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in bringing the 5th Battle Squadron into action is not deserved.

The German battle cruisers were able to find the range and to get hits more quickly than our own,* and the destruction of the 'Indefatigable' and 'Queen Mary,' with the hair-breadth escape of the 'Lion,' occurred in the first half-hour. Mr Churchill considers that at shorter ranges our heavier shells would have shown relatively to better advantage. Incidentally, Admiral Beatty's opening action raises the whole vexed question of the policy of building battle cruisers with weak armour and ammunition hoists unprotected against a downward flash. The ruling idea was that these very fast ships, with a much heavier armament than that of their German analogues, would be able to select long ranges and to injure their opponents with a minimum of risk. Experience pointed to a different conclusion. Mr Churchill tells us that he 'recoiled from the battle cruiser type' in 1911, as did some reasoned naval opinion. What happened in the battle cruiser engagement was thus largely due to prior causes. Structural defects in this new type of warship caused the loss of more than 3300 officers and men in the three vessels sunk by explosion.

In the second place, Admiral Sir J. Jellicoe had laid down in advance his general tactical procedure in the event of a fleet action, and had explained his reasons for extreme caution. In a most important letter, to the Admiralty of Oct. 30, 1914, he pointed out inter alia that

"The Germans have shown that they rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes, and there can be no doubt whatever that they will endeavour to make the fullest use of these weapons in a fleet action, especially since they possess an actual superiority in these particular directions.'

As the Germans could not rely on using submarines or mines except 'in waters selected by them and in the southern area of the North Sea, my object will, therefore, be to fight the fleet action in the northern portion of the North Sea.' He then proceeded to explain how

* They had, however, an advantage in visibility at this time.

the German submarines might be expected to be used, the idea being to lead the Grand Fleet on to a prepared battle area.

'If, for instance, the enemy battle fleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet, I should assume that the intention was to draw us over mines and submarines and should decline to be so drawn. I desire particularly to draw the attention of their Lordships to this point, since it may be deemed a refusal of battle, and indeed might possibly result in failure to bring the enemy to action as soon as is expected and hoped. . . . It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half of our battle fleet might be disabled by under-water attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a false move is made.'

This momentous document was approved by Mr Churchill; but he does not accept on behalf of the Board of Admiralty any responsibility for the actual conduct' of the Battle of Jutland eighteen months later when the Grand Fleet had been powerfully reinforced. The responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief were undoubtedly tremendous; but 'praiseworthy precaution had induced a defensive habit of mind and a scheme of tactics which hampered the Grand Fleet even when the special conditions enjoining caution did not exist.'

The exaggerated fear of torpedo attack at long ranges had been effectively exposed, just before the outbreak of war, by Admiral Sir Reginald N. Custance as a result of a careful analysis of the war performances of the under-water weapon. The battle area of May 31 could not have been prepared in advance. No submarines were present, for the sufficient reasons which Admiral Scheer has given. We had a marked superiority in torpedo craft, and our torpedoes did more destruction than those of the Germans, while the only trap, by which the 'Ostfriesland' was damaged, was laid by Admiral Jellicoe.† The officially approved tactical scheme, how

* It does not seem to have been realised that, if a retreating fleet were not followed up, a naval victory might become impossible.

† In addition, three submarines left Harwich at 7 a.m. on May 30 for the Horns Reef Passage with orders to lie on the bottom till June 2. The change in the situation was not communicated to them, although there seems no reason why this should not have been done. They, therefore, carried out their original orders, thereby missing a good opportunity' (Admiral Harper, The Truth about Jutland'). The German Fleet must have passed over them.

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ever, ruled the course of the battle, and saved the German Fleet at the most critical moment. The issue was predetermined, and some of Mr Churchill's criticisms go wide of the mark. He dwells on what he regards as three lost opportunities, and among the purple patches such an appalling sentence as Three times is a lot' comes as a shock.

A difference of reckoning between the Grand and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, amounting to 11 miles,* and lack of precise information-due mainly to want of systemplaced Admiral Jellicoe in a dilemma when actual contact with the High Seas Fleet was imminent. Mr Churchill critically discusses the deployment, completed at 6.38 p.m., by which time Admiral Scheer had turned his command 'together' and was retiring, and he explains at length the advantages of a different evolution. The real mistake was, however, that the cruising formation of the Grand Fleet was maintained far too long. An earlier deployment, bringing that fleet into order of battle with its scouts and flotillas in their proper positions, might have provided the first of Mr Churchill's chances.' As carried out, the deployment of the battleships was in part under fire. There was local bunching,' and much disorder of the scouting forces, leading to considerable losses. There was no time, even if it had been possible, to give the necessary orders to the scattered squadrons and flotillas when the enemy was close at hand, and the Grand Fleet thus obtained contact in disadvantageous conditions.

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Yet a real chance was to be given. Admiral Scheer again turned his fleet together' to attack the Grand Fleet fully deployed, and to place himself in a position of grave danger. As he has explained, 'The manoeuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, and if the blow

This might have been anticipated in the circumstances-dead reckon. ing and much zigzagging.

†The presence and course of the High Seas Fleet were signalled to the flagship from the 'Southampton' at 4.38 p.m., and at 6.15 p.m. the deployment began; but previously, at 3.13 p.m., the columns of battleships had been opened out in preparation for deployment.

It [the High Seas Fleet] was now heading straight into the centre of the arc formed by the British Fleet. In a few minutes the leading squadron and battle cruisers would be threatened with envelopment and the concentrated fire of practically the whole Grand Fleet' (Admiralty Official Narrative).

fell heavily, it would facilitate the breaking loose at night.'* Two German flotillas delivered an attack, and the Grand Fleet turned away according to plan, and lost the enemy never again to obtain contact. This was the real crisis of the Battle of Jutland, and the main reason why the most powerful fleet the world has ever seen was never brought into effective action.

Mr Churchill selects as his third chance the moment when Admiral Jellicoe received at about 11.30 p.m. the Admiralty message announcing that the German Battle Fleet had been ordered back to port at 9.14 p.m. on a course stated, which indicated the Horns Reef Passage. If the Admiral had decided to act on this important information, he had, according to his critic, 'only to turn his fleet on to a course parallel to the Germans in order to make sure of bringing them to action at daybreak.' This can only be regarded as a rash speculation. The Grand Fleet had been turned nearly south at 9 p.m. and was proceeding at 17 knots. The 1st Battle Squadron was not in station, and as the 'Marlborough' had been hit by a torpedo and the flag had not at once been transferred, this squadron became detached.† The Commander-in-Chief could not know the positions of his scouting forces. He had ordered the flotillas to follow five miles astern without instructions, and the whole German Fleet crashed through them in the darkness. Thus prolonged fortuitous fighting occurred, in which our young officers displayed conspicuous gallantry and initiative. The position of the enemy was not understood, and a night action could not be risked by the Grand Fleet for the reasons given in Admiral Jellicoe's Report:

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The German organisation for night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is excellent. Ours is practically nil. Their searchlights are superior to ours and they use them with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives excellent results.'

These reasons, if humiliating, were certainly cogent.

* Admiral Harper describes this manœuvre as a 'blundering' attack; but it was bold, extremely astute, well executed and successful for Admiral Scheer's purpose.

It did not rejoin the Grand Fleet till the evening of June 1.

After the crucial turn away, not followed by a determined attempt to find out where the enemy was, the decision to steer south can easily be justified. The Grand Fleet could not, in any case, have been ready to fight at daybreak because, as a whole, it was not in hand, and time would have been needed to bring it into order of battle. Mr Churchill's general conclusions are that there were chances on May 31 and later on Aug. 19,

'for gripping the enemy without in any way increasing the risk of being led into an under-water trap. A more flexible system of fleet training and manoeuvring would have enabled these movements to be made. The attempt to centralise in a single hand the whole conduct in action of so vast a fleet failed.

This may be admitted; but shortly after the battle, Mr Churchill's imagination led him to fancy the heavenborn commander 'regulating almost by gesture from moment to moment the course of the supreme and intense battle'-an attractive picture far removed from the possibilities of war. There are some inevitable drawbacks to the writing of naval history by an exFirst Lord. Captain Frothingham's able study of the Battle of Jutland has the great merit of detachment, and he explains why the ensuing results of the British failure to win a decisive victory at Jutland became more and more disastrous to the Entente Allies as time went on.'

He attributes this failure to the 'cautious policy,' the 'defensive idea,' approved by the Admiralty, and his verdict is that the 'ill-effects should not solely be charged against the men who were fighting the battle.'t In this country, controversy will continue to rage, and Mr Churchill has given it a fresh impulse. Perhaps in the future the tragedy of Jutland will take its true place in the history of the Great War, and it will be realised that psychological causes pre-existing made a Nelson or a Togo victory impossible. The personnel of the Grand

The working of a large fleet by divisions had been suggested and tried by Sir R. N. Custance and Admiral of the Fleet Sir W. May, but apparently did not commend itself to the Admiralty.

The Naval History of the War,' vol. II. University Press, 1925.

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