strictest sense, intolerable; not because it aims at the extinction of life, but of every thing which gives life its value, of virtue, of reason, of repose in God, or in truth." Such was the state of Portugal at the time when the patriots in Andalusia were pressing on Dupont, when the intruder was advancing to Madrid, and when Palafox was so gloriously defending the streets and houses of Zaragoza. There was no force which could withstand the French in battle, with any reasonable hope of success; yet neither the slaughter which was made among them in the field, nor the massacre which took place upon the fugitives, nor the murders which were committed upon the prisoners, could break the spirit of the Portugueze. The enemy were masters only of as much country as they could over-run, and even there their small parties were cut off, and every straggler put to the death which he deserved. As soon as the French departed from the solitude which they had made, they who had escaped collected again, and again renewed the war, which they were the better enabled to do, because the Spaniards along the whole line of frontier, not having an immediate enemy, were enabled to afford assistance. Thus the unconquerable spirit of the patriots in Estremadura and Alentejo, notwithstanding the carnage *which was made among them, prevented Junot from sending forces to Porto and to Algarve. These transactions in Spain and Portugal excited the deepest interest in the English people, not so much for the hope, which had thus unexpectedly arisen, of advantages to England, and to the general welfare of Europe, as for the nature of the contest, their detestation of the unequalled iniquity by which it had been provoked, and their sympathy in the instinct and principle by which it was carried on. Every day seemed lost till an army of our own should be cooperating with men engaged in a cause so sacred, so congenial to the feelings of a Briton. Such was the eagerness to participate in the glorious struggle, that the militia almost universally offered themselves for foreign service, and the country called for an effort equal to the occasion, which, had it been made, would, according to all reasonable calculation of success, have completed the work that had now been begun, and, in all human probability, have destroyed the fortune of Buonaparte. That this effort was not made, is not exclusively imputable to the English cabinet, deficient as it unfortunately was, both in foresight and in vigour. The juntas preferred assistance in money and supplies to an auxiliary force, foreseeing the danger, that mutual dislike would arise between combined armies, whose habits and * Yet it has been said that the Portugueze resigned themselves to their fate without a struggle! that nothing was sufficient to rouse them!-that they murmured at French oppression, but bore it. Against these extraordinary charges, made by an officer in Sir J. Moore's expedition, the authority of Sir A. Wellesley may be quoted. In his dispatches of August 8th, he says, "The whole kingdom, with the exception of the neighbourhood of Lisbon, is in a state of insurrection against the French: their means of resistance are, however, less powerful than those of the Spaniards. Their troops had been completely dispersed, their officers had gone off to Brazil, and their arsenals pillaged, or in the power of the enemy; and their revolt, under the circumstances in which it has taken place, is still more extraordinary than that of the Spanish nation." prejudices were so widely dissimilar, and perhaps also having an undue confidence in their own strength. In Portugal, however, our aid was need-, ed; and it was not doubted that, when the deliverance of that kingdom was completed, a plan of co-operation with the Spaniards might be arranged. A rumour was thrown out, that the Duke of Yok would take the command upon this expedition: the manner in which it was received curiously discovered the general feeling. By those writers who were the avowed political enemies of the duke, the keenest and most stinging sarcasm was employed-others, who maintain for their journals a character of uniform decorum, gravely deprecated the thought of exposing one of the royal family, and warned ministers against consenting to such an appointment, as if, upon these grounds, it were a crime. The sound constitutional plea was urged by others, that if a prince were employed, there could be no actual responsibility, and responsibility ought to be inseparable from command. There was not, perhaps, any point upon which the whole nation so entirely accorded in opinion. An expedition had been preparing at Cork, which, as different prospects opened upon us, had been supposed to be destined, at one time for Ceuta, at another, for South America. The destination was now fixed for the peninsula, and the command was given to Sir Arthur Wellesley,-an appointment not less grateful to the army than it was to the people. A general order which was issued to the army at this time, however unsuitable it may appear to the dignity of historical narration, is yet too characteristic to be omitted. The commander-in-chief gave notice that his majesty had been graciously pleased to dispense with the use of queues until farther orders; and the officers were directed to take care that the men's hair should be cut close to their necks, in the neatest and most uni form manner, and that their heads should be kept perfectly clean, by combing, brushing, and frequently washing them; for which latter essential purpose, it was his majesty's pleasure that a small spunge should hereafter be added to each man's regimental necessaries. Such orders, issued at such a time, indicate by what kind of spirit the military system of Great Britain was regulated. They excited the scorn of many persons, the wonder of all: they who felt the deepest interest in the honour of the country, and in those principles the immediate fate of which seemed to depend upon the issue of this war, regarded them with shame and sorrow, as matter of mockery for the enemy, and of evil omen før ourselves. 1 CHAP. XIX. Sir Arthur Wellesley's Campaign in Portugal. Battle of Vimiera. Armistice and Convention of Cintra. General astonishment and indignation of the People of England. Proceedings at Lisbon. Public Meetings in Engand. Court of Inquiry. SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, having about ten thousand men under his command, sailed from Cork on the 12th of July, and leaving the fleet as soon as he had seen it clear of the coast, to make its way for Cape Finisterre, he himself made all sail, in a frigate, for Coruna, and arrived there on the 20th. There the junta of Galicia informed him of the battle of Rio Seco, and that the French, being, in consequence, masters of the course of the Douro, were enabled to cut off the communication between that province and the country to the south and east. The French in Portugal were estimated at 15,000, of whom twelve were supposed to be at Lisbon; and he was told that the Portugueze troops at Porto amounted to 10,000, and that a Spanish corps of 2000 had begun their march for that city on the 15th, and were expected to arrive there about the 25th. Arthur consulted with them concerning the immediate employment of his army. They explicitly stated that they were in no need of men, but wanted arms, ammunition, and money:-this latter want was relieved by the arrival of £200,000 from England, that very day. They strongly recommended him to employ his forces against Junot, because while his army remained unbroken, the Spaniards could never make any simultaneous effort to drive the French out of the peninsula; and they advised him to land in the north of Portugal, that he might bring forward and avail himself of the Portugueze troops in that quarter. Accordingly Sir Arthur sailed for Porto, ordering the fleet to follow him. He arrived there the 24th, and had a conference that night with the bishop and the general officers. From them, and from Lieutenantcolonel Browne, who had previously joined them, he learnt that the regular Portugueze troops who had been collected amounted to 5000 men, and were posted at Coimbra that there were about 1200 peasants Sir in advance, and a corps of 2500 Portugueze and 300 Spanish infantry at Porto, besides volunteers and peasants; but all were badly equipped and armed, the peasantry having only pikes. It was concerted that the 5000 should co-operate with him, and the remainder with the Spanish corps, then on its way from Galicia, and that the peasantry should be employed, part in the blockade of Almeida, part in the defence of Tras os Montes, which province was supposed to be threatened by Bessieres, in consequence of his victory at Rio Seco. Here Sir Arthur received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, advising him to leave the troops either at Porto or at the mouth of the Mondego, and proceed to communicate with him off Lisbon. The fleet accordingly was ordered to Mondego Bay, and the general proceeded to confer with Sir Charles. There he found dispatches from General Spencer, stating that he had landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the junta of Seville; but that he had resisted the applications made to him to join Castanos, thinking it advisable to preserve his force unbroken, to act with Sir Arthur. He had, however, consented to take up a position at Xeres, where he might serve as a point of support for Castanos, in case of defeat, and from whence he could reimbark in eight-and-forty hours. He supposed that Sir Arthur would begin his campaign at Cadiz, implying an opinion that Dupont could not be defeated without English assistance. Sir Arthur, however, being convinced by the junta of Galicia that his army would be employed with more advantage to the common cause against Junot, ordered General Spencer to join him off the coast of Portugal, unless he should be actually engaged in operations which he could not relinquish without loss to the Spaniards. General Spencer represented Junot's force as exceeding 20,000 men: the admiral, according to the reports of the Portugueze, estimated them at less: Sir Arthur concluded that they were from 16 to 18,000, of whom about 12,000 were at Lisbon, and in its vicinity, and 2400 at Alcobaça. Any attempt at landing in the Tagus was considered impracti cable: it would be equally so at Cascaes it was at all times difficult to land an army in the small bays near the rock, now especially dangerous in the neighbourhood of the enemy. Peniche was garrisoned by the French. There was therefore no choice but to disembark in the Mondego. Thither Sir Arthur returned. He rejoined the fleet there on the 30th, and there he found intelligence of the defeat of Dupont, and advice from his own government, that he would be reinforced immediately with 5000 men, under Brigadier-ge neral Auckland, and afterwards with the 10,000 who had been under Sir John Moore in Sweden, the command being vested in Sir Hew Dalrymple. He also received accounts that Loison had been detached from Lisbon, to open the communication with Elvas, the patriots in Alentejo having been joined by about a thousand men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and being now formidable. This latter account made him conclude that there was no danger of being attacked by superior numbers before the arrival of his reinforcements; and he began to disembark on the first of August. The weather was so little favourable, and the surf so high, that the whole of the troops were not landed till the 5th, and on that day General Spencer arrived, his corps following him the next. He had embarked immediately upon learning the surrender of Dupont, not waiting for instructions. This corps was disembarked on the 7th cers. and 8th, on which night the whole army were in readiness to advance: the march of the main body was, however, delayed till the 10th, at the desire of the Portugueze general offiSir Arthur conferred with them at Montemor o Velho, and arranged the plan of operations: he armed and inspected their troops, recommended and superintended their organization, and offered as large a sum as his military funds could afford, to defray the expences of their equipment: this, however, was declined by their officers. While the troops were landing, four companies of Portugueze cavalry arrived at Coimbra, having effected their escape from Lisbon. This hazardous attempt was planned and conducted by Feliciano de Carvalho. A serjeant, by name Gamboa, as soon as their flight was discovered, was dispatched to the French commander at Santarem, with orders to intercept and make an example of them, according to the atrocious system of these barbarians. Gamboa, however, with the party under his command, followed and joined his countrymen; and they accomplished their dangerous march in safety. Sir Arthur determined to march along the road nearest the sea, for the sake of communicating with the fleet of store-ships; but as this communication must needs be very precarious, both as depending upon the state of the surf, and also because the army might find it expedient to strike more into the country, arrangements were made for taking with them sufficient stores to last till they should reach the Tagus. The advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under Generals Hill and Ferguson. Laborde and Thomiere had collected their corps, to the amount of from 5 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leiria; they threatened the magazines formed in that city for the Portugueze army; and Sir Arthur was urged to advance as speedily as possible, for the sake of preserving them. The main body followed on the 10th: on that day Sir Arthur received advices from Coruna, informing him that neither Blake nor Cuesta was in a condition to act offensively against Bessieres, nor to follow him, if he should enter Portugal. But at the same time news arrived of the flight of the intruder from Madrid; and Sir Arthur perceived that Bessieres would be more solicitous to cover his retreat towards the French frontier, than to attempt a diversion in favour of Junot. At all events, there was time enough for his operations against the latter before the former could possibly arrive; and it was to be expected that General Auckland, or Sir John Moore, would land before Bessieres could come up. These advices, therefore, only determined him to follow up the plan of operations which he had concerted with the utmost celerity. On the 11th, the main body joined the advanced guard at Leiria, and the next day the Portugueze force, consisting of 6000 men, including 600 cavalry, arrived, the whole force being now collected there. Loison, meantime, having added to his force about 1000 men, from the garrison of Setubal, had again over-run Alentejo, dispersed the small detachment of the Spaniards which had entered that province, perpetrated fresh slaughters at Evora, re-victualled Elvas, then, turning back, crossed the Tagus, by the bridge of boats, at Abrantes, and arrived at Thomar on the same day |