To the numbers of men, which all these objects require the British to send abroad for service on land, let gentlemen add the numbers which are required, by the British policy, to serve at sea. Reflect on the exertions necessary for keeping the British navy manned so as to be competent for decisive action! Add to all these the numbers required for the service in Great Britain and Ireland! After this review, let it be asked, What part of the British population can be spared, and sent across a thousand leagues of ocean, to attack the United States? Why should any British force come into our country to reap defeat and disgrace? What motive of interest is there for the British to invade our territory? What are the British means for the invasion? The population of their United Kingdom, liable as it is to various existing requisitions, is unequal to the service. say nothing of any regard to justice, the British Government must be unwise in the extreme to meditate the invasion of this country. The idea has too much of the maniac character to be admitted for a moment. APRIL, 1808. insist on the policy of the embargo, and yet contending for the additional army proposed by this bill. Advocates of the embargo have asserted the policy of adopting it, as tending not only to secure the vessels and seamen and merchandise of the country, but also by operating against other countries to constrain them to recognise and respect our maritime rights. According to declarations of its advocates, the policy of the embargo was to be commended for its efficacy to conserve and to coerce. For protecting ourselves, this was to be the impenetrable shield-for annoying others, the irresistible spear. As to a navy on the ocean for securing maritime rights, we have none. For this service do we want an army? In viewing our foreign concerns with a reference to the present bill, the next question is, whether the proposed army is wanted against France? To The President of the United States has not so told us, although the measure is brought forward on his recommendation; nor are we so informed by gentlemen on this floor, who are among the warmest supporters of the President and the bill. Although there is no territorial contest with the British Government, it is well known that questions of a serious nature respecting territory have existed for a considerable time between the United States and Spain, the vassal of France. With regard to those territorial disputes, it is clearly true that an army might be properly employed to maintain the exercise of rights claimed on land. And the uncertainty as to the result of the territorial controversies with a vassal of France, has almost induced me to decide on giving my voice for this bill. But there has remained one objection to making this decision. I am not informed that the Executive intends to maintain the territorial claim on our part by arms. I have no offi view to that point. And this want of information is no cause for acting, although, in my estimation, it may justify the abstaining from a positive act of legislation. The want of satisfactory information is no reason for not acting. Can any supposed commercial jealousy be so operative as to make that country go to war with this? If the British are jealous of our prosperity, and indulge the wish that our commerce and navigation may be checked or swept from the ocean, can this constitute a motive for their being at open war with us? If war were declared between this and any European country, our navigation, it is to be presumed, would at least be allowed to appear on the ocean, under the impulse of enterprise and courage, provided with means for defence; and a hope might be cherished that the acquisitions resulting from such active commerce as should be successful, on the average of all the adventures, would be sufficient to counter-cial information that this army is wanted with a balance the losses by capture, and leave a benefit to the concerned. But, however stimulated by jealousy of our maritime growth, would any foreign Government, unless grossly uninformed and foolish, be capable of proclaiming war against us with a view merely to reduce our share in the The proposed army may cost about two miltrade of the world, while our own Government lions of dollars annually. Cannot the sum be is taking measures so efficacious to destroy the more beneficially expended? I agree to the prinnavigating interests of the country? Whoever ciple of employing regular forces for stations on may have been jealous of our success in maritime the frontier. But is this bill the proper mode of pursuits, might well be content at the present time giving effect to that principle? It is not pretendto abstain from attempting anything further ed by gentlemen that the whole of this additional against us. Exertions on their part are needless, force is wanted for the service of the different garwhile such efficacious means are practised in this risons. As to all that portion of the force not country. The embargo is operating to accom- wanted for what may be considered as garrison plish more against our navigating interest than duty, I would rather apply the expenditure in a any foreign jealousy could otherwise hope to have mode which appears to be more beneficial and realized. Ships rotting; merchants failing; sea- necessary. Let it be applied to preparing durable men quitting the country; the domestic trade fortifications, which are so much wanted and earchecked; industry discouraged; business stag-nestly requested. Or let it be applied for some nated if a policy so prostrating is to be continued, what more can be necessary to satiate the most vindictive excess of commercial jealousy? To destroy our navigating interest, the addition of war is needless. Permit me, Mr. Speaker, to observe, that there seems to be some inconsistency in continuing to other preparatory purpose, corresponding to the exigencies of our own situation and the general state of the world. As to maintaining regular forces constantly in service for the fortifications on the Atlantic frontier, it might be more correct to have artillerists, perhaps, than infantry, certainly, than dragoons. APRIL, 1808. Additional Army. H. of R. one of the most extensive and complex of arts. The discoveries of genius, the attainments of science, the labors of industry, the wisdom of experience, the improved capacities of civilized society, all have been rendered contributory to the art of destruction. So fully do I accede to the import The national utility of a military school has been mentioned by my colleague, (Mr. TALLMADGE,) as an argument in favor of the bill. Let it not be supposed, Mr. Speaker, that I would question his superiority in the knowledge of military affairs and tactical principles. I cannot, as he could, appeal to the recorded evidence of ac-ance of having skilful officers to conduct brave knowledged military merit. I will not say of him only, that he has the soldier's sense of honor, and that his gallantry has been repeatedly proved in the hour of serious trial, for this would be no more than might be said of those whom he has led to danger and victory-higher praise, that which honors the capacity of the officer, united with the qualities of the soldier, has been publicly awarded to him. In a Journal of the proceedings of Congress, during the war of the Revolution, I find his meritorious services acknowledged in the following terms: "WEDNESDAY, December 6, 1780. "The committee to whom was referred the letter of November 18th, from General Washington, brought in a report: Whereupon Congress came to the following resolution: "While Congress are sensible of the patriotism, courage, and perseverance of the officers and privates of their regular forces, as well as of the military throughout these United States, and of the military conduct of the principal commanders in both, it gives them pleasure to be so frequently called upon to confer marks of distinction and applause for enterprises which do honor to the profession of arms, and claim a high rank in military achievements: In this light they view the enterprise against Fort St. George on Long Island, planned and conducted with wisdom and great gallantry by Major Tallmadge, of the light dragoons, and executed with intrepidity and complete success by the officers and soldiers of his detachment: "Ordered, therefore, That Major Tallmadge's report to the Commander-in-Chief be published, with the preceding minute, as a tribute to distinguished merit, and in testimony of the sense Congress entertain of this brilliant service." The use of a military school is to qualify persons for military command, by instruction in the theory and application of principles relative to the art of war. The great object is to provide officers of skill, who may be competent to the various duties of the field in case of actual service. I would refer, therefore, to my colleague as an officer, whether the adoption of this bill is the best mode to form a military school? Are officers to become accomplished in the art of war? Are they to be formed for ornaments of the profession of arms, by being distributed over the country for enlisting recruits? In this employment, they might, indeed, acquire some knowledge relative to military affairs, although not that knowledge which should most distinguish the officer. They might acquire, in the recruiting service, a knowledge corresponding to that employment, a practical acquaintance with such qualities as distinguished Sergeant Kite. But qualities far other than those are required to form the accomplished officer, according to the modern system of warfare. men, and such is the opinion entertained of my colleague, that I can have no hesitation in declaring my readiness to agree to any system for a military school, which, after mature consideration, he might propose as best adapted to the specific purpose. Shall the provisions of this bill be regarded as our system of preparation for meeting a war? If presented in this view to either Britain or France, will the force be of any value? Is it not rather an implied admission of weakness, than a respectable display of strength? Gentlemen have spoken of the state of the world and the aspect of our foreign affairs as requiring measures of preparation-measures not necessary in confirmed peace, nor yet fully adequate to the exigencies of determined war. What, then, is the preparation which would be the least expensive, and the most useful for this country, in relation to military force? ness. Unless the spirit of the country should be Strength, activity, courage, we have in readiprostrated by a fatal policy, we may rely on finding them in the general mass of population which a serious war might require, to fill the ranks of our battalions. Arms, discipline, and tactical skill we principally want; these, especially discipline and tactical skill, it is the most important to prepare. With an ample preparation of these, in the event of serious war, a numerous army might soon be arrayed. So much of the force, mentioned in this bill, as may be requisite for the general service of our garrisons and military posts, let us provide. This may be done by acting upon the bill expressly relating to the Peace Establishment, as I have already mentioned. If the sum which may be saved to the Treasury in this manner should not be applied for durable fortifications or further supplies of arms, it may still be applied in another mode so as to be of essential service. It may be applied to providing a fund of military science, of discipline, and tactical skill, that we may have in readiness a sufficient number of our own officers, well qualified to direct the valor of our country men, that we may have in readiness an ample proportion of our countrymen worthy to command some of the bravest of men. Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL said, that notwithstanding the long time that had been spent in the discussion of this bill, he felt it his duty to state to the House the reasons that would influence him to vote in favor of it; and he deemed it the more necessary that he should do so, because attempts had been made to impress the public mind with an opinion, that those who were disposed to raise this army, had abandoned the principles they maintained in former times, when they had in I admit that the art of war, in modern times, issisted that standing armies were dangerous to lib erty and the rights of man, and that the chief reliance for security and defence ought to be placed on the militia. I am, and always have been, one of those who think we ought to rely on the militia as the main support and defence of our country in the day of danger. I consider them as the great bulwark of our liberties, and believe we may repose the highest confidence in their patriotism and courage. I am, also, as I always have been, opposed to standing armies. I have considered them, and still consider them, as the bane of freedom, and the instrument in the hands of a despot with which to scourge the people, reduce them to submission, and deprive them of their liberties. In this view I consider large standing armies in times of peace. But at the same time that I entertain this opinion, I believe that a regular force may, in certain cases and under certain circumstances, be necessary. I consider it as a kind of necessary evil, which we cannot in those cases do without, and which may be essentially useful in repelling invasions of our rights and territory, and rendering more secure, while kept within proper limits, our liberty and independence. I wish it therefore to be distinctly understood, that though I shall vote for the bill on your table, I have not changed my opinion with regard to the confidence we ought to repose in the militia, nor as to their efficiency in ordinary cases for the defence of their country. I have not, sir, altered my opinion on these points, and the only difference which exists between myself and many others on this subject, appears to be, that I consider the present crisis to be such as requires us to prepare for a state of war, while they seem to think that there is no necessity for making such preparations. I also believe (what I presume few, if any, deny.) that in a state of war a regular force is necessary to aid and support the militia. This seems to be admitted on all hands, and indeed little or no argument can be necessary to prove that there are certain services to which the militia are not competent, and which ought not to be required of them. It has been said that, in ordinary times, they may be relied upon for every purpose. Though this position may, in the general, be true, yet there are some exceptions to it in the present situation of our country, and I may be permitted to state some services which are important, and which ought not to be imposed upon the militia. Among these may be mentioned the protection of the most exposed points on our extensive frontier-I will instance New Orleans. Should an attempt be made to invade your territory, no place is more exposed, or seems to promise a greater prospect of success to the invader than New Orleans. When danger threatens, what is there to protect that city from a sudden attack by either of the belligerent Powers? You have no effective militia there sufficiently numerous to defend it, and it is seven or eight hundred miles from the body of the militia of the Western country. Exhausted by so long a march, is it to be expected that the militia would be willing to remain for months, and perhaps years, as a permanent protection to that place? APRIL, 1808. Suppose they would submit to any burdens which you should impose upon them, and I am confident they will never shrink from any duty which may be assigned them by their country, is it consistent with propriety is it honorable to the nation to impose this task exclusively on the militia of the Western country? Are your militia to be called out, and to remain out, to protect the many exposed points from Detroit to New Orleans, to repel the savages, or a neighboring enemy, should he meditate an attack on that quarter? These duties would be too arduous to impose upon them. Their vast distance from the scene of action, and the sickliness of the climate to which they might be called, would expose them to diseases and fatigue, which their constitutions would be incompetent to sustain, and even bear down the strongest constitutions, and damp the most ardent disposition to serve their country. I say, therefore, that whether we are actually at war or threatened by it, it is important to have an active, disposable force, to be stationed at those places, to repel the first attacks, until your militia can be called out to support them. But it is said by gentlemen, who admit that in time of war a regular force may be necessary, that they will not raise a single man till they see the enemy. I would not have believed that any gentleman would make such an assertion if I had not heard it on this floor-if I had not heard gentlemen say that, though you are surrounded by dangers, they will not vote to raise a single regiment, no, not a single man, to defend their country. Can gentlemen justify this conduct to the nation? Are they willing to remain inactive and unprepared, with their arms folded up, until you are actually attacked, until the enemy is at your door, and when it will be too late to prepare to resist him? Will this be doing justice to the nation? Will this be acting like men ought to do who are appointed the guardians of the American people, and to whom are confided the protection of their best rights, their liberty, and independence? It will not, sir, the nation will never sanction such conduct. But, sir, if the militia are sufficient under all circumstances to repel an enemy, however formidable, in the first instance, will there be any occasion to raise a regular force to support them, after they have withstood the first impulse, and acquired more experience? I should presume not. I have always understood that one great object of regular troops was to give discipline and energy to the militia when first called into service, and that after they had served some time, say one or two years, they in fact became regular troops for all useful purposes-although, in the first instance, considerable inconvenience and difficulty were experienced with regard to them, for want of system, for want of the habit of acting in concert, for want of discipline. A regular force also answers an important purpose, by being distributable at those places where danger is most to be apprehended, and serving as firm bands, around which the militia would rally at the call of their country. The regularity and discipline of the former would give confidence and energy to the latter, while, in turn, the latter, (the militia) being their fellow-citizens, and fighting by their side in defence of their country, would add courage with enthusiasm to the skill and discipline of the regular troops. A regular army is made acquainted with and preserves the knowledge of military tactics, and is prepared to infuse it among the militia when called into service. But that we should remain inactive, and wait until our enemy shall come to our doors before we begin to prepare, when it is admitted on all hands that we are threatened with danger, appears to me extraordinary, and is a line of conduct that I could not reconcile to myself, to my constituents, or to my country. I do not feel disposed, like the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. WILLIAMS,) to express my resentment in terms so highly aggravated against Great Britain and France as he has done. I can see no real benefit likely to result from calling them by hard names; yet I do not mean to reprehend his conduet in this respect. I have no doubt that he expressed his real feelings, and I believe I view the conduct of those nations with as much abhorrence as any man in this House. But how the gentleman can represent them both as so hostile to this country, and their measures towards it so unjust, so contrary to all the known laws of society, and even of humanity, as to induce him to call one the tiger, and the other the shark, and yet, in the same breath, refuse to make any preparation to raise any force to defend the nation against the ravages of these wild and voracious animals, is to me beyond all comprehension. Can gentlemen be serious when they aggravate, and paint in the highest colors, the atrocity of the conduct of those nations, and yet tell you there is no necessity to prepare for war? Surely, sir, when this nation is threatened with dangers from abroad, from more quarters than one, as has been stated on this floor, it is high time to prepare for defence, to prepare to resist those dangers, and our preparations ought certainly to bear some proportion to the dangers that threaten us, and be in a great degree regulated by the disposition those Powers have manifested, in their acts, to harass and destroy our commerce, violate our rights, and murder our fellow-citizens. H. OF R. ion of their patriotism and bravery. But such arguments can have no weight in regard to the present question; whatever plausibility they might claim in relation to a standing army in time of peace, they are entirely misapplied in the present instance. In time of war, or when threatened by war, a military spirit, a martial enthusiasm, ought to be cherished and excited among the whole people of this country; in time of peace this is unnecessary. There is little or no analogy between the force proposed to be raised by this bill and a standing army in time of peace, such as the gentleman from North Carolina seems to have had in view, and which is so terrific to his people. Almost every man in the House is opposed to a large standing army in time of peace, such as could intimidate the civil authority, or endanger liberty. Objections that are valid against such an army, do not apply to the force intended to be raised by the bill, which is a temporary force, raised on the emergency of the present state of our affairs, and to be disbanded whenever that emergency ceases. Gentlemen have, indeed, brought to view our situation in 1798, when they say an army was unnecessarily raised; and, also, that in 1805 and 1806, when we refused to raise one; and on these two points have insisted that there is no more, nay, some have gone so far as to say, that there is not as much occasion for this force now as there was at those respective times for raising an army. It appears that the principal difference between us arises from two positions which have been assumed by the opponents to the bill, in both of which I conceive they are mistaken. The one is, that the force to be raised by the bill is a standing army of the kind hitherto so much opposed; and the other, that the present crisis is not such as to require us to prepare for a state of war. With regard to the first position, notwithstanding what has been said by the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. DANA,) and his acute knowledge of the grammatical institutes and construction of language, I must deny that the force to be raised by this bill is intended as an addition to the Peace Establishment, or that the bill justifies such an inference. The gentleman admitted the words of the bill would not support this construction, Much has been said on this floor, particularly but he insisted that, according to the spirit of the by a gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. STAN- law, it must be sound. The bill proposes to raise FORD,) with respect to the danger of a standing an additional military force. Now, said the genarmy, and he stated the horror the people felt at tleman, a military force and the Peace Establishthe beat of the drum in time of recruiting soldiers, ment, must be the same, because we have at presand I suppose they must have felt the same hor- ent no military force but the Peace Establishror at the sound of the fife, as it generally accom- ment. The Peace Establishment is certainly a panies the drum on those occasions. I regret that Military Establishment; but an addition made to the gentleman has represented his constituents so the Peace Establishment would be so expressed, timid as to be alarmed even at the sounds that and would be different and distinct from troops usually accompany war. I must, however, be- raised towards a War Establishment as these are. lieve, that this timidity, this horror, at the sound This force, if raised, will be, as stated in the bill, of the drum, are confined to the grave matrons, an addition, while in service, to the present Milithe fond mothers, and tender-hearted sisters, of tary Peace Establishment, but will not form a those in the gentleman's district, who may be part of it. So the understanding of nine-tenths about to risk their lives in defence of their coun- of this House is, that this is a specific force to try, and do not affect the people generally in that meet a crisis which may probably occur in our quarter. I entertain a much more favorable opin-public affairs—a state of war; and it is distinctly H. of R. Additional Army. APRIL, 1808. understood, that they are to be disbanded when to act as if they wished to court a war with France, that crisis is over, or the probability of war ceases. and indeed it has been so stated on this floor durBut, says a gentleman, it may continue forever. ing the present session by the gentleman from I do not think it necessary to enter into an in- North Carolina, (Mr. MACON ;) and because the quiry how long it may be requisite to keep these then minority, (who are considered as having troops in service; it is a sufficient answer to the become the present majority in a political sense.) gentleman from Connecticut, that this establish- considered it impolitic and unjust to aggravate ment is in the power of the Government and of or provoke a war, and that the country was not this House; and, so soon as the exigency ceases, in danger of either invasion or attack from any it cannot be supposed that this branch of the Gov-quarter, they therefore opposed the raising of an ernment would be disposed to continue them any longer in service. So long as continuing this army remains exclusively in this House, there can be no danger of its being retained any longer than the crisis may require. This House has the power to refuse making appropriations to support such army, and when that is refused, it must be disbanded. This is supposing an extreme case that the other House will not agree with you to discontinue it by repealing the law, which can hardly be expected to occur. army. I take it for granted that these were their reasons, and, were this a similar crisis, would oppose the bill upon your table; and, in doing so, should act on the very same principles as those on which I shall now act in voting for it. With regard to our situation in 1805 and 1806, I can speak with somewhat more precision, being here at that time, and having a much better opportunity of being acquainted with the circumstances of our public affairs, and the causes that led to the then differences between us and Spain. With regard, therefore, to the position that this is a standing army in the sense in which it has There was indeed some appearance of war on been stated, it is not supported by the bill, or by our southwestern frontier, but what were the any fair inference from it, and the moment it is causes of it? Not such as to promise any serious examined it will appear unfounded, and the pre- consequences. I will not take up the time of the texts on which opposition is made to this bill by House in detailing the differences which then the gentleman from North Carolina and others, took place between some Americans and certain will thereupon entirely vanish. In the same man- disorderly persons in the Spanish territory; they ner the argument, that it will affect the morals of are already known to the House, and when fairly the people and endanger civil liberty, is futile-examined, they will clearly prove that Spain had for the moment that the idea of its being a stand- no intention whatever of going to war with us ing army, such as is to continue in time of peace, at that time. We have had all the evidence on ceases, that moment all possible force which those this subject before us, and there is no proof of any arguments could give to the opposition also ceases, serious hostile disposition towards us on the part and leaves this without being affected by them. of the Spanish Government. One circumstance We may, therefore, lay them entirely out of the goes far to prove that the Spanish officers did not question. intend to commit any act of hostility, or to violate our territory in this transaction, which is, that the Spanish troops remained on their own side of the line until those persons (the Kempers) whom they had procured to be taken, were delirered to them, on their own territory, by some American citizens. This was the clearest proof that they were determined to avoid committing any act of hostility, or even entering on the American territory; and though they may have used fraudulent means to obtain their object, it is clear that they had no authority from their Government to disturb the peace subsisting between the two nations. With regard to the dispute respecting our boundary west of the Mississippi, it related to a small tract of country uninhabited, bordering on the Sabine river, and extending from that river towards Natchitoches. Whatever our claims were, and still are, and however founded they may be to territory far west of the Sabine, the dispute at that time was confined to the small tract above described. The Spanish commanders informed you that they were ordered to maintain the most friendly relations with the American Government and people, were expressly ordered not to act on the offensive, but only on the defensive; but that they were directed and thought it their duty to occupy the territory in question, because they believed it belonged to their Gov The second position taken, viz: that the present crisis does not require preparation for a state of war, may require somewhat more particular notice. We are called upon to review the scenes of 1798, when our vessels were captured, and which was said to be a time of greater danger than the present. At that time I did not pay much attention to politics, but, according to the best information I have been enabled to obtain, our situation then was extremely different from what it is now. The Government of France was at that time struggling for existence against a powerful coalition, in which were united the great Powers on the continent as well as Great Britain. Her Government was not firmly established, and it was not known how long she could oppose the powerful torrent of that coalition. For this reason it was, that those who opposed the regular force at that time said there was no occasion for raising an army. It was contended that France had no land forces to spare, nor had she a maritime force sufficient to transport them to this country, if even she had them to spare at home. It was, therefore, contended that war was not to be expected. I understand it was then insisted upon by those who opposed the raising an army, that the Government of this country, at that time, appeared |