IDENCE-SUFFICIENCY-APPEAL-COSTS. 1. When a husband fraudulently conveyed land to his wife she could not, as against his creditors, execute a valid mortgage thereon for a debt of the husband barred by limitations. 2. Where a husband fraudulently conveyed land to his wife, she could not execute a valid mortgage thereon to her father, based on unauthorized payments by him of insurance money due by the husband, the payments being made by the father to protect the wife's interest in the property. 3. Interest on mortgages on the land, assumed by the wife on conveyance to her, could not form the basis of a valid indebtedness sustaining the mortgage to the father, he never having actually paid the interest, and being under no legal obligation to do so. 4. Items for store account, board, and clothing to the wife and children while she had left her husband and was living with her father, could not support the mortgage to her father, in the absence of evidence that the items were furnished at the husband's request, or under circumstances rendering him liable. 5. The mortgage, being largely in excess of the real indebtedness of the husband to the father, who had knowledge of the insolvency, was presumptively fraudulent. 6. In taxing costs against an appellee, the expense of printing a portion of appellant's brief, containing an unnecessary reprint of the complaint, answer, and findings, will not be allowed. Appeal from circuit court, Dodge county; James J. Dick, Judge. Proceedings in aid of execution by John G. Liver against August Thielke, impleaded, etc., to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance and mortgage. From the judgment the plaintiff appeals. Reversed. The plaintiff is a judgment creditor of the defendant John Frey. An execution having been issued and returned unsatisfied, the plaintiff brings this action in aid of execution to set aside a deed from Frey to his wife, the defendant Augusta, and a mortgage given by the wife to defendant Thielke. The facts material to the questions involved, as found by the court, may be stated as follows: May 18, 1901, John Frey was insolvent. On that day he executed and delivered to his wife a deed of about 60 acres of land, subject to two mortgages, for which the wife paid no consideration. The defendant Thielke, who is the father of the defendant Augusta, was present when said deed was delivered. On the same day Augusta executed and delivered to Thielke a mortgage for $1,500 on this same land. The evidence shows that this mortgage was given without the knowledge or consent of John Frey. The court found it was given to secure an actual indebtedness of $1,500, owing by John Frey to Thielke, and for no other consideration, and that the latter holds said mortgage to secure a bona fide indebtedness, without fraud. The evidence shows items of indebtedness claimed by Thielke against Frey as follows: Money loaned in 1887, $300; milk delivered in 1887, $150; Frey's note to Metzger, Thielke surety, $507; Frey's note to Norton, Thielke surety, $300; interest to Herman Insurance Company, $100; Frey's store account to Thielke, $52; board for Frey's wife and children, $60; clothes and supplies for same, $75; interest on two mortgages on 60 acres, $175; horse sold Frey 1895, $125; four cattle sold Frey 1895, $60,$1,904. The court concluded that the deed in question was fraudulent and void, and should be set aside; that Augusta Frey had legal authority to execute the mortgage to her father, and that the latter holds it as a valid claim on said land. Judgment was ordered accordingly. Plaintiff requested findings to the effect that the mortgage to Thielke was without authority from Frey, and was fraudulent and void as to creditors, which the court refused. Due exceptions were taken to the court's findings and refusal to find, and from the judgment entered as directed the plaintiff takes this appeal. Sawyer & Sawyer, for appellant. Lamoreux & Husting, for respondents. BARDEEN, J. (after stating the facts). If it be conceded that Mrs. Frey had legal authority to execute a mortgage to her father to secure his claim against her husband, still, if such mortgage was not given to secure a bona fide indebtedness, it was fraudulent as to creditors, and should be set aside. At the time this mortgage was given John Frey was utterly insolvent, and this fact was known to the mortgagee. He was present when the fraudulent deed from John Frey to his wife was given. He knew Frey was deeply in debt. He knew the deed was without consideration. While these facts alone perhaps would not have prevented his taking security, they imposed upon him the duty of acting in good faith. The items claimed to have been secured by this mortgage are set out in the statement. One item was for money loaned in 1889. No note or other writing was taken. No proof was given that Frey had ever recognized this indebtedness in any way. Another item was for milk delivered in 1887. It stood a matter of open account. It does not appear that any claim had ever previously been made against Frey on account of either of these matters. Both claims had been outlawed many years before the mortgage was given. It is the settled law of this state that the effect of the statute of limitations is to completely extinguish the right upon which it has operated. Eingartner v. Steel Co., 103 Wis. 373, 79 N. W. 433, 74 Am. St. Rep. 871. Mrs. Frey had no power to resuscitate or to give these extinguished claims any legal validity. Another item was for interest to the insurance company, amounting to $100. This was due on a mortgage on lands owned by the wife, for which Thielke was in no way responsible. It was paid by him without any authority from Frey, and evidently for the protection of his daughter's property. It constituted no debt against Frey. In this connection we may consider another item of $175, for interest on two mortgages upon the land in suit. Thielke had never paid the amount, and was under no legal obligation to do so. Under the agreement between Frey and wife when the deed was given, the latter was to assume and pay these mortgages. In no sense was it a debt due from Frey to Thielke. The items of store account, board and clothing to Frey's wife and children, were not proven as legal debts against Frey. Thielke testifies to no fact from which any legal inference arises that Frey was bound to pay him therefor. Mrs. Frey left her husband and went to live with her father some time in the year 1901. The husband was not responsible for debts indiscriminately contracted by her. The proof does not show that Thielke furnished goods to the wife by Frey's request, or that they were necessaries, or were furnished under such circumstances as would make the husband liable therefor. At the time the mortgage was given, Thielke was security for Frey on the Metzger note of $500 and the Norton note of $300. No part of either note had been paid by him at that date. From this review of the Thielke ac count, it appears that the only actual existing indebtedness of Frey to Thielke at the time the mortgage was given was for the horse and cattle, amounting to $185. These items were tacitly denied by Frey when he detailed the items of his indebtedness, which did not include Thielke's said claim, and said these were all of his debts. We do not say that Thielke might not, under proper circumstances, have taken security for his contingent liability on the notes mentioned, but, inasmuch as the mortgage largely exceeds any real or contingent claim he had against Frey, it became presumptively fraudulent. Thielke knew that Frey was under no obligation to him for any such amount as the mortgage secured. He knew Frey was deeply in debt, and had but little property. In speaking of the situation, Mr. Thielke said: "I made a good many payments, and had a good many expenses, so I thought to secure myself. I took a mortgage of $1,500, and took it very easy. I might have taken one for $2,500." In his answer he set up that the consideration for said mortgage was moneys advanced as purchase price of the land covered by the mortgage, and for care of Frey's wife and children. He utterly failed in his proof as to moneys put into the land. His entire attitude is inconsistent with good faith. It cannot be easily reconciled on any other theory than that he was assisting Mrs. Frey in placing the land beyond the reach of creditors. The mortgage, being so largely in excess of any possible legal claim, and being valid on its face, had a tendency to deceive creditors, and delay them in the collection of their claims. The inference of fraud properly arising in the case was in no way repelled or overthrown by the testimony, or by the circumstances attending the transaction. Butts v. Peacock, 23 Wis. 359; Bradley Co. v. Paul, 94 Wis. 488, 69 N. W. 168; Kellogg v. Clyne, 4 C. C. A. 554, 54 Fed. 696. Under the circumstances we think it very clear that Thielke was not acting in good faith. That his mortgage was not taken to secure an actual existing indebtedness, as found by the court, and being so much in excess of any possible claim held by him, its tendency was to mislead and deceive Frey's creditors, and prevent them collecting their claims against him. The court should have made findings as requested by plaintiff. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed, and a judgment for plaintiff entered, declaring said mortgage void as to creditors. In taxing costs the court will disallow the expense of printing 15 pages of appellant's brief. A reprint of the complaint, answers, and findings was wholly unnecessary. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment as indicated in the opinion. STATE ex rel. ASHLAND WATER CO. v. -REASSESSMENT. 1. An assessment of the property of a water company in the assessment roll, under the title "Real Estate," which assesses the land owned by it, "together with its buildings, houses, pumping house, and station used in connection with the operation of said works, and its intake pipe, mains, distributing pipes, and hydrants throughout the city, and its rights, privileges, and franchises, all in its entirety,' is a valid assessment, though such property is personalty, for purposes of taxation, under Rev. St. 1898, § 1037a, and wrongly classified as realty; and a reassessment thereof pursuant to the order of the county board declaring the assessment illegal and void is unauthorized by Rev. St. 1898, §§ 1087, 1087a (Laws 1899, c. 351, § 13), authorizing the reassessment of property subject to taxation when an assessment has been set aside or determined to be illegal or void by the judgment of a court or the action of the county board. Appeal from circuit court, Ashland county; John K. Parish, Judge. Certiorari by the state, on the relation of the Ashland Water Company, against Finley Wharton, as city clerk, to review the proceedings of the common council reassessing taxes on relator's property. From a judgment affirming the reassessment, the relator appeals. Reversed. This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court affirming the proceedings of the common council, at a regular meeting thereof held December 10, 1901, reassessing the taxes upon the relator's property, described, for the years 1891, 1892, 1893, and 1894, and which proceedings were taken to the circuit court on certiorari. The return to the writ shows, in effect, that the property of the relator was assessed by the assessor and board of review of the city of Ashland in 1893, as appears by the assessment roll of that year, as follows: On page 9 of such assessment roll, which page is headed, "Real Estate Assessment for the City of Ashland, in the County of Ashland, for the year 1893." Under the head of "Owner's name," "Ashland Water Company." Under the head of description, "Lots 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 in block 46, and block 8, included in Ellis division, together with its buildings, houses, pumping house, and station used in connection with the operation of said works, and Its intake pipe, mains, distributing pipes, and hydrants throughout the city, and its rights, privileges, and franchises, all in its entirety." Under the head of "Value Fixed by Assessor," "$200,000." The same valuation under the head of "Value Fixed by the Board of Review." And the city clerk carried out against such assessment a tax of $4,000. Also on the same page: "Ashland Water Company," "assessment omitted in 1891," giving the same description as above, and assessed at "$165,000." And the city clerk carried out against such assessment a tax of $3,300. Also on the same page: "Ashland Water Company," "assessment omitted in 1892," giving the same description as above, and assessed at $175,000. And the city clerk carried out against such assessment a tax of $3,500. That the amount of taxes so carried out against such de scriptions for the three years mentioned amounted, in the aggregate, to $10,800. Such taxes, not having been paid to the city treasurer, were returned to the county treasurer as delinquent. That thereupon, and on May 15, 1894, the county treasurer sold the real estate so described for the payment of the $10,800,-the aggregate amount of such taxes for the three years mentioned,-with interest and charges, making in all the sum of $11,512.22, and issued his certificate of sale (No. 59) therefor, in which it was stated that the county or its assigns would be entitled to a deed of conveyance of the lands so described in three years from the date thereof, unless sooner redeemed from such sale according to law; describing the lots and blocks mentioned. The return to the writ also shows, in effect, that the property of the relator was assessed by the assessor and board of review of the city in 1894; that a 91 N.W.-62 true copy of such assessment, as it appears upon the assessment roll of the city for that year, is as follows: On page 18 of assessment roll for that year, which page is headed: "Real Estate Assessment Roll for the City of Ashland, County of Ashland, for the Year 1894." Under the head of "Owner's Name," "Ashland Water Company." Under the head of "Descriptions," "Lots 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 in block 46, and all of blocks 7 and 8, in Ellis division, including power house, machinery, engine, boilers and pumps, intake pipe, water mains, pipes, outfit, and franchises." Under the head of "Value Fixed by Assessor," $150,000. Under the head of "Value Fixed by Board of Review," $155,000. That the amount of taxes so carried out against such descriptions for the year 1894 was $2,687.20. That such tax, not having been paid to the city treasurer, was returned to the county treasurer as delinquent. That thereupon, and on May 21, 1895, the county treasurer sold the real estate so described for the payment of such last-mentioned sum for the tax of 1894, with interest and charges, making, in all, $2,875.20, and issued his certificate of sale (No. 3,787) therefor, in which it was stated that the county or its assigns would be entitled to a deed of conveyance of the lands so described in three years from that date, unless sooner redeemed from such sale according to law; describing the lots and blocks, as mentioned. It further appears from such return that November 20, 1901, the county treasurer informed the board of supervisors of the county that each of such tax certificates, numbered 59 and 3787, respectively, were illegal, for the reason that the lots and blocks therein described were a part of the property of the relator, and included its franchises, and therefore should have been assessed as personal property, instead of being assessed as real estate, and recommended that such tax certificates, and each of them, be canceled as illegal, and that the county board order an assessment of the relator's property for the respective years mentioned, and that the same be charged to the city, with instructions to properly extend the amount of the taxes and omitted taxes for the four years mentioned, amounting, in all, to $13,487.20, upon the personal property tax roll for the year 1901, against and opposite the name of the relator. November 23, 1901, the county board of supervisors of the county, at its annual meeting, determined by resolution the amount of taxes apportioned to and levied upon the city of Ashland for the then current year; the aggregate amount being $71,423.50, which included the $13,487.20 mentioned, and $3,610.87 in addition, making, in all, $17,098.07, for "illegal taxes." Thereupon, and on November 26, 1901, the county clerk certified such taxes to the city clerk of the city of Ashland. Thereupon, and on December 10, 1901, the common council of the city, at a regular meeting thereof, and after reciting, in effect, the facts stated, adopted a resolution, among other things, to the effect that there was thereby reassessed upon the real and personal property and the franchises of the relator the $13,487.20 mentioned; and the city clerk was thereby directed to extend such amounts opposite the personal assessment of the relator in the tax roll of 1901, as provided in section 1087, Rev. St. 1898, and section 13, c. 351, Laws 1899, for the reason that the assessment was made against the real estate of the relator, instead of being made as a personal assessment against the company. Thereupon, and pursuant to and in accordance with such resolution, the city clerk carried out on the tax roll of the city for the year 1901 the amount of taxes so assessed, and containing, among other things, under the name of the owner, "The Ashland Water Company," and under the head of "Value of Real and Personal Property and Franchises of Water Company," $350,000. Under the head of "Total Valuation," $350,325.88. Under the head of "Total Amount of Taxes of 1901 Assessment," $8,783.13. Under the head of "Ordered Assessed by Common Council $13,487.20, giving the amounts for the several years, making up the sum as mentioned, and giving the grand total amount of taxes against the relator as $22,270.33. From the order and judgment of the circuit court rendered and entered January 9, 1902, affirming such reassessment so made by the common council, the relator brings this appeal. Tomkins & Tomkins (Lamoreux & Shea, of counsel), for appellant. M. E. Dillon. for respondent. CASSODAY, C. J. (after stating the facts). The trial court held that the several assessments for the years 1891, 1892, 1893, and 1894 were each illegal and void because the relator's property was assessed in each of those years as real estate. It is said that the court reached such conclusion by reason of the former decisions of this court. Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Wood Co., 81 Wis. 554, 51 N. W. 1004, 17 L. R. A. 92; Fond du Lac Water Co. v. City of Fond du Lac, 82 Wis. 322, 329, 52 N. W. 439, 16 L. R. A. 581; State v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550, 63 N. W. 746; Id., 97 Wis. 114, 72 N. W. 386; Pittsburg Testing Laboratory Co. v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 110 Wis. 633, 643, 86 N. W. 592. In the Fond due Lac Case it was held that all property in this state was taxable, except such as was exempt by statute, and that, as none of the property of the water company therein mentioned was exempt, it was all taxable; and it was also held in that case, among other things, in effect, that an assessment of several lots on which were located the pumping works and station of the water company, merely by their numbers, and the number of the block, was insufficient to cover "the entire property of the company, including its mains, pipes, and hydrants throughout the city, and its rights, privileges, and franchises," and hence that the board of review had no jurisdiction to make a valuation of such entire property against such lots. Such defect in the assessment in that case is obviated in this case, since each of the assessments not only covered the lots and blocks and the division, but added, "together with its buildings, houses, pumping house, and station used in connection with the operation of said works, and its intake pipe, mains, distributing pipes, and hydrants throughout the city, and its rights, privileges, and franchises, all in its entirety." It appears that prior to section 1037a of the Revised Statutes of 1898 there was no statute giving detailed directions for the valuation and taxation of such rights, privileges, and franchises. State v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550, 63 N. W. 746; Id., 97 Wis. 114, 72 N. W. 386. That section declares, in effect, that such property as was owned by and assessed against the relator in the case at bar should "be deemed personal property for the purpose of taxation." Section 1037a. The statute has for many years provided for the reassessment of real estate whenever any tax or assessment thereon has been set aside or determined to be illegal or void by the judgment of a "court or the action of the county board." Section 1087. In 1899 a new section was added to the statute, as follows: "Section 1087a. Any property described in section 1037a shall be subject to re-assessment for reasons stated, and in the manner provided in section 1087." Section 13, c. 351, Laws 1899. There are other sections of the statute providing for the reassessment of special assessments and general taxes. Sections 1210a-1210h. The statute also provided for the assessment of real estate omitted "by mistake or inadvertence." Section 1059. That section has been amended so as to apply to personal property. Chapter 50, Laws 1899. But we are not aware of any statute authorizing the reassessment of a valid tax. Can it be fairly said that the assessment in the case at bar was vold merely because the property was classified as real estate instead of personal property? As indicated, the assessment was just as full and complete as it could have been had the entire property been classified as personal property. Had it been so classified, still the statute cited required that the assessment should include "all real estate owned or used by the person or corporation engaged in such business and necessary to the prosecution thereof." Section 1037a. We must hold that the assessment was valid for each of the several years mentioned. Be-. ing valid, there was no authority nor ground nor reason for a reassessment. The statute prescribed a method for enforcing the payment of taxes assessed on personal property. Section 1127, Rev. St. 1898. Had the tax warrant been issued to the sheriff within the time prescribed by that section, there could have been no doubt but what he would have had "the same power to collect the unpaid taxes specified" therein that he would have had "upon execution issued out of a court of record," for the section so declares. Id. Whether there is still a right and a remedy to enforce collection of such taxes is a question not before us. The result is that such attempted reassessments were without authority of law and void. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with direction to reverse and set aside such reassessments, and for further proceedings according to law. MCMILLAN v. SPIDER LAKE SAWMILL & LUMBER CO. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Oct. 21, 1902.) 1. Plaintiff's intestate, 36 years of age, had worked in the woods for about 16 years. He had been unloading logs from cars on a landing, and so continued until he was killed on the second day, at such employment. At the time of the accident, when cars were brought to the landing, he hooked the trip line into the fit hook, so as to unfasten the wrapper chain of a car, and while standing near the car gave the trip line a jerk, unfastening the wrapper chain, and while stepping back out of the way he fell into a hole, and before he could get up the logs rolled off the car and killed him. Any one who looked could have seen the hole. Held, that decedent assumed the risk. 2. Rev. St. 1898. §§ 4255, 4256, provide that in the event of death by wrongful act an action for damages may be prosecuted in the name of the personal representatives of the deceased for the benefit of the husband or widow of such person, if there be such surviving, otherwise for the benefit of such person's lineal descendants, or, in default of such descendants, such person's lineal ancestors. Held, that a nonresident alien mother is not entitled to maintain an action for the death of her son, instantly killed, or who died without conscious pain, without leaving him surviving a widow, or issue, or father. Appeal from superior court, Douglas county; C. Smith, Judge. Action by Dan McMillan, as administrator of the estate of John McMillan, deceased, against the Spider Lake Sawmill & Lumber Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. This action was commenced August 21, 1901, to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of the plaintiff's intestate July 7, 1900. The complaint alleges, in effect, that prior to July 6, 1900, the deceased was in the employ of the defendant as a teamster; that on that day the defendant put him to work unloading logs, which were brought from the woods and hauled on cars by an engine to the mill of the defendant; that on 2. See Death, vol. 15, Cent. Dig. 37. the following day the deceased was engaged in unloading such logs, and while in the act of so doing he fell into a hole about two feet deep, and before he could get up the logs rolled against and over him, injuring him so that he died from the effects thereof on the same day; that for three months prior to the accident the hole had been there, and its existence was well known to the defendant and its servants; that there was slippery bark around the hole into which the deceased stepped; that it was the duty of the defendant to furnish the deceased with a reasonably safe place to work, and that the defendant was negligent in failing to do so, and that it was also negligent in failing to inform the deceased that the place was dangerous and unsafe. The complaint also alleges "that plaintiff's intestate at the time of his death was an unmarried man, thirtysix years of age, and left, him surviving, his mother as next of kin, who was entirely dependent upon him for her support; that plaintiff's intestate at and prior to said injury was a strong, healthy, able-bodied, industrious man, earning and capable of earning $50 per month; that for many years prior to his death he was continuously employed, and, but for his death, he would have, out of his earnings, provided for the support of his mother during the remainder of her life; that by reason of the aforesaid plaintiff has sustained damages in the sum of $2,000." The defendant answered by way of admissions, denials, and counter allegations, and among others that the plaintiff was injured by, through, and on account of his own negligence or the negligence of his fellow servants. At the close of the testimony on the part of the plaintiff the court granted a nonsult, and dismissed the complaint, with costs. From the judgment entered thereon accordingly, the plaintiff brings this appeal. W. P. Crawford and Crownhart & Foley, for appellant. Ross, Dwyer & Hile, for re spondent. CASSODAY, C. J. (after stating the facts). It appears from the record, and is undisputed, that the deceased was 36 years of age, and a strong, healthy man, and had worked in the woods for about 16 years, and had been in the employ of the defendant in the logging business as a teamster for a year. On the morning of July 6, 1900, he was set at work unloading logs from the cars upon the landing, and continued such work until he was killed in the forenoon of July 7, 1900. During that time he had assisted in unloading something like a dozen train loads of logs. The cars were 20 feet or more long, and the logs were about the same length. The facts attending the accident, as stated by the plaintiff's counsel, are to the effect that at the time of the accident four cars were brought in the train; and that, as the |