforce the execution of it; and strongly insinuates all this was produced by the influence of the The members of the National Legislature are Treasury Department, through the Executive. undoubtedly accountable to the people for the The repeal of the embargo, Mr. C. said, was a laws passed by their votes; and it must be with subject on which he did not wish to enter. It a very bad grace they ascribe their enactment to was always to him the most unpleasant that could the influence of others. The honorable gentlepresent itself. It had at the time met with all the man informed you, he proposed to issue letters of feeble resistance that was then in his power (weak marque and reprisal as a substitute for the em as his state of health was) to oppose to it. He bargo, as being in his opinion better calculated considered it a measure which not only damped, than that measure to maintain the honor and but chilled the spirit of the nation, and impressed promote the interests of the nation, &c. Mr. a stain on its character, to wash out which would C, said, he understood the provision alluded to, probably require much of its best blood. It was in a sense very different from that stated by the not, however, the inexecution of the embargo that gentleman. Its true meaning would, however, occasioned its repeal, nor was it the influence of be best understood by recurring to the provision the Treasury or Executive Departments. It was itself. It is found in the 11th section of the nonthe fatal panic with which certain members in intercourse bill, as passed by the Senate in 1809, both Houses were seized, in consequence of the in the following words: "That the President of clamorous threats of the opposition in certain the United States be, and he hereby is authorquarters of the Union, that produced that effect.ized, in case either France or Great Britain The plan of the Executive undoubtedly was, (as he understood it from himself at the time,) to continue and enforce the embargo, combined with the non-intercourse, until the extraordinary session proposed to be held in the following May; which would give time for that measure to have its full effect on the belligerents; would add but little to the pressure felt by our own citizens, and would afford all the chances of avoiding war, arising from the probability of those Powers being induced to rescind their unjust edicts, and again respect neutral rights. Should this favorable change in their conduct, however, not take place,

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"shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they
'shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of
the United States, to declare the same by proc-
lamation, after which the trade of the United
States suspended by this act, and by the act
laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in
'the ports and harbors of the United States, and
the several acts supplementary thereto, may be
renewed with the nation so doing, and to cause
to be issued, under suitable pledges and precau-
tions, letters of marque and reprisal against the
nation thereafter continuing in force its unlaw-
'ful edicts against the commerce of the United

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