Fleet was incomparable. From the Commander-in-Chief to the youngest boy, all were intent on a decision; but defensive ideals had for some years prevailed at the Admiralty, where monster ships and guns had seemed more important than the study of war. It followed that, on the day of trial, the High Seas Fleet, with a great inferiority in numbers, gun-power and speed, proved to be better prepared than our own in important respects.*

It remains a popular delusion that the German Fleet did not again show itself in the North Sea, and Mr Churchill has done well to describe in detail the instructive evolutions on Aug. 18, when again this Fleet, less the slow 2nd Battle Squadron, was at sea with a definite plan, and again there was the chance of a fleet action. Two pieces of false information prevented contact. The light cruiser 'Nottingham' was torpedoed by a submarine; but a mine-field trap being suspected, the Grand Fleet was turned about and lost four hours in its movement south. Later, Admiral Scheer received a false report from an airship that strong British forcesthe Harwich flotilla, which was taken for the Grand Fleet-had been seen to the southward, and fearing to be cut off, he returned to port.

The year 1916 reached its 'crimson close,' and 1917— crucial because of the Russian débâcle and the intervention of America-was to see a repetition of the offensive policy in the West against which Mr Churchill consistently inveighs. A local success at Verdun, carried out mainly by General Mangin, had brought a new exponent of the art of war into prominence, and forthwith a stream of celebrities took the road to Verdun and made for the first time acquaintance' with General Nivelle, who had become Commander-in-Chief of the armies of France on Dec. 12, superseding Foch, Pétain, and Castelnau. His 'forceful and continuous argument,' spoken in English, captivated Mr Lloyd George and led to a 'promise,' not communicated to Haig or Robertson, of control over the British forces, which naturally created difficulties. The new strategy was to depend on surprise and, in Nivelle's words, on violence, brutality, and

If it is necessary to find scapegoats, they must be sought at the Admiralty. In 1892, the writer gave a plain warning of what might follow from a warped naval policy.

rapidity.' Mr Churchill lucidly explains the vitiation of the assumed conditions by Ludendorff's sudden withdrawal and the other causes which led to a great failure. On May 15, 1917, Nivelle was dismissed, and it fell to Pétain to render invaluable service by restoring the moral and discipline of the French armies, grievously shaken by the 'experiment' which our and many French generals had viewed from the first with misgivings unshared by Mr Lloyd George. The prolongation of the attack at Paschendaele, attributed to the 'HaigRobertson combination,' is severely condemned. The cost may well seem excessive; but the natural desire of the British generals to occupy the enemy during the critical period of Pétain's labours, and the fact that Sir D. Haig ultimately succeeded in occupying a strong position, might have received recognition.

On July 22, Mr Churchill conveyed his views to the Prime Minister.

'With regard to the East, the truth is staring us in the face. An army of six divisions . . . should be taken from the Salonica front and put in behind Jemal's army. This will force that army to surrender, and all the allied troops in Syria and Palestine, including Allenby's, would be free by the spring of next year for action in Italy or France.'

Mr Lloyd George's response was to offer the command in Palestine to General Smuts, who declined it because his stipulations were not accepted, and General Allenby proceeded to smash Jemal, and in a masterly campaign to drive the Turkish army before him and to occupy Jerusalem. This fine offensive wins Mr Churchill's un

stinted praise. In July 1917 he became Minister of Munitions, and we have an impressive account of the vast activities of his department, which, later, was preparing on a tremendous scale for the 'unfought campaign' of 1919. Yet the almost overwhelming responsibilities thus involved did not suffice, and he was constantly in France watching great battles and occupying a 'central position between the Army and the War Cabinet.'

Before the end of 1917, German intrigue, crowned by the sinister mission of Lenin and his myrmidons, had secured the total collapse of the great Russian armies,

which at the beginning of the year were better equipped than ever before. In October the astounding disaster' at Caporetto occurred, and heavy detachment from the armies in France was needed to re-establish the Italian front. Meanwhile Ludendorff was busily engaged in transferring divisions from the East to the West and in maturing the 'Michaels' and the 'Mars' plans for a mass attack. American forces in large numbers could not be available for many months, and over the High Commands in France brooded the menace of their greatest peril.*

'The cry for a new offensive died away. The mood swung round to pure defence-and against heavy odds. It was a revolution at once silent and complete. I responded to it with instant relief.'

Nevertheless, Mr, Churchill blames Sir W. Robertson for the inadequate reinforcement of our armies, which nearly led to disaster.

'He succeeded in enforcing his policy against the better judgment of successive Cabinents and War Councils, with the result that when he left the War Office in February 1918, the British and French armies were at their weakest strength and fighting power.'

The Field-Marshal has explained the earnest efforts of the military authorities to obtain reinforcements; but Mr Lloyd George believed that we were 'over-insured in the West,' † and according to Mr Churchill, he

'did not feel that, if the troops were once in France, he would be strong enough to resist those military pressures for an offensive which had so often overborne the wiser judgment of Statesmen.'

And yet we are told that military judgment had 'swung round to pure defence'! The result of the Prime Minister's doubt of his powers was the over

* Numerically,' wrote Ludendorff of the time when his concentration in the West was completed, we had never been so strong in comparison with our enemies,' and he has recently explained that, by March 1918, he had brought more than 480,000 German troops from Russia, Rumania and Italy to the Western front ('New York American,' May 22, 1927).

There were at this time nearly 760,000 troops in the East (Sir W. Robertson).

whelming of our 5th Army and a heavy handicap in the 'fearful year which was approaching.'

Mr Churchill is at his best in describing the course of 'the mightiest military conception and the most terrific onslaught which the annals of war record.' His chapters dealing with Ludendorff's smashing blows delivered against our armies during forty days and at length parried, with the tremendous attacks on the French, based upon the surprise on the Chemin des Dames on May 27 and pressed beyond the Marne, and with the 'turn of the tide,' when the stricken forces of the Allies swept back the German hordes and won a final and crushing victory, are admirable. The prolonged ordeal of the splendid troops of France and Britain, and of their sorely-tried commanders, could not be more impressively portrayed. Ludendorff's tremendous effort, which Mr Churchill unsparingly condemns, was nearly justified by success, which the American army, just in time to act with vigour and to hearten the war-worn forces of the Allies, rendered impossible. But for the fortitude of the British soldier and the devotion of the French poilu, which by the end of July had stemmed the 'most terrific onslaught' in the annals of war, what might not have happened? General Mangin's flanking counterstroke on July 18, in which two strong American divisions took part, and General Rawlinson's brilliantly successful attack on Aug. 8 marked the beginning of the ebb tide. Henceforth gloom settled down upon the German Headquarters.

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At the end of August, the Cabinet sent an amazing message to Sir D. Haig warning him against the losses which a great offensive might involve-a message which would have shaken the determination of a weak commander. It is pleasant to find that Mr Churchill realises that our General had a truer view' of the situation than the national leaders.' But this significant admission is marred by a reiterated condemnation of the 'obstinacy and serene confidence' of Foch and Haig, who devised and carried out the measures which led in a few months to complete victory, while as late as

* What we owe to the fact that General Pershing from the first realised the gravity of the situation and that the American Government, therefore, made preparations on a vast scale has been inadequately recognised.

Sept. 5, Mr Churchill was contemplating the 'unfought campaign' of 1919.

As historian, Mr. Churchill suffers from a natural desire to record the prominent and often valuable part which his vigorous personality played in council, from a too exalted estimate of 'the wiser judgment of Statesmen,' and from a superabundance of speculative criticism. He has given us pictures of war which can fearlessly challenge comparison with those of Napier and of Tolstoy. As a vivid narrative of a long sequence of tremendous events, his book will not be surpassed. Valuable material of many kinds has been brought together and lucidly recorded. The chapters entitled 'The Munitions Budget' and 'Britain conquers the UBoats' embody permanent contributions to history. If, as I have ventured to point out, his analysis of cause and effect and his attribution of blame to some of the actors in the great tragedy are not always just, this arises from personal bias uncorrected by adequate study of the past, and from a natural combativeness which supplies the spice that will attract a large section of readers.

That the Great War was in many respects gravely mismanaged, partly by reason of the inherent disabilities of our forms of democracy for the conduct of war, cannot be denied ; but it may be that the huge scale of operations, and the difficulty of balancing the advantages and disadvantages of widely separated yet interdependent plans were beyond the capacity of the human brain. The great political lessons, bearing upon the supreme direction of operations so complex, are best conveyed in the measured pages of Sir W. Robertson's revealing book, which serves as a needed corrective to many passages in Mr Churchill's always fascinating volumes.

SYDENHAM OF COMBE.

In America, no injurious conflict between the 'Statesmen' and General Pershing seems to have arisen in regard to the huge military preparations begun in 1917.