Relations with Great Britain. voked. The measure has wounded deeply the interests of many of her own people, and is not a popular one. The United States furnish them at all times one of the best markets for their manufactures, and at present almost the only one. Her colonies are dependent on us. Harassed as they are already with war, and the menaces of a powerful adversary, a state of hostility with us would probably go far to throw this country into confusion. It is an event which the ministry would find it difficult to resist, and therefore cannot, I presume, be willing to encounter. But is it safe for the United States to attempt a vindication of their rights and interests in a decisive manner with Spain and Britain at the same time? Will it not unite them against us, and do us most essential injury? This is certainly a very important consideration, and will of course be maturely weighed by our Government. In my view of the subject the cases do not interfere. We probably shall never be able to settle our concerns with either Power without pushing our just claims on each with the greatest decision. At present, though at war with each other, they harmonize in a system of aggression against us, as far as it is possible in such a state. Is it not presumable, then, that at peace their harmony will be greater and its effects more injurious? It seems to be a question, simply, whether we will resist their unjust pressure at this time or defer it to some other opportunity, and surely none can be more favorable for us or less so for them. They are now respectively much in our power. We can wound both essentially should it be necessary to push things to that extremity, without receiving much comparative injury in return. I am strong in the opinion that a pressure on each at the same time would produce a good effect with the other. Success with either could not well fail to produce it with the other. I am far from thinking that the incident with Britain should change our conduct towards Spain, or that the necessity we may be under to push our pretensions with Spain should relax our exertions against Great Britain. Some considerations indeed occur which make it probable that the latter incident was a fortunate one. By pressing both at the same time France may find herself relieved from a dilemma, in which a pressure on Spain alone might place her, in consideration of her conduct in the late negotiation; and being desirous to encourage our misunderstanding with England, she may be prompted to promote an adjustment of our differences with Spain, to leave us free to push the object with England. As these subjects have been practically much under my view, in the trusts with which I have been honored by the President, and have entirely engrossed my attention, I have thought it would be agreeable to you to receive the result of my reflections on them. I am, sir, with great respect and esteem, your very obedient servant. JAMES MONROE. P. S. October 25. I have just had an interview with Mr. Hammond, in which I asked him when I should obtain an answer from Lord Mulgrave. He assured me that the subject was under the consideration of the Cabinet, and that it was intended to give me as early an answer as its own importance and the other very important concerns of the Government would permit: that I knew they were contending for their existence &c. I told him that I was detained here by that business alone, and should have sailed long since for the United States had his Government placed our affairs on such a footing as to have enabled me: that we wanted nothing but what was just and reasonable. Nothing else material passed in the interview; Mr. Bowdoin sailed for the continent about ten days since. I have not heard of his arrival in Holland, and fear, as the winds have been unfavorable, that he has had a bad passage. Captain Tompkins will not sail until February, so that there is no prospect of an immediate passage in his vessel. No. 37. Mr. Monroe to Mr. Madison. LONDON, Nov. 26, 1805. SIR: I hasten to transmit to you a copy of a letter which I received yesterday from Lord Mulgrave, in reply to mine of August 12 and September 23. From the length of time which had elapsed, and other circumstances, I had almost concluded that his Government had resolved not to enter on the subject, but to leave me to get its determination as I could from the decisions of the Admiralty. I find, however, with much satisfaction, that it is intended to take it up; whence there is some cause to presume that the business may yet be placed on a satisfactory footing. I shall not fail to cherish a disposition to such an adjustment by all the means in my power, or to inform you without delay of whatever may occur in it. I am, sir, with great respect and esteem, your very obedient servant. JAMES MONROE. Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Monroe. DOWNING STREET, Nov. 25, 1805. SIR: Upon a deliberate consideration of the nature and importance of the question which you have opened in the two official notes which I had the honor to receive from you, and adverting to the grounds of reasoning upon which you have principally rested your representations, I deemed it indispensably necessary to a due discussion of the subject, that a reference should be made by me to those who are best acquainted with all the circumstances respecting the decisions which have taken place, and the rules which have been established in our courts of admiralty and appeal, as well as with the principles and practice according to which the law is therein administered. I have not yet received any report in consequence of the reference which I have made, but I hope at no distant period to be enabled to give a full and, I trust, conclusive answer upon this most Relations with Great Britain. important point. I trust that you will not con- Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Jan. 15, 1806. SIR: The letters received from you since my last are down to No. 36, inclusive. The perse verance of the British Government in the principle which licenses the depredations on our commerce in colonial productions, with the losses already sustained, and still apprehended by our merchants, has produced a very general indignation throughout this country, and makes it necessary that you should renew and extend your remonstrances on the subject. In aid of the means for this purpose, furnished by the information and instructions given you from time to time, I forward you an examination of it just published, in which you will find a variety of facts and views of the British principle and proceedings that may be made to bear against them. I will forward also, in a few days, copies of sundry memorials from the merchants of our maritime cities, explaining the wrongs done them, and the disgust with which their are filled. They, with other documents accompanying them, will assist your endeavors to make on the Government impressions which the occasion calls for. ceive and forward me his letters; and that I would repair to London to wait on him whenever it might be necessary. By late accounts from the Continent, it appears that the French have entered Vienna almost without opposition, the Austrian and Russian armies having left it open to them. It was a while reported and believed that the Emperor of Austria had made a separate peace, the conditions of which had been dictated to him by his adversary in the spirit of conquest; but this is now contradicted and disbelieved. The Emperor it seems plays a bolder game, and is willing to hazard all rather than make the sacrifices which it is supposed were insisted on. Thus the campaign seems to be hastening to its crisis, which will unfold the policy of some movements in the field and cabinet which may not have been heretofore well understood. It will soon be seen whether the Emperor of France has been drawn on, without system, by the bril liancy of his success against General Mack, to hazard more than an able and prudent commander ought to have done, or, having in view the accomplishment of a vast object, his movements, combined with those of General Massena in Italy, were judicious, and conformable to a plan wisely laid down in the commencement. It will soon be seen whether Prussia, who cannot be an indifferent spectator, and has much in her power, intends to act a part in the adventure, and performs it well; or, governed by circumstances, makes and breaks her resolutions as they change, and finally becomes a victim to unsteady and feeble councils. Whatever may have been the motive of the Emperor of France to take his present position, it is I shall only add at present, that notwithstand- certainly a daring and hazardous one. It gives, ing the conviction of the illegality of the British in plain terms, the defiance to Europe; and, if principle, which becomes more and more evident Prussia takes part against him, he may be consid the more it is investigated, the President so far ered as fairly pitted against Europe; for the Powyields to a spirit of conciliation as to be still will-ers that are on his side are not volunteers in the ing to concur in the adjustment on the point authorized in your instructions of January 5, 1804; but expects and enjoins that you will be particularly careful to use such forms of expression as will furnish no pretext for considering an exception of the direct trade between a belligerent nation and its colonies as declaratory of a limitation of the neutral right, and not a positive stipulation, founded on considerations of expediency. I have the honor to be, &c., JAMES MADISON. No. 38. Mr. Monroe to Mr. Madison. CHELTENHAM, Dec. 11, 1805. SIR: The delicate state of health which my family has enjoyed of late, attributable as is supposed in a great measure to the atmosphere of London, induced me to come here last week. A letter from Lord Mulgrave, which I received just before I left town, having revived the expectation that I should hear from him on the subject of my former ones, I thought it proper to apprize him of my proposed absence; as that it would be short; that Mr. Purviance would remain behind to re cause. If he experiences a serious reverse of fortune, they will, I think, quickly fall off. He must either succeed-that is, make at least a good and safe retreat in case of necessity-or he is utterly undone. It remains to be seen whether, in case he succeeds by completely vanquishing the armies opposed to him, he will be able to make a prudent use of his victories, for the purpose of consolidating and securing his own power; and of course whether his victories are to prove of any solid and permanent advantage to him. It may, perhaps, require greater talents in the present state of the world, in respect to that object, to turn such victories to the best account, than, at the head of the veteran armies of France, to gain them. The situation of the United States, in respect to all these Powers, is, in every view, a very favorable one. So circumstanced are they, respectively, that while we have the means of doing each irreparable injury, all are interested in preserving the relations of peace and friendship with us; and none have it in their power to do us comparatively equal harm. As things now stand, each of the parties forms a complete counterpoise to the other, in a way best adapted to its own safety, and to our interest. Victorious by land, France has scarcely Relations with Great Britain. a ship at sea, and is, therefore, interested in the prosperity of our commerce. Victorious at sea, Great Britain finds herself compelled to concentrate her force so much in this quarter, with a view to her own security, that she would not only be unable to annoy us essentially in case of war, but even to protect her commerce and possessions elsewhere which would be exposed to our attacks. As to Spain, she ought not, perhaps, to be considered as a party to this controversy. If she was asked in which scale her interest lay, which party she wished to prevail, her friends or her enemies, she would most probably be at a loss to decide. I think it must be her interest that neither should succeed; but that the scales should stand suspended as they now are. If her enemies succeeded completely, she would be undone; and the same thing would happen if her friends did. Thus it appears that from none of these Powers have we any serious danger or injury to apprehend in the present state of affairs; nor, from what I can see, is it likely that we soon shall have. While the Powers of Europe are contending against each other. none of them can venture to break with us, in consideration of such motives as the just pretensions and claims of our Government may furnish; and by many causes they seem to be destined to remain in that state some years longer, or at least in one of great jealousy and rivalry of interest, which may produce the same effect. very respectable one, and I knew that reference had been made to him in some of the cases that were depending, although he was employed by our citizens on the receipt of my first letters, and that on his opinion the vessels were discharged. But, what gave more countenance to the presumption, was certain extraneous circumstances which were likely to be felt by the Government. A strong paper, extracted from the National Intelligencer, which reprehended in decisive terms the conduct of this Government towards our commerce, had appeared in the Morning Chronicle, and produced some sensation in the city. In addition to which, the character of events on the Continent, under the most favorable aspect in which they might be viewed, still wore an equivocal face. My experience here, without going further back into our history, has satisfied me that nothing inspires those in power with such friendly sentiments towards, or brings to their recollection, with such glowing feelings and expressions, the circumstances of our common origin, language, &c., as adversity. Before I went to Spain, when this country stood alone pitted against its adversary, and I pressed a decision on the propositions I had presented, I heard some eloquent discourses on that topic, to which I was not insensible. But as soon as the prospect improves, the relationship is forgotten and scouted; nothing is thought of then but their maritime rights, which, by their pretensions, comprise a complete monopoly of the ocean sovereignty over all islands belonging to their enemies, &c. This change has been very visible of late, and is to be traced to the period of the organization of the new coalition. What the disposition of this Government is at this moment on these subjects I shall endeavor to ascertain. It is my intention to sound it thoroughly, in some suit I have just received your letter of September 20th, respecting the ship Huntress, which has been given up to General Lyman, as I understood, by the order of the Admiralty.. The cargo, consisting of provisions, having been much injured by the detention, was, at his suggestion, and by my direction, to have been lately disposed of. I shall communicate with him on the subject, and transmit you shortly a correct account of the bu-able mode, and to profit of the opportunity, if one siness. Mr. Monroe to Mr. Madison. LONDON, December 23, 1805. SIR: I came to town on the 20th, in consequence of a letter from General Lyman, of which a copy is enclosed. Although the suggestion which it communicated as proceeding from Dr. Lawrence, a proctor in the Admiralty, who has no connexion with the Ministry, that the Government would suspend, on my application, the seizure of our vessels till the principle could be adjusted, might be founded on mere conjecture, yet I did not feel my self at liberty altogether to disregard it. After what had passed, it did not seem probable that the Government would expect any new application from me before it had answered those I had already made, or that it would adopt such an expedient to obtain one. If it was disposed to accommodate, the invitation already given was surely sufficiently strong. Still, it was not an impossible case. Dr. Lawrence's standing in the court is a is offered, to arrange them on satisfactory terms. The latest accounts from the scene of action state, with some degree of credibility, that the conflict was continued between the contending parties, near Austerlitz, on the 3d, 4th, and even the 5th, and that fortune finally proved favorable to the allies-in what degree, however, is variously represented. Some accounts state that the French army was completely broken and put to rout, while others represent it only as a handsome check. In truth, less confidence is now due to official statements than they used to obtain. Since they have begun, under the pretext of ruses de guerre, to mistake simple facts, people at a distance do not well know what to believe. From everything I can collect, it does not seem probable that any event has taken place to decide the fate of the campaign, much less of the war, nor is there any certainty that Prussia has taken a more decisive attitude towards France, as yet, though it is often reported to be the case. On this point you will doubtless receive better information from the Continent than I can give you. It is probable that negotiations for peace will be opened in the course of the Winter, as it may be that most of the parties seriously wish it. The mission of Count Haugwitz was supposed to pre Relations with Great Britain. at the expense of other Powers, that it seemed to be impossible for them to reconcile their safety with her existing state. The new dynasty, too, which grew out of the revolution, did not diminish, if it did not increase, the difficulty. It seems to have made up its mind that it was impossible for it to incorporate itself with the ancient ones, sent to the Emperor of France a species of ultimatum, which, if adopted, would put an end to the war, or, being rejected, bring Prussia into it on the side of the allies. The following are said to be its conditions: that he should separate the Crown of Italy from that of France, and withdraw his troops from Naples, Holland, and Switzerland, and leave those countries to the enjoy-even by alliance, if such were to be formed in such ment of their independence. It is reported that the a manner as to establish confidence, friendship, conditions, be they what they may, were known to and an opinion of security between them. The and approved by the Emperor Alexander, whence French Emperor has not been able to attach to it is inferred that they are such as Austria and him the ancient nobility of France. He has taken Great Britain also would accede to. It is likewise many into his service, but even these are not the reported that a provisional treaty was formed be- persons in whom he reposes his chief confidence. tween Russia and Prussia, when Alexander was Thus, while he possesses powers utterly incomat Berlin, which stipulated that Prussia should join patible with the principles of the revolution, he the allies in case France rejected the propositions of finds himself under the necessity to rely princithe latter. But I should not be surprised if it should pally for his support on the revolutionary party in ultimately appear that this mission was adopted the public councils, in the armies, and among the by the King of Prussia to get rid, at the time, in a people. It cannot be doubted that it draws to his handsome manner, of the pressure of the Emperor aid every species of support from every quarter, Alexander; or, being adopted in good faith for the and by means which he deems best adapted to the ostensible purpose, should nevertheless produce no end; still, the revolutionary party are his chief immediate effect, either with respect to a general counsellors, his generals, and body guard. Where peace, or the union of Prussia with the allies in the that business will end is a problem to be solved, war against France. It is not probable that the which time alone can solve. Perhaps the result King of Prussia sent to the Emperor of France is connected with other causes in embryo, which a positive, unqualified ultimatum, which should may hereafter unfold themselves. From what I admit of no modification. A measure so bold and can see, he appears to think that foreign war tends hazardous is not consistent with the character of to consolidate his power at home, and thus that the Prussian Cabinet, which is more remarkable consideration increases much the interval between for its hesitation and deliberation than the promp- him and foreign Powers, and also gives an addititude of its action; for its desire to preserve what tional impulse to the revolutionary movement, it has by peace, than to risk everything in an at- though directed to a different end. Should the tempt to gain more by war. And, if the propo-issue be fairly made between France and the other sitions which were to be made by the Prussian envoy were liable to modification, I cannot well discern how his mission is to be distinguished from ordinary ones, which commence in negotiation, and have a regular course and termination. In this view, it is not unlikely that the business may be referred to conferences or a congress to be held elsewhere, which by management, may be prolonged for a considerable time, and whose result may finally depend on the fortune of other battles between the existing parties; unless, indeed, by the successes of France over her present opponents, and the high pretensions of her chief, Prussia should hereafter have no alternative, but be forced into the war in her own defence. Be the fact however, as it may, with respect to Prussia, that is, whether she abstains from the war or becomes a party to it, and at an earlier or later period, I do not think that there is much prospect of a general peace in the course of this winter. I rather think that the war will go on till it produces some great change in the condition of one of the parties. The contest is, in truth, between France and her dependencies and the rest of Europe, and seems to be now so deeply laid that I cannot well perceive how a solid and permanent peace can be established between them till one or other gains so far the ascendency as to be able to dictate the terms. The gigantic struggle of the French revolution had so far extended the bounds and contributed to the aggrandizement of France, Powers, it is by no means certain, provided the parties live, in whose favor the scale will preponderate. On one side there is a vast superiority of population; on the other an extraordinary concentration of talents, with proportional activity and enterprise, in the leaders of a great and powerful people. On both, the regular force is nearly equal; but the character of the troops, as well as of the people, is essentially different. On the side of France, they feel the impulse of the revolutionary movement; while, on that of Austria, there seems to be a consciousness of imbecility, an entire want of enterprise, and an evident indisposition to the conflict, which cannot be attributed to the want of courage, for there are no braver troops. Under such circumstances, the superiority of population promises to be of little avail. We have already seen, by the incursion into Germany, that no part of it, or but a very inconsiderable one, has been brought into action; that it is a lifeless mass, subject to the command of the victorious army in the field, though perhaps inferior to the force to be found in the smallest provinces. It seems probable, if the Emperor of France beats the armies opposed to him, that he may demolish the dynasties; but then would arise a question, whether, in case those events happened, the nations were subdued. The world has seen with astonishment, that Austria, who has among her people several millions of fighting men, has not been able to call into the field, at this great crisis, above two Relations with Great Britain. hundred thousand. Surely, it cannot be said that business, if Lord Mulgrave had prepared an anthe defeat of this force is the subduction of Austria. swer for me? to which he replied in the negaDoes it not, on the contrary, give good cause to tive. In conversation he gave me reason to infer presume that her Government has lost its influence, that no decision had been made upon the subject. that the people have withdrawn their confidence I requested him to inform his Lordship that I had from it, that it is tottering, and that everything is come to town to see him on that business, and ripe for a change, which the slightest external should remain some time, in the hope of hearing pressure may produce? If I may judge of Austria from him; which I was desirous of doing at this by what I saw of Spain, and I am told that in time, as the Congress was sitting, and several many respects the lines are parallel, there is much opportunities offered to bear my despatches to our ground for these suggestions. I did not believe Government. He promised to do so immediately, that there existed in Europe, if there did on earth, and assured me, that if he received his Lordship's a Government so completely worn out and ex-instructions to make any communications to me, hausted, in all its institutions and functions as I that I should hear from him without delay. Four found that to be; or that it was possible for any days were more than sufficient for the correspondGovernment to produce such an impoverishing and ence between them, whereas twice that term has destructive effect on the moral character of the now elapsed without my hearing anything on the people, which is naturally a manly one, and on subject; so that I conclude that no change has the face of the country, its cultivation, and even taken place in the disposition of the Cabinet on on the soil itself, as is evident there. These con- it. The business is in the regular train between siderations afford sufficient cause, at least, to doubt the Government and myself. It appears to me that, although the armies be defeated and the that I have done everything that it was proper to dynasties overthrown, the nation ought not to be do, and must attend an answer, which, if much considered as subdued, or liable to be disposed of longer withheld, cannot be considered otherwise as a conquered people, by arrangements that are than as a decision of the Government to support likely to be durable. This is, however, in some present measures till some stronger motive premeasure a digression from the subject. In stating sents itself. that I did not think it probable the existing strife between the Powers at war would be soon settled, I have thought that it might not be improper to explain the reasons of that opinion. I will conclude these with a few additional remarks. Under existing circumstances, I think our attitude with all these Powers is a very imposing one; that, although with their loose system of political morality, inordinate pride, and extravagant pretensions, they will respectively commit all kinds of injustice and outrage against us, if permitted, it is nevertheless in our power, and will be while the present state lasts, to obtain of either, by a suitable pressure, any just and reasonable demand we may have against it. That nothing will be obtained without some kind of pressure, such a one as excites an apprehension that it will be increased in case of necessity, and that to produce that effect, and protect ourselves against unexpected and unfavorable results, which are always to be supposed and provided for, it will be proper to put our country, by invigorating the militia system, and increasing the naval force, in a better state of defence. I am, with great respect and esteem, your very obedient servant, JAMES MONROE. P. S. Since I came to town I have endeavored to ascertain whether anything had lately occurred, to invite from me a new application to the Ministry respecting the proceedings against our commerce; and the result has been to satisfy me that there had not. I called on my arrival at Downing street to see Lord Mulgrave; who, as I was informed, was at Bath with Mr. Pitt, as he had been more than a fortnight. I asked the young man in the office who is charged, in the absence of Mr. Hammond, with the American It is unnecessary to add that, in giving my sentiments on these important subjects, I am far from being wedded to them; that being founded on a partial view only, that which is presented here, of those facts and circumstances which ought to be taken into consideration in making a decision, I have always given them with diffidence; and, as I well know that a combined view of all the great interests and concerns which merit attention will be taken by our Government in making the decision, by whom alone it can be taken with advantage, I shall, from that and many other considerations, have much greater confidence in its judgment than my own. No. 40. Mr. Monroe to Mr. Madison. LONDON, January 28, 1806. SIR: I informed you lately, in a short note by Mr. Clark, who sailed in the Remittance, of the death of Mr. Pitt, which took place last week. The King hath since resolved to commit the administration to the opposition, as we are informed by all the gazettes of this day. It is said that he announced this to Lord Grenville yesterday, and authorized him, in conjunction with Mr. Fox, to form a new Ministry from among their friends. It is expected that this will be done in a day or two, as they are now engaged in the business. This change has an aspect toward peace, and fully persuaded I am that it will be the serious object of those who may be thus brought into power to endeavor to make one. Mr. Fox, it is understood, will have the Department of Foreign Affairs. Í shall see if it is possible, as soon as he is inaugurated, to obtain a change in the policy of this Government toward the United States; of which, I think, there is great probability. About a fort |