(the non-importation act,) was the very party with whom we had a negotiation actually pending. Towards the other no step was taken but the vote of money.

APRIL, 1808.

millions otherwise to be thrown away upon armies would be saved; that we should keep close house and there would be no danger. This system of expensive Military Establishment-this is no time to exaggerate, no time for tropes and figures of rhetoric, for common sense, and common sense alone ought to have influence-this system, I say, does not comport with your system of no commerce. They are at war with each other, and cannot go on together; and in less than one year, even with these 6,000 men, you must do one of three things-borrow money at extravagant inyour harassed citizens, who cannot comply with their engagements to one another, whom the sheriff is even now hunting with his writs-or, open your ports and scuffle for commerce as you did during the American Revolution-catch it as you can. The two courses are incompatible; the Treasury was full to be sure, but is in the wane, and the expense of this army alone will soon completely empty it.

If, said Mr. R., the state of things be such as my friend from Georgia represents it-if there be danger of offensive war waged by either of the belligerents upon us, or by us upon them, then are all our measures fundamentally wrong. You have been warned that the tigress may spring upon you in the night-we have been alarmed by the fate of Copenhagen, and the seizure of the Spanish frigates-even old Braddock's war has been rum-terest; lay direct taxes, and try to extort it from maged up to find precedents of insidious attack. I have ever been of opinion, and am now, that arguments founded on justice, reason, or the laws of nations, (which are the dictates of reason,) never have had and never will have much weight in the transactions of nations. They have served to swell the ponderous volumes of jurists, and to stuff the portfolios of diplomatists-nations have never been ruled by them, and never will, so long as a superior tribunal is wanting to enforce obedience to them. The Romans indeed put on the semblance of that virtue which they had not, although they kept up the character and preserved the costume with great address-but even they paid no regard to any principle of faith or justice in their conduct to the neighboring States; for they attacked and devoured them one by one-keeping up their professions until they had digested and incorporated into their body politic the immediate enemy, when they instantly turned their arms against their former friend, perhaps the very ally who had assisted them in their last conquest. It is therefore that I do not trust at all to those maxims of equity and good faith so much relied upon by diplomatists, since I see them every where disregarded. I see the same system pursued on land on one side, and on water on the other; and that they have no respect for any obligation, however sacred, the violation of which may aggrandize the power of either. I shall never be the apologist of either Power; neither shall I dwell with peculiar emphasis on the aggressions of the one, passing over at the same time those of the other. If the state of things be such as my friend from Georgia represents them to be, our measures are radically defective. If war be expected, you must raise the embargo, arm your merchantmen, and scuffle for commerce and revenue as well as you can. When the great American tortoise draws in his head, as this nation laying an embargo has been compared to this animal, you do not see him trotting along; he lies motionless on the ground; it is when the fire is put on his back, that he makes the best of his way, and not till then. The system of embargo is one system, withdrawing from every conquest, quitting the arena, flying the pit; the system of raising troops and fleets of whatever sort, is another, and opposite to that dormant state. As long as the embargo exists, we consider ourselves in a state of peace; and it was laid, I undertake to say, with that view, at least such were the arguments adduced in its favor-that it would ve all the expense of armies; that the annual

My worthy friend from Georgia has said that the tigress, prowling for food for her young, may steal upon you in the night. I would as soon attempt to fence a tiger out of my plantation with a four-railed fence, as to fence out the British navy with this force. It is because she may come in the night and choose her point of attack, that this force is incompetent; for that very reason, sir, you ought to be prepared; not with 6,000 men, but with every man, at every point. The gentleman indeed says that the militia system is so defective that we must resort to this force. This is a reason for classing them, for arming them, and not for raising a standing military force; for if it be, I undertake to say, that we never shall have an efficient militia. I know, with my colleague (Mr. BURWELL,) that this is no more a standing army than the one we have; but if two and two makes four, (a truth sometimes pressed upon us by gentlemen,) this is an addition to it. A standing army, after all, will be liable to the same objections urged with so much force against the militia-it will be composed of men of different ages and strength-the young and active must wait the motions of the old and slow, and that which happened with Prussia will happen to you; you will find that old men cannot cope with young men.

Whilst the Prussians marched three miles, the French conscripts, by their superior activity, marched four, interposed between Berlin and the Prussian army, and the battle of Jena terminated the campaign. It was decided by celerity of movement, as well as superiority of numbers. I do trust if the Rochefort squadron should land 5,000 men, or a British squadron either, that no one man of them would ever live to return home with news of their destruction. I hope that on the subject of foreign invasion the American nation will become as proverbial as the lion's den in the fable, that no retracing steps from our den will ever be found; for in case of actual war, the country would act as one man, would bring a force into the field against which no European army could

APRIL, 1808.

Additional Army.

stand, whatever superiority it might possess in the artificial modes of warfare.

H. OF R.

though I would underwrite all the loss to which the United States are exposed from this time to that, which could be averted by such a force. I would guarantee the nation from any danger which may accrue from this time until our next meeting, which might be suppressed or repelled by the force now proposed, at the same time that I should not be willing to trust to them against such danger as may rise.

It has indeed been said that nothing would be more easy than when you have done with this army, to command it to lay down its arms. My worthy friend from North Carolina (Mr. MACON) of whose sentiments I was apprized before I rose yesterday, and whose dissent from my opinion would have caused me to distrust it if I had not conceived that his own speech in favor of the But it seems we have, as we had in '98-when army was one of the most masterly arguments the gentleman from Virginia tells us there was no against it, and I assure him I was not singular in probability of a war with France-I am afraid he that opinion tells us that it is easier to raise is rather too young to recollect accurately, for we troops than to get rid of them. Recollect the pat- were then at open war-flagrante bello-we have riot army of our Revolution-was there no reluc- wealthy cities and rich banks to defend from tance, no aversion there expressed at being dis- plunder, and we want these troops as a rallying banded? There was; for, from their intimate point to the militia. These six thousand men are connexion with each other, they felt it as a separ- to form rallying points against every attack, fall ation of body and soul; they cannot bear it; it is where it may. If every man of them were placed as taking men from their wives and children, to separate and apart from his fellows there would take them from those with whom they have not be points enough. Are the militia afraid of shared victory and defeat and all the toils and ghosts? Are they afraid to assemble together in sufferings of war. Was there no expression of a their own defence unless protected by the talissentiment in that army to disband those who man, the charm of a red coat for a blue one. were disposed to disband them? There was; and When the gentleman from Kentucky dwelt so it was especially honorable to their Commander- much on the importance of Detroit, I was glad to in-chief, if indeed any peculiar circumstance could find that the protection of the Bank of Detroit, confer honor on that man, that they did not step amongst the rest, was not a motive for raising forth against their country. It is not from the this additional force; although I understand, our physical force of this army that I apprehend any positive law to the contrary notwithstanding, that thing; it is from that connexion, that ramification this bank is still in operation and that the troops of interests which it extends to every class of soci- of the United States are paid in its paper by one ety-your son or nephew holds a commission in who might not improperly be styled president of the army-my neighbor is a contractor-your the bank. But Great Britain, who is fortifying uncle supplies this thing, my father-in-law that; Quebec against attack from you, is to take Detroit. the evil extends itself through all society, and is It must be immediately retaken. It is impossible so wrought that it requires not only the strongest she can retain it a day-we have too strong a popubut the most resolute hand to tear it asunder. Ilation in the western parts of New York and never again expect to see a disposition for reform so radical as that which prevailed in the first session of the seventh Congress, when the army was reduced. I do not, because I have seen a gradual relaxation, a general backsliding from principles which were then considered axioms in politics.

But, let me ask, where is the crying necessity of immediately passing this bill? Is the occasion for raising these troops so urgent, and have we been sitting here for six months, with folded arms, and never thought of it till now? Or is it that we feel impatient to get back to our homes, and by way of saving the expense of keeping Congress in session for a few months-to save the expense of two or three hundred thousand dollars, throw away two millions on the first thing which presents itself as a pretext for adjournment? I will not believe that the urgency is so great as it is represented, and that gentlemen would have permitted the measure to sleep till now. And I repeat that I am not one of those who think we can, without a dereliction of principle, consent to raise these troops for a possible emergency; it is our duty to stay here and watch the coming storm, to provide for the event, be it what it may. I am not among those who will take these six thousand men as a safeguard from now till next Christmas, supposing that they could be raised instanter,

Pennsylvania, and in the State of Ohio. It can produce no Indian war unless she can hold it, and would only justify us in rooting her out of the continent. It is on British America, a name so justly offensive to my friend from South Carolina, (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS,) that she relies for sustenance and support of her rich possessions in this quarter of the globe, upon which her West India islands must depend for food, if they were not already fed by us, the embargo to the contrary notwithstanding, on cheaper terms than supplies can be furnished from Canada and Nova Scotia: for such is the unfortunate propensity of our coasting vessels to be blown off, make leeway, spring their masts, or stave their water-casks, that American flour was but a short time ago almost a drug in the Havana. In no other way can we account for its bearing the price in the market of Baltimore which it even now does. One of my colleagues not long since obtained leave of absence to visit his family; on his return through Fredericksburg a vessel had just arrived from Antigua which left sixteen sail of American vessels at St. John's, who had all fallen to leeward since the embargo. The current of the Gulf Stream is changed, sir-it sets from Newfoundland to Cape Florida and sweeps our flour along with it.

My colleague has said that Great Britain's

H. OF R.

Additional Army.

APRIL, 1808.

in vain, therefore, to urge a state of quasi or quid war, as a justification of measures which, in 1798, were not conceived to be justified by actual war. But, really, I was of opinion that a quid war was one of the last in which my friend would be a party, in any manner whatsoever.

throwing troops into Canada and Nova Scotia is to him an evidence of her intention to attack us in that quarter. Infatuated as her ministers sometimes have been, such a Quixotic project never entered their heads. No, sir, I am more apprehensive of her involving us in war, not as an enemy but as an ally. The race between her It has been said that our understanding with and France now will be which shall soonest con- Great Britain is not quite as good at present as cede our just claims in the hope of producing a hers was with Turkey and Denmark at the time rupture with the adverse party. The only thing of her attempt on the Dardanelles, or Hellespont, which now can lead to war is the giving to the and of her attack on Copenhagen. Admitting one cause to believe that we incline to the side of that fact, what does it prove? It is well known the other. If, for instance, the French Emperor, to you-you have proof in your pocket, I was gowhose opinions have been so emphatically pro- ing to say-that the motives for the attack on Conounced, should consider our late measures as a penhagen, which I am the last man on the earth compliance with his demand for the exclusion of to defend, was a belief, not totally without founBritish commerce from our ports, as an expres- dation, that a movement was about to be made by sion of those dispositions in security for which France at the same time against Denmark and American property is held sequestered, and Portugal (with the connivance of the former) to should release this property accordingly, it may put these countries in the possession of France; lead to war with Great Britain, in case she should the Portuguese not manifesting a disposition to take up the subject in the same point of view. play into the hand of France, apprized Great But if, on the contrary, she shall view the measure Britain of what was going on, and we know what as equally directed against both the rival Powers, has happened; if they had manifested such a disthere is no probability that we shall have war, position, the same measures would have been but that when she shall see the tenor and com- taken against Portugal as against Denmark. I am plexion of the French Minister's communication not palliating the attack on Copenhagen; but we to us it will produce a relaxation of her late ille- know that Denmark was not disposed to resist the gal, offensive, and enormous doctrines, even with-intentions of the French Emperor-in fact she out supposing (what is probable) a change of possessed not the ability-she had no Brazils to ministry. fly to. Are gentlemen, when they bid us beware My excellent friend (Mr. MACON) says that no of the fate of Copenhagen, prepared to tell us reparation has been made for the attack on the that Great Britain has any right to believe that Chesapeake, and, with him, I am inclined to we are disposed to connive at the designs of think, none will be made. But let it be recol- France, or become a passive instrument in her lected, that this Government, (and by this Gov- hands? I hope not. I do not conceive that Great ernment, I do not mean the President alone,) has Britain, if she possesses common sense, will ever not deemed the failure to make reparation to be dream of attempting here anything like the attack a just cause for war; or, rather, that it has deter-upon Copenhagen, which alone could justify an mined (and I do not say that it is not correct) not increase in our military force, and which would to make war upon the aggressor. We are, there-demand an effort very disproportionate to this. fore, not in a state of actual war at this time with It has been admitted on all hands, nemine disGreat Britain; and whatever may be the opinion sentiente, that we are to be governed by circumof my friend as to the disposition in our Govern- stances which are not within our control. The ment in 1798, to provoke a war with France, he difference in this House on this question has been must agree-his good sense, candor, manliness, as to the state of those circumstances alone. Two and ingenuousness of character must compel him years ago, it was said, fiat justitia, these are our to agree that actual war between two nations, rights, and we will not attend to circumstances; whoever was in fault in the beginning, is a state we will know nothing, and care nothing about the more imperiously requiring military preparations balance of Europe; we will not be guided by it. than a state not of war, however great provocation I am glad to find now, however, that circumstanmay have been received. In 1798, even conced-ces have their due weight in our deliberations; ing that we were the offending party, (a point not easy to make out,) we were at war. In 1808, though it is agreed on all hands that we are the deeply, justly offended party, it must be conceded that we are not at war. I believe if we had taken measures of immediate reprisal, we should have been at war; or when Mr. Rose required that the Proclamation should be withdrawn, which he had not a right to do any more than the French Government had to expect that we should renew the negotiation in 1798; if we had then taken such measures, we might have been at war. We have not taken such, and we are not at war, although, it may be alleged, on the very brink of it. It is

that we are disposed to have an eye upon them, and that they, and they alone, prevent us from laying a declaration of war on the table against either or both the two belligerents.

But it has been said, that New Orleans is in the vicinity of the Havana, and that we are exposed to attack. From whom? Does the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. HOWARD) believe that Spain or France (for they are one and the same) are capable of throwing a force at this time from the Havana into New Orleans that can maintain it a day against the force from the upper country, which will be brought down against them-for as to this business of having a force in every

town sufficient to ward off an attack à la Copenhagen, I am against it, and so is this bill. Norfolk and New York need such a force as much as New Orleans; and so do Wilmington, Charleston, and other ports as much as they. This bill does not propose to raise such a force; it is not proposed to give a defence against a coup de main from a well-appointed fleet and army. When the gentleman mentioned the Havana, I could not help thinking, (for Republics, too, have ambition,) that it was a much stronger argument for taking possession of Havana than fortifying New Orleans, or rather for garrisoning it for it was fortified, we all know, against the conspirators. I have no doubt, so far from New Orleans being attacked from the Havana, such is the tide of human events, such the cupidity and ambition of man, under whatever form of Government, that the time will come when the Havana will be reduced by an army from New Orleans, or some place along that coast; and, after we have got the mouth of the Mississippi, to secure the navigation of the river, we shall want some other place to secure Havana; and we shall go on as all other nations have done, trying to keep what we have got, and get what we can.

With regard to the importance of these six thousand men, for rallying points, I think, without pretending to know what disposition the wisdom of the Executive may make of them, whether South, West, North, or East-no doubt my worthy friend beside me. (Mr. MUMFORD,) would be glad to have them all at New York-that out of these six thousand there would scarcely be a corporal's guard for each point; and I want to know what claim any one point has more than another to be made a rallying point?

H. of R.

ishing. What are six thousand men to man a line of coast of two thousand miles in extent ? The arguments in favor of the bill will not hang together. The reasoning of its advocates, if true, would show that the bill ought not to pass. Dangers have been held up to your imagination, and if there were ground to believe their existence, you ought to bestow two millions of dollars on implements of war, to be put into the hands of every one capable of using them, instead of throwing out of your Treasury millions on these mercenaries, and dealing out, with a niggardly hand, a scanty pittance to purchase arms; and it is because I believe the balance in your Treasury win be too much diminished by the enormous and useless appropriation which must follow this bill, that I wish it to be postponed that we may make a liberal appropriation to the former object. I am more astonished and surprised, and, permit me to say, concerned, for I feel the deepest concern whenever I differ with the gentleman in question, (Mr. MACON.) and nothing but the impulse of honest duty, knowing as I did of the difference which existed between us, on this subject, could have prevailed upon me to rise yesterday: I say, it is a matter of surprise and regret to me that he should support this bill; that he should declare the present Establishment useless, and, at the same time, declare his willingness to increase it three-fold. I hope the gentleman will pardon me for taking this notice of his arguments, as well as the gentlemen from Georgia and Kentucky, for it is the strongest evidence of my respect for them.

We are told that military science ought to be fostered. I agree that this is a military age. The century before the last was an age of religious An argument of mine, with regard to the effi- fanaticism-the world was ruled by priesteraft; ciency of military force, has been much misrepre- the next was the century of political intrigue and sented. I did not say these troops would be equiv-negotiation-the taking of a single town was the alent to the militia of the cities. They are not work of a campaign; this is the military age, a equivalent; I would not give a pinch of snuff for great portion of the world being overrun and subthem. If this army be so necessary, if the occa-jugated by military despotism; and if you wish sion for it be so urgent that we are to be precipi- to quench forever the military ardor in the great tated at once into the measure, what are we doing mass of your own citizens, who alone are to reswith the force around us? (the Marine Corps.) Icue you from the general chaos, take it from the might have been well justified if I had supposed these to be the piping times of peace; for, with a trifling exception, I never heard of any service which those troops we have, have ever performed. Where are they? Why are they not sent to intercept the tigress? It is evident to me, if you cannot find employment for those troops which you have, except to play on the pipe and tamborine, and I know not what, on Sunday, it is a plain demonstration that you have already more than you can put to any beneficial use; and that gentlemen should, at the same time declare that they deem fortifications unnecessary, and as money thrown away, and yet should wish more regular troops, when the main reason given, in favor of the bill, (God forbid that I should accuse any gentleman of inconsistency, much less the gentleman who made that observation,) that we want these men to take care of these fortifications, and keep them in repair, is, to me, aston

whole, kindle it in a portion, and make them exclusively military men-confine the profession of arms to a particular class, speak tauntingly of the militia, or at least damn them with faint praise. "The militia are the only defence of a free nation, but they are defective in organization and not armed." Yes, sir, and as long as you waste all your pains and treasure in organizing and arming regulars, defective and unarmed they will remain to the end of the chapter; and by a perpetual recurrence to this standing army, your children will read in your history that of every nation who has preceded you.

Ι

It is said, too, that, to preserve peace, you must prepare for war. To this observation I agree, in one sense, but not in that in which it is applied; for it admits of very different constructions. If it is meant, by the observation, that every man in the community should be armed and trained, it is true; because whenever it is the interest of the