It was indeed too late,' since all the conditions which justified the original project had passed away long before this authority' was forthcoming.

In didactic mood, Mr Churchill outlines his policy as regards the handling of the whole campaign in France and Flanders, and the tactical conceptions which he sketches with a light hand, colour much of his abundant military criticism. His policy is defined as an 'active defensive.' 'Suppose,' he writes, 'that we,

'both British and French, have trained our armies behind the trench line to a high standard of flexible manoeuvring efficiency; suppose we have permanently fortified, with concrete and every modern device, those portions of the front where we cannot retreat; suppose we have long selected and shrewdly weakened those portions where we could afford to give 20 or 30 kilometres of ground; suppose that we lure the enemy to attack them and make great pockets and bulges in a thin and yielding front, and then, just as he thinks himself pressing on to final victory, strike with independent counter-offensive on the largest scale and with deeply planned railways, not at his fortified trench line, but at the flanks of a moving, quivering line of battle'!

To this general policy, artifice should have been added. 'Craft, foresight, deep comprehension of the verities, not only local but general; stratagems, devices, manœuvres, all of these on the grand scale are demanded from the chiefs of great armies.'

These are manifestly counsels of perfection based upon experiences dearly bought; but it is unlikely that they entirely escaped the purview of the generals whom Mr Churchill criticises. It must be admitted that our splendid infantry was sometimes used before it was fully trained to 'a high standard of flexible manoeuvring efficiency'; but valiant attempts were made to 'make great pockets and bulges,' and their comparative failure was in great part due to conditions which Mr Churchill ignores. The enemy's 'fortified trench line' had in any case to be broken through on a broad front before the 'quivering' flanks of his army could be attacked, and when this had been accomplished, much time was required to bring the artillery to new positions and to organise supply. Such efforts, and notably that of Ludendorff

in 1918, always came to a standstill during which the threatened forces could draw upon reserves and create a new defensive line. Mr Churchill's policy would have been to lure the enemy' to make these bulges' just where it suited our preparations; but the Germans, though committing gigantic errors in his opinion, were well served in the matter of information, and in vain is the snare if the bird has observed it. Our armies were never free to adopt an independent policy, but were forced to conform to conditions either arising in France or prescribed by the enemy. The fighting of 1916 was dominated by Falkenhayn's decision to make a mass attack on Verdun, which Mr Churchill regards as dictated by a hopelessly false strategy. That of 1917 was virtually ordained by the 'Nivelle experiment,' deranged from the first by Ludendorff's sudden withdrawal. In that of 1918, German initiative governed the action of the allied generals until the general advance to victory.

In the form of a Political Interlude' (Chapter X) Mr Churchill deals with some of the political reactions which powerfully affected the course of the War. Of the break up of the Asquith Cabinet and its implications, he has much to tell. In July 1915, he drew up an important report for the Cabinet, the gist of which was that the then methods of recruiting were unjust and inadequate. The time for ordered conscription had come, though this was not stated, and divisions in the Cabinet made a thorough discussion' impossibly dangerous. The personal differences of leading politicians thus prevented the truth from being laid before Parliament and the nation. Many weeks slipped away in deadlock,' and at length the Derby scheme was evolved as a compromise, well intentioned and well directed, but quite insufficient to meet the realities of the military situation. Further prolonged political complications followed, and after consideration by numerous committees, the new Man Power Bill was not introduced in the House of Commons till April 9, 1917, and was quickly passed though not wholly satisfactory. Over these protracted proceedings Mr Churchill skates too lightly; but happily Sir W. Robertson has filled up the gaps and explained the great

efforts of the soldiers to bring home the dire needs of the situation to successive Cabinets.

With the setting up of the Lloyd George Government in December 1916 a new political era dawned, and fresh vigour was imparted, in certain respects, to the tremendous national effort; but strategic inspiration was not apparent. Mr Churchill claims the fortunate destruction of 'a series of absurd conventions.'

'The first and most monstrous of these was that the Generals and Admirals were more competent to deal with the broad issues of the war than abler men in other spheres of life.'

Much might be written about this 'most monstrous' convention, and it will be admitted that the 'abler men' should prevail in council; but the underlying assumption that 'national leaders,' upon whom democracy has thoughtlessly conferred position in peace time, are able to dispense with a long study of war and to become instantly fit to stand by Cæsar and give directions,' needs qualification. Any attempt to estimate the respective contributions of these 'national leaders' and of the professional chiefs to the changing scenes in the great world tragedy could only lead to interminable controversy. Both-French and British-played essential parts. Neither could perform the rôle falling to the other.

Mr Churchill pays a well-deserved tribute to the qualities of Mr Lloyd George; but, in view of his many admonitions and of his speech at the secret session of Parliament, he cannot acquit the Prime Minister of his responsibility' for not stopping the 'offensive in France.' He even makes it clear that Mr Lloyd George's curious fascination by Nivelle led to proceedings which the military chiefs regarded with grave misgivings. He is entitled to claim credit for the First Minister of the Crown, who at least sanctioned 'the convoy system, which broke the U-boat attack at sea; the forward impulsion in Palestine which overwhelmed the Turks, and the unified command which inaugurated the crowning victory in France.' But if Mr Lloyd George was really working for a Generalissimo, he moved by 'cautious, devious but persevering steps, extremely laborious and mystifying.' Even so late as November 1917 he declared in the House of Commons:

'I am utterly opposed to that suggestion [a Generalissimo]. It would not work. It would produce real friction, and might produce not merely friction between the armies, but friction between the nations and the Governments.'

Inexorable circumstances-not Mr Lloyd George-raised Foch, a week ago described as a "dotard," to the supreme command at Doullens on March 26, 1918.

The year 1916 opened in gloom. The Russians had suffered a series of heavy defeats, Bulgaria had entered the War, and Serbia had been over-run. General Townshend's force was imprisoned at Kut, and the relic of the Dardanelles expedition still lingered in a position of much danger at Helles. The failure of this great venture was, in Mr Churchill's view, fatal to Lord Kitchener'! Moltke had gone under, and on Feb. 21, 1916, Falkenhayn began his terrific attack on Verdun, which throughout the year largely ruled the course of the Western campaign. The threat to the vital Mezières-Thionville railway may have influenced von Falkenhayn; but Mr Churchill considers that this momentous decision was a German mistake of the first class, and that the French, by whom the retention of this old and dismantled fortress was treated as a point of honour,

'would have been wise to play with the Germans around Verdun, economising their forces as much as possible. . . and endeavouring to lead their enemies into a pocket or other unfavourable position.'

Space fails to discuss this and other highly disputable imaginings.

The series of great battles on the Somme are admirably described; but Mr Churchill, in accordance with the views he consistently upholds, under-rates the effects obtained at heavy cost. The mass attacks on the Somme were not far from success, and it is Ludendorff who declared that the decline of the military might of Germany dates from 1916, when we were completely exhausted on the Western front.' If, as Mr Churchill admits, 'never again did the mass of German rank and file fight as they fought on the Somme,' the cruel sacrifices of the allied armies were not all in vain. Nevertheless, in a long Memorandum of August 1916,

circulated to the Cabinet, and in his text, he reaches a 'sombre verdict,' and criticisms are abundant. It is pleasanter to turn to his fine tribute to Kitchener's Army of which the 'battlefields of the Somme were the graveyards.' Nowhere else is his mastery of forceful English more worthily or more effectively employed.

The time has not yet come for an impartial judgment, in this country at least, on the causes of the most momentous failure in our naval history. Four years elapsed after the Battle of Jutland before the movements of Admiral Scheer at the critical period were understood, and fictions thus arose and became deep-rooted The earlier diagrams of the manoeuvres of the fleets were most misleading, and the evolution, which the High Seas Fleet had sedulously practised, was held to be impracticable by our naval authorities long after it had been successfully carried out three times by the German command. Mr Churchill's views, expressed three months after the event, were precise and dogmatic. There was,' he wrote, 'no strategic cause' impelling us to fight off the Danish coast. What harm does it do us if the German Fleet takes a promenade at sea?' To him, therefore, it then appeared that 'naval history records no prouder assertion of fighting superiority on the part of the stronger fleet' than the abortive action of May 31, 1916. He now describes this action with a wealth of detail, and he finds much to criticise.

In a sense, the issue may be said to have been predetermined by two untoward conditions. In the first place, the structural defects of Lord Fisher's battle cruisers helped to rob Sir D. Beatty of a decisive victory over Admiral Hipper's squadron, when he reached an interposing position with a force, nominally at least, far superior to that of his antagonist, for whom escape was apparently impossible. If the four 'Queen Elizabeths' had been in company with the Battle Cruiser Fleet when the action began, a smashing blow might still have been delivered; but grave defects in signalling arrangements appeared on other occasions, as Rear-Admiral Harper records, and the blame which Mr Churchill imputes to Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas for the unfortunate delay

* By Sir F. Smith, now Lord Birkenhead.