H. of R. Naval Establishment. means of promoting the general welfare, and were therefore rather rude than conciliatory to him. JANUARY, 1812. thousand dollars. In the meantime the constant drains of money wrung from the hands of the great body of the people by heavy internal taxes would keep them poor. The wealth of the country would be gradually assembled in the hands of a few; and wealth is the strong basis of power everywhere. Consequently the power of the country would be concentrated in the hands of a few, who would apply your navy to maintain and support the wealthy and well-born in the possession of this power. He had stated it to the committee, as his opinion, that the establishment of a large navy would change, in the progress of time, the present form of this government. The House has been informed that this statement was mere assertion, unsupported by argument or even an effort to prove that we could not create and support a large marine without difficulty or danger. In support of the opinion he then expressed, which he had not seen But we are told by gentlemen that this is mere any reason to change, he had submitted to the assertion; the product of a mind frightened by House a statement of the probable expenses of the hobgoblins and bugbears, and laboring under the Government in the succeeding years, including influence of prejudice. If gentlemen were corthe expenses of the proposed navy. If those state-rect, it would be a gratification to him to find his ments were substantially correct (and he had not apprehensions dissipated by experience. But heard them questioned) they prove the fact, that what does the experience of other nations prove? a war of five years duration with a navy would England, the bright example always quotedincrease the public debt from forty-five millions whose political dogmas we affect to despise, but of dollars, the present amount, to upwards of an in whose paths we seem now to be treading with hundred and fifteen millions; and would likewise undeviating steps as fast as the moments runincrease the expenses of the Government on the England once had no public navy, and then too return of peace to upwards of eighteen millions she had no public debt. She also had a Parliaper annum. From those facts the conclusions ment the real representatives of the British nation were drawn which appeared to him very natural- (who dared to resist the corruptions of the times ly to follow, that permanent internal taxes in and the encroachments of the Crown. But Engtimes of peace as well as war would be rendered land was then vexed with the Spanish Armada necessary; and even with the aid of internal taxes and the Dutch fleets, which rode triumphantly in to the amount of four millions of dollars per an- the English channel with a broom at the mastnum, your public debt would be gradually increas- head. ing. He had also stated the revenue of the country, under the existing Constitution, with the intention of showing the difficulty of meeting so large an expenditure. This statement, so far as it had been noticed, was met by a statement that the public lands as a source of revenue were worth twelve hundred millions of dollars, and that the revenue arising from commerce might amount to eighteen or twenty millions per annum. He confessed he did not understand the arithmetic by whose magic these results were produced. The first was to him evidently incorrect and the second seemed also incorrect; our revenue for the last ten years (the most prosperous period of our history) had averaged about twelve millions of dollars per annum, and the world was evidently more hostile to commerce now than it had been for the last ten years. No reasonable calculation could therefore be made on a revenue from imposts and tonnage for the succeeding ten years, exceeding in amount the receipts of the past ten years, and admitting the revenue to be equal to that we had received, the taxes would be rendered permanent to the amount of upwards of six millions of dollars per annum in order to pay the current expenditure: you will then have a large public debt with permanent and heavy internal taxes, and this is the soil which produces aristocracy in every country; and here, the debt furnishes to moneyed men the facility of increasing their wealth without ingenuity, industry, or care. Ten thousand dollars vested in the public funds, by converting the interest into principal at the respective periods when the interest falls due, in twenty years would amount to more than forty England commenced ship-building on national account and borrowing money on the same account. Her navy too, when small, was loaded with the imputations of "wasteful expense and comparative inefficiency." It was increased because "it was demonstrably clear that she was destined to be a great naval power;" her debt also increased pari passu (as the diplomatists would say) with her navy. The British Navy now is the most splendid fabric of human power the world ever witnessed; her debt is equally great and splendid; the wretchedness and misery of the great mass of her people bears a full proportion to the debt and navy; her Parliament also is highly celebrated for its venality and compliance. The man who knows the views and wishes of the English Ministry, with out farther inquiry, thereby knows the opinion of a majority of Parliament. Create the causes and the consequences will follow-man is substantially the same everywhere; here a little more civilized and there a little more savage; but God and nature for wise purposes have implanted in every human bosom the same original desires; and love of wealth, of fame, and of power, create the means of their gratification on a large scale, and you give them activity-an activity fired with ambition and fraught with ruin to the peace of society. Gentlemen had exultingly called on those opposed to an increase of the Navy, to show how commerce could be protected without a Navy. He had supposed it to be the duty of those who advocated a system attended with immense expense to show the good to society resulting from the JANUARY, 1812. Naval Establishment. H. OF R. expenditure, and if the advantages arising therefrom were not clearly demonstrated and shown to bear some proportion to the expenditure, their patronage could not be expected. But how has this been shown? you are informed that navies are necessary for the protection of commerce; but has it been shown by any process of reasoning, that the twelve ships-of-the-line and thirty frigates contemplated, when built, would enable you to convey the productions of your soil from the ports of the United States in safety to Havre or Ham-1802, is cited as an evidence of the feelings which burg, or to any port in the Baltic or Mediterranean? Certainly this has not been attempted. The additional security supposed to be afforded to your ports and harbors by the Navy, is all that has been attempted to be shown; your ports and harbors heretofore have been thought well secured by fortifications; but it is now for the first time discovered, that your fortifications are of but little or no use. How unfortunate it is that this discovery had not been made before the Government had expended near $7,000,000 on that object, and that the discovery has been delayed to this time, when you are officially informed that the fortifications are nearly completed. You are also told that the proposed navy would be sufficient to maintain the mastery in the American seas, particularly as far as the Gulf Stream, and in order to substantiate this position, you are informed that the British navy is stripped up into small squadrons and stationed at different places; part in the English channel, part at the Elbe, part in the Mediterranean, part in the East India, West India, Jamaica, and North American stations. Much labor is used to prove that this distribution of the naval force of England could not be altered in case of a war with this country, and that we are so far removed from Europe, where a fleet destined to act against us must receive its outfit, that three times the quantity of force possessed by us would be necessary to produce any effect on us. Without hoping to expose the fallacy of this argument, by a recurrence to our own experience during the Revolutionary war, when England was contending for the British channel against the fleets of France and Spain, she then spared a fleet of sufficient magnitude to beat double the force now contemplated. He would ask what protection commerce would receive from this supposed mastery in the American seas? It is said that England cannot spare the force necessary to meet you in the American seas. Be it so, and consequently she will send none. But she can say to you in practice, you shall not go to the West Indies or to Europe, if you do, I will capture your vessels; and where then is your commerce which is to receive protection? it is annihilated; and the arguments, of gentlemen, if correct, did prove incontrovertibly that your naval force must be more than equal to that of Great Britain to unlock the European ports to your commerce. Is this an incorrect view of the subjeet, and the consequences attendant thereon? If it was, he was unable to perceive in what it was incorrect, and if it is correct, it necessarily follows, that you must have a navy competent to meet the British navy in equal combat on the ocean, to effect any valuable result in favor of your commerce, and this is not contemplated. But the gentlemen have expressed much solicitude for the commerce of the Mississippi, lest its mouth should be blocked up by a single ship of war of the enemy; and the sensibility expressed when the right of deposite at New Orleans was withheld from the Western people, in such an occurrence would excite. The objects of those arguments were easily perceived; and they were, in his opinion, utterly fallacious. It required only a moment's reflection to perceive that a war with any maritime nation who happened to hold the West Indies, would annihilate the commerce of the Mississippi during its continuance; and the arguments of gentlemen just referred to, if they proved anything, supported his opinion. The substance of these arguments is already recited; that the remote situation of England from our coast, the difficulty of maintaining a fleet for any length of time hovering on a hostile coast, gives to our fleet, aided by a friendly coast, furnishing ports and harbors for their protection and aid in time of danger, an advantage over an enemy of three to one. Be it so, and how does the argument stand, when applied either to Europe or the West Indies? As it relates to Europe, it has already been shown that the argument operates against you in the same proportion, or nearly so, that it operates in your favor in relation to the American coast, and in the West Indies. England possesses, for all commercial purposes, and he might say for all the purposes of annoyance to your commerce, all the West Indies, with the exception of St. Domingo and two other inconsiderable islands. The commerce of the Mississippi must necessarily pass near the Havana and double Cape Floridaall in the hands of the enemy-to reach the Atlantic ports; and yet gentlemen talk of protecting this commerce during the war. The whole argument of gentlemen is founded on the supposi tion that your twelve ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates will always act together in one body against the separate squadrons of the enemy; this is manifestly absurd; and as your navy, if built, will be at the common expense of the whole community, it ought to be stationed at different stations for the common defence. The United States seem to be naturally divided into six stations, to wit: Boston, New York, the Delaware, Chesapeake, Charleston, and the Balize stations; divide out the navy to those stations respectively, and you will have two ships-of-the-line and five frigates to each station. Send your two ships-of-the-line and five or six frigates to the Gulf of Mexico, to protect the trade of the Missississippi, where there is not a single harbor for their reception; and unless the same supernatural hand which saved Daniel of old from the teeth of the lions, when he was cast into their den, is stretched forth for the protection of your naval force sent, there, in six weeks after it arrives at the place of destination, its flag will be changed. But admit your two ships-of-the-line and five frigates competent to guard in safety the productions of the country, watered by the Mississippi, from New Orleans to the Atlantic ports, where is the benefit resulting therefrom, when every man who knows anything of nature and the character of the commerce of the Mississippi, must be uncandid if he does not acknowledge that in time of war the productions of the Mississippi in general would not pay freight to the Atlantic market. Mr. McK. said he pretended to have some practical knowledge of the commerce of the Mississippi, and he unhesitatingly declared that a war with any maritime nation holding the control of the West India islands would annihilate all legitimate trade from New Orleans during its continuance; an illegal or licensed trade perhaps might be carried on to a small amount, and it would not require protection. Gentlemen seemed to be enamoured with the superior protection (as it is called) afforded to the persons and property of other nations on the high seas. This superior protection was desirable; it was highly appreciated by the Governments of Europe. But the picture had two sides; and he desired gentlemen to look at both. The persons and property of the subjects of the Governments of Europe are said to ride in safety on the ocean beneath the triumphant banners of their country. And as a compensation for this protection (which was far from being complete) the sighs of the oppressed ascended to Heaven, from every corner of Europe, in secret or open curses against their oppressors. It was due to candor to admit that the griefs of Europe were not altogether owing to navies. And it was also worthy of remark that the people of every nation in Europe had been more or less oppressed with taxes and debt | in proportion to the extent of their navy; create the cause, and the consequences will follow. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. WRIGHT) had said that what might be wrong in 1798, might be perfectly prudent and right now. He admitted there was a time for all things; but the principle in politics or theology certainly could not be very stubborn that was wrong in 1798 and perfectly right now; and if any change in this respect had taken place, it must consist in the greater fitness of the means to effect certain desirable ends. In 1798 American commerce was most shamefully plundered by both France and England. At that time Spain, France, and England had large navies-Holland and Denmark had ships of war; a navy of twelve ships of the line and twenty frigates on the part of the United States by uniting with the fleets of France and Spain, would have been able to have coped with England on the ocean; and in case of a war with France, a similar result could have been effected against the fleets of France and Spain; but the condition of Europe in this respect was materially changed, and not for the better as it regards us. He had no disposition, however, to censure the opinions of any gentlemen or their arguments, on account of their great similarity to JANUARY, 1812. the opinions and arguments used in support of them in 1798. It was certainly proper to consider all questions coming before the House on their intrinsic merit, without much regard to former opinions; and, therefore, he did not mean to say to the gentleman that he had gone over to the enemy's camp. But suppose your navy of twelve ships-of-theline, and twenty frigates had been built in 1798, and maintained ever since-would it have rendered your commerce more prosperous than it has been since that period? He did not believe any man would assume such a position, inasmuch as our commerce since 1798 had been more prosperous than was or could have been foreseen; and if the navy had been then built, the national debt would now be near one hundred and fortysix millions of dollars, instead of forty-six millions, the present amount; and he entertained no doubt but that the good consequences resulting from a rejection of the navy project at this time, would be seen as clearly and as thoroughly felt fourteen years hence, as the good effects of its rejection in 1798 was now perceived and felt. With regard to the effects which it is supposed the navy would produce on England in time of war, he thought those effects much overrated. He was, however, willing to see what could be done with the present navy, which amounted to between sixteen and twenty in number, exclusive of gun vessels. If thirty fast sailing frigates would produce the wide-spread ruin on British commerce in time of war, of which gentlemen have spoken, twenty frigates would produce twothirds of these effects. He desired to see what could be done in the first place with our present force; and if the result was proportionate to the expectations which seem to be entertained, the nation would be willing to increase the naval force. But at the present time, when we were incurring immense expenses, it did not seem prudent to him to increase those expenses by a project of this kind-the proposed war would not be a war of great battles, but rather a war of means; England would make the war as expensive to us as possible, and if we sat out with expenses so extravagant, the war might terminate unfavorably. The House adjourned without taking the question. MONDAY, January 27. Mr. BACON, from the Committee of Ways and Means, presented a bill making appropriations for the support of Government, for the year 1812; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. Mr. SEYBERT said, that when he considered it his duty to take up the subject of the Navy, he had occasion to look into the expenses of that establishment, and especially into the expenses of the navy yard in this city; and from examining the account lately laid before this House by the Secretary of the Navy, of the expenses of 1810, he was induced to offer the following resolution: Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be di rected to lay before this House a statement of the ex- Mr. SEYBERT declared he would not; and on suggestion of Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS, the resolution was so modified as to embrace all the navy yards, and then agreed to. NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT. The House then took up the order of the day, viz: the bill concerning the Navy. The question of agreement to the report of the Committee of the Whole to strike out the section for building new frigates being still under consideration H. OF R. be carried, and the means which are best calculated to effect the object. At a Had the advocates for a navy been as successful in enforcing conviction of its necessity or efficacy in the protection of trade, or in defending the rights of the nation, as they were in displaying their ingenuity and talents, I should not have curred with them in the proposed measure. But addressed you on the subject. I would have conwhile I admire the zeal they have manifested, and the ability and eloquence with which they have not been convinced, nor have I ceased to lament defended their favorite project, my judgment has the discussion in which we are engaged. moment when a solemn pledge has been given to the nation of a determination on the part of this House to wage war with England-when the mode of warfare and points of attack have been selected with reference to our own strength, and to the weakness of the enemy-when it is acMr. BIBB said, that indisposed as he was, had knowledged that to prosecute such a war will rehe obeyed the impulse of his feelings, he should quire all the resources of the Government-when not then have risen from his seat. He did not to devise a system for obtaining money by loans know indeed that he should be able to present and taxes, the financial talents of the distinguished his view of the subject to the House, nor (should officer who presides over your Treasury Depart he be so fortunate) did he expect it would influ- ment have been called into requisition-I say, sir, ence the decision of the question. But as the under such circumstances, it does appear to me opponents to the bill had been identified with the unfortunate indeed, that the attention of Congress enemies of commerce, and as he was one of the should be diverted from the objects for which - number, he could not quietly submit to an infer- they were assembled at an earlier period than ence so totally unsupported so totally unfounded, usual, and, what is worse, that instead of proviThe people, said Mr. B., whom I represent are as ding the ways and means which will be indispenmuch interested in commerce, in proportion to sable, we should be hunting up objects for further their numbers, as those of any section of the expenditures. If the ten frigates which it is proUnion, and would be as unwilling to abandon it. posed now to build, could be in readiness for imAre we to be told that because the principal part mediate service, the proposition would certainly of the American tonnage belongs to the Northern be less objectionable. But it is admitted that and Eastern States, they have a greater stake in no such expectation is entertained-that the excommerce than the Southern? Unquestionably penditure we are called upon to authorize, is not not. The annual surplus products of the planter for the war establishment, but for future purposes. and farmer are the foundation of commerce, and What says the report of the committee on this their value depends on the demand for them and subject? After stating the injuries to which we the facility with which they may be conveyed to are liable on the ocean, the committee remark, market. The ship-owners are concerned only to that" it may be necessary to array the national the extent of their profits arising from transportaforce on that element where the injury may be tion and other incidental circumstances. It is, suffered, and where alone it can be avenged or retherefore, obvious that if commerce be suspended, dressed. With this view your committee have the agriculturists, who furnish the articles to be ⚫ not considered this subject with regard only to transported abroad, sustain a loss so much greater practicable and advisable preparation for the presthan that of the ship-owners as the value of those ent momentous crisis, which, whatever it may articles is superior to the profits of conveyance to be, must be greatly inadequate; but the object of a foreign market. The carrier loses his freight-the committee is to recommend a system which the farmer and planter their products. On look- 'shall look to futurity," &c. ing at the amount in value of our domestic exports, it will be perceived that nearly one-fourth is furnished by a part of the Southern States in the article of cotton alone-a proportion which is not furnished by an equal population in any other portion of the country. My object is not to draw invidious distinctions, but to show the extreme importance of commerce to the prosperity of the South, and consequently the interest we have in its protection. Sir, there exists no indisposition to protect commerce-the only difference of opinion is in reference to the extent to which the protecting powers of the Government should It appears then that the appropriation of money which is demanded, will be applied to a system which shall look to futurity, and which if it should be now executed to the extent required by the report, would be "greatly inadequate" to its object. And is this the proper time to expend millions for futurity, when you are about to appeal to the patriotism of the people for the means which are indispensable to immediate purposes? To my mind, the present is the most inauspicious moment which could have been selected for increasing the Naval Establishment. An attempt to build a navy on the eve of war by loans and taxes H. OF R. Naval Establishment.. JANUARY, 1812. when the people are without a market for their disposed to retaliate. The enemy is invincible surplus products, is an extraordinary and unparal- on the ocean, even if the whole naval force of the leled undertaking. I will not call it " ludicrous." world besides be united against her. Her posses Although such a character has been attributed to sions to the north are, under existing circumthe opposition on this occasion, it cannot be stances, of the first importance to her, and they applied to the bill before you. The project of are within our reach. Without then applying my friend from South Carolina (Mr. CHEVES) our exertions where defeat would be inevitable, will certainly escape an imputation of that sort, we have determined to direct the strength of the and yet it may acquire a reputation which will nation against the most vulnerable points, where not be more consoling to his feelings than that success will be certain, and where retaliation will which has fallen to our lot. No, sir, if this bill be most sensibly felt. And it is on this principle shall pass, it will not be considered "ludicrous" the advocates of a navy propose to derive advan-it will not excite the laughter of the people. tage from it. They admit that it cannot protect But unless I am much mistaken their murmurs our commerce in the European or Asiatic seas, but, will be heard, and their discontent will be felt. I say they, it will be competent to annoy the West rely as much on the patriotism of the people as India trade of England if she interrupts ours in any man. I am persuaded they will bear any distant seas, and in that way make it her interest taxes which are necessary for the support of a to let us alone. Well, sir, this is precisely the obwar in defence of their rights, and I am willing ject of taking Canada, and we will leave the anto vote them; but they will not submit to unne-noyance of her West India trade to the enterprise cessary taxes. of our privateers, They are much better calculated for that purpose than ships of war. เ But, say gentlemen, to rely for the defence of the country on any force other than a naval force, But we are told that the President has recomwould be as unwise as to attempt to protect a corn mended an increase of our Naval Establishment, field by fencing in a distant cotton field. The as a part of the war preparations. A reference cases are not at all analogous; but I should con- to his Message will demonstrate that gentlemen sider the wisdom of a planter, who, with a know- are mistaken in regard to that fact. After deledge of his ability to complete a fence around his tailing the evidence of hostile inflexibility on the cultivated field, would undertake to build one half part of Great Britain, and calling on Congress way for its protection, at least equal to that which to put the country into an armor and attitude deadvises us to expend the public resources on a na-manded by the crisis, he proceeds: "I recommend` val force, which it is agreed will be "greatly in-accordingly that adequate provision be made adequate" to its object. If the United States must 'for filling the ranks, and prolonging enlistments become a great naval Power, the system can be of the regular troops; for an auxiliary force to maintained only in time of peace, and to attempt be engaged for a more limited term; for the acit in time of war when you are unable to throw ceptance of volunteer corps, whose patriotic upon the ocean a force competent to cope with ardor may court a participation in urgent serthe enemy, would be to diminish your own vices; for detachments, as they may be wanted, strength, and to increase theirs. On the subject of other portions of the militia, and for such a of the first paragraph of the report which I have preparation of the great body as will proportion read, permit me to address myself particularly to its usefulness to its intrinsic capacities." Surely the gentleman from New York, (Mr. MITCHILL,) if he had placed any reliance on a navy, and had and to remark, that the doctrine which confines believed it ought to constitute a part of the "arthe remedy to the seat of disease in all cases, is at mor," he would have felt himself bound by a war with the acknowledged principles of the ani- sense of duty to say so. It is true that in another mal economy, and has been proved not to consti- part of the Message, unconnected with the subtute a part of the political system, by the vote not ject of war preparations, the following paragraph only of himself but of the gentleman from South is to be found: "Your attention will of course Carolina (Mr. CHEVES.) Need I tell the gentle-be drawn to such provisions on the subject of man from New York, what he understands much ' our naval force as may be required for the serbetter than I do, that diseases of the head are fre- vices to which it may be best adapted. I subquently cured by applications to the feet? Or ismit to Congress the seasonableness also of an it necessary to remind the gentleman that in vo-authority to augment the stock of such mating for the bill which authorized the raising ofterials as are imperishable in their nature, or twenty-five thousand men to take Canada, they ad-' may not at once be attainable." What are the mitted the fallacy of this doctrine? Where has services to which our naval force is best adapted, England done you the most injury? On the is left to the decision of Congress; but an inhigh seas. Where do you propose to retaliate? crease of the existing force is not recommended. In Canada. And when gentlemen themselves As to augmenting the stock of materials, the prehave advocated this course of proceeding, do cise object is not stated, but it was probably adthey act consistently in telling the House that in-vised for the purposes of repairs and the like. It juries can only be redressed or avenged on the element where they have been committed? In my humble opinion the course which has been pursued as a rational one, founded in the policy that must always influence the conduct of an injured party has, however, been mentioned, that as the Secretary of the Navy, an officer acting under the President, has, in a report now before the House, said much in behalf of ships and frigates, it follows he has spoken the sentiments and wishes of |