concur in enabling him to discharge it in a manner worthy of the country. That the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with the United States of America, which was concluded and signed by commissioners, duly authorized for that purpose, on the last day of the year 1806, had not taken effect, in consequence of the refusal of the president to ratify that instrument. That, for an unauthorized act of force committed against an American ship of war, he did not hesitate to offer immediate and spontaneous reparation; but an attempt had been made by the American government to connect with the question which had arisen out of that circumstance, pretensions inconsistent with the maritime rights of Great Britain; and such pretensions he was determined never to admit. Nevertheless, he hoped that the American government would be actuated by the same desire to preserve the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, which had ever influenced his conduct, and that any difficulties in the discussion then depending might be effectually removed. It stated, farther, that, in consequence of the decree by which France declared the whole of his majesty's dominions to be in a state of blockade, and subjected to seizure and confiscation the produce and manufactures of his kingdom, he had resorted, in the first instance, to a measure of mitigated retaliation; but that, this measure having proved ineffectual for its object, he had found it necessary to adopt others of greater rigour, which required the aid of parliament to give them complete and effectual operation. The resources of the country continued to be so abundant during the last year,

as to have produced, both from the temporary and permanent revenue, a receipt considerably larger than that of the year preceding; he confidently hoped, therefore, that it would be found possible to raise the necessary supplies for the present, without any material addition to the public burdens. It concluded by affirming, that, if ever there was a just and national war, it is that which his majesty is now compelled to prose-cute. This war is, in its principle, purely defensive; his majesty looks but to the attainment of a secure and honourable peace; but such a peace can only be negociated upon a footing of perfect equality. The eyes of Europe, and of the world, are fixed on the British parliament; if that parliament displayed the characteristic spirit of the British nation, and faced, unappalled, the unnatural combination which was gathered around, it was the king's firm persuasion, that, under the blessing of Divine Providence, the struggle would prove ultimately successful and glorious.

The Earl of Galloway, in moving an address, according to customary form, touched upon all the topics of the speech. The capture of Copenhagen, he said, verified all that government had foreseen; an arsenal was found there over-supplied with every material of equipment, magazines replete with stores, which were ascertained to have been purchased by the agents of France, and it was evident, from proofs which no seaman could mistake, that the fleet was on the eve of being fitted out. Concerning Russia, he hoped some good would be extracted out of evil, and that we should become independent of her for ever If the legislature

would grant a liberal bounty to encourage the cultivation of hemp and flax, both at home, and in the British colonies, our quarrel with the Emperor Alexander would, indeed, be beneficial to us. The opinion which he expressed concerning America, differed, in some degree, from that of the ministry, and it came with weight from him as a naval officer. It was not, he said, his intention, to dispute the principle of respect which is due to national ships of war, as applicable to the government and nations of Europe, but, as merited by America, he was inclined to think, that, if all the details of that transaction were before the house, their lordships themselves would question it. He was, however, happy to learn, that it was not the intention of ministers to concede one point more to that illiberal and prejudiced people. A stand must be made somewhere, and where can it be made better than in defence of our seamen and our trade, which they unequivocally demand?

The Duke of Norfolk moved, as an amendment to the address, that all that part of it which approved the expedition to Denmark should be omitted. He did not wish it to be understood that he meant to condemn the expedition; for, if he were well informed concerning it, he might, perhaps, approve it himself as warmly as any man: but, among the papers which were ordered to be laid before parliament, there was not a single document upon this subject. It was inferred from the tenor of this speech, that the Prince of Wales and his friends were not disposed to censure the conduct of ministers on this occasion. On the other hand, it was supposed, that the

king had given a reluctant consent to the attack upon Copenhagen, because Lord Sidmouth totally condemned it. His arguments were, that Denmark had given no indications of a hostile disposition towards this country. At the time our fleet entered the Baltic the Danish army was in Holstein, prepared to resist the French, or any other power that should attempt to violate their neutrality. When did this perfect understanding between Denmark and France take place? The definitive treaty between France and Russia was signed on the 8th of July, and Lord Gambier entered the Baltic on the 3d of August. Therefore it was not possible that ministers could have acted upon any information which they had obtained of the secret engagements entered into between France and Russia. To justify the attack upon Copenhagen, it ought to have been proved, that the danger was a danger of great magnitude, and such as could not be warded off by other means; for, certainly, the calamity inflicted was not proportioned to the calamity apprehended. If Holstein had been occupied by the French, still Zealand was not at their mercy; nothing but such a frost as would render the Great Belt passable for an army could have endangered it; but, supposing the French had got there, and obtained possession of the Danish fleet, he would not so derogate from the valour, the activity, and the exalted character of the British navy, as to admit, for one moment, that any well-grounded apprehensions were to be entertained from the addition of sixteen sail of the line to the maritime strength of the enemy. Still, he trusted, ministers

would yet be able to lay such documents before the house, as would justify an enterprise which so deeply involved the honour and character of the nation. Upon the other topics of the speech, and the address, Lord Sidmouth coincided with ministry. The emigration of the court of Lisbon, he said, was a measure which reflected immortal honour upon the Prince of Brazil, and promised the greatest advantages to England, not immediately, indeed, but ultimately. We had done wisely towards America in not insisting on the right to search ships of war, for our restrictive policy should be commensurate to the exigency of the case. He then adverted to the petitions for peace, and justly censured them, saying, there was no ground for doubting the disposition of ministers to make peace when it could be done with security and honour to the country. The way to restore peace was to adopt a plan of expenditure that should enable us to carry on the war, and to convince the enemy that his plan of ruining our finances was hopeless; but it was in vain to look for a secure peace, unless a military system should be adopted which should be available at all times.

Lord Grenville entered into a wider field of discussion. It was truly asserted, he said, in the speech, that the eyes of Europe, and of the world, were fixed upon the British parliament. There is on the continent a great reliance on the integrity and on the justice of the British parliament; they look with anxiety for its decision upon the motives and the policy of the expedition against Denmark. It has already made an impression throughout the continent unfavourable to this country. How much greater would that impression

be, if parliament gave its decision, approving that expedition, and still more, if it approved it without any evidence or information upon the subject? In his majesty's declaration respecting that subject, secretarticles were stated to exist in the treaty of Tilsit, proving a determination to form a hostile confederacy against this country, of which Denmark was to make a part. In the declaration respecting Russia we were told, not of secret articles, but of arrangements made at Tilsit, and now in the king's speech neither the one nor the other were mentioned. Thus had the grounds been shifted upon which the expedition was justified, and thus had the assertion which was to prove its necessity been first weakened, and finally abandoned. It was indeed laid down, by the most approved writers on the law of nations, that, where you have certain evidence of the intention of an enemy to seize upon the territory, vessels, or property of a neutral, such neutral being incapable of resisting, and thereby to place you in imminent danger, you have a right to seize them yourself, for your own safety; but the same writers state the dreadful consequences which would result from the applicátion of such a doctrine, unless the imperative circumstances were accurately defined; the intention of the enemy, the danger to yourself, and the incapability of the neutral, ought all to be clearly established. The intention on the part of France he admitted, but how, he asked, did that bear upon the point? and how, even if Denmark had become a party to a treaty against this country, could that be a justification for setzing her fleet and her territories? After showing, in what respect, the proof of the other points was de

fective, he lamented that the speech should be so worded as to tend to induce a belief that peace would be rejected; and though he censured the petitioners, he censured ministers also, for asserting, that we should not enter into a negociation, unless the basis were previously stated, and that we should not avail ourselves of the mediation of any power suspected of partiality to the enemy. As to Portugal, it appeared to him, he said, that ministers had appreciated the subject very erroneously indeed. We had lost Lisbon and Porto, two of the most important ports for us on the whole coast of the continent; and what had we gained? The increased culture of Brazil, far from being of service, would be injurious to us; and he could not conceive how the emigration of the court of Portugal to that territory could extend the market for our goods, which it had already afforded us. So far as that emigration evinced any friendship for us, or presented a contrast to the conduct of other powers, it certainly formed a grateful subject for the contemplation of mankind. But as to the commercial and political advantages to be derived from it, he could not consent to delude his countrymen by holding out such hopes, and he was rather of opinion with the French, that the transfer of the Portugueze government to Brazil, would be more advantageous to France than to England.

So many points of much greater parliamentary, party, and immediate interest were discussed in this debate, that what Lord Grenville asserted respecting Brazil was left unanswered. Hitherto we had had no direct trade with that country; every thing went through Lisbon, and when it reached Brazil, was clogged with hea

VOL. I. PART. I,

vy duties, and the charges of a second freight. Hitherto the court of Lisbon had acted towards its colonies upon a jealous system of policy, fearful of their growing strength, and anxious to keep them in dependence. Now that St Sebastian was become the capital of the Braganzas, this feeble system was at an end, and the strength of the colony became the security of the sovereign. Thus, then, the removal of the court necessarily tended to the encouragement of commerce, and the consumption of English goods would be increased in proportion as they could be afforded cheaper. Lord Sidmouth had rightly observed, that this removal would ultimately produce the greatest advantages to England, not immediately, it was easily to be foreseen that the greediness of our speculators would overstock the market, and make the trade a losing one for a time; so far, therefore, Lord Grenville said wisely, when he declared, that he would not delude the people with flattering hopes; but, in thinking it probable that France would derive more benefit from this great event than England, he advanced a paradox which he did not attempt to support; and, in affirming that the increased prosperity of Brazil would be injurious to us, he betrayed a predilection for what are called "truly British interests," the basis of a pitiful system, equally selfish and short-sighted.

Lord Grenville proceeded to the affairs of America. A war with America, he said, would be the greatest additional calamity for us, and the greatest advantage for France. Ministers had studiously separated the two questions which were in dispute, the attack upon the Chesapeak, and the Orders in Council: but those

questions could not be separated in America, nor could they be separated in discussion here. When all the papers, relative to these orders, were laid before the house, it would then be for them to enquire whether his majesty's government could constitutionally enact such prohibitions. He maintained, that they had actually violated an article of magna-charta. America had received the most satisfactory assurances from France, that its blockading decree would not be acted upon against American shipping; in point of fact it never was acted upon, he did not think that France ever intended to act upon it; he believed that, and all other decrees of the same character, were but mere experiments upon the wisdom and discretion of the British government, experimentswhich, unfortunately,had been but too successful. The French decrees must have been a mere dead letter, except in their own ports, and could have availed nothing, if ministers had acted prudently; but, by their precipitance, they had placed this country, with regard to America, in that state in which France otherwise would have stood; for though the system of restriction originated with our enemy, we had so adopted it as to ap propriate the odium to ourselves.In concluding his speech, he prest upon the house, the necessity of immediate enquiry into the state of Ireland, with a view to the adoption of measures calculated to conciliate the population of that country. The principal points to which he would direct the attention of the house, upon this subject, were familiar to their lordships, and he conjured his majesty's ministers to use their utmost endeavours to remove every obstruction to the attainment of those objects; for, compared to the question of Ire

land, every other subject which called for their attention, every topic that had been alluded to in the course of the debate, was trifling, and was, in fact, little else than driving nails into the sheathing of a ship, while her main timbers were on the point of starting.

Lord Hawkesbury's reply related chiefly to Denmark. Evidence, he said, was required of the secret engagements, in the treaty of Tilsit, to employ the navies of Denmark and Portugal against this country; but that evidence was of a description which could not possibly be produced: for, were government to communicate private information, there would be an end of all confidence ; and, at this time, when Europe was under the controul of France, the lives of individuals, friendly to this country, would inevitably fall a sacrifice. But even the papers published by the French government did not contradict the assertion, and there were facts which corroborated it. It was corroborated by the testimony of the Portugueze government, to whom it was proposed to make common cause with the Continent against England, and to unite their fleet with that of Spain, of France, and of Denmark-to make a general attack upon this island. It was corroborated by the testimony of different persons in Ireland, where it was promised, that these combined fleets would make a descent, both there and upon England; and the time when this design was to be attempted was announced to the disaffected. The intention of Denmark could not be doubted. He lamented the uncalled-for mention of the state of Ireland. The concessions alluded to could not now be thought of. Indeed, even if these concessions were made, still greater