given. Why not let the army of reserve go on along with this new plan, whatever it may be? If officers are to run a race together for rank, as I understand they are, (for although the intention is not avowed in this house by ministers, applications are known to be matle to and by several officers,) why take away the competition of the army of reserve? I cannot conceive any thing more irrational. When a new mode of raising recruits for the regular army is proposed, it naturally brings to my mind. an opinion which is much disputed, and upon which, because it is so disputed by some great military authorities, I cannot presume to pronounce a decided sentiment, I mean the propriety of raising men for limited service; although I certainly should think it the more eligible policy, and best calculated to render the army respectable and efficient. However, military objec tions as to the difficulty, if such a system existed, of supplying our foreign stations, must be overcome before the system be attempted.

As to the plan for bringing the Irish militia over here, I do not approve of it under existing circumstances. No argument can be drawn in favour of such a plan at present, from a precedent which occurred in quite a different situation of things. With respect to the interchange of the militias of the two countries, there are many physical objections to it that would render it a measure very disagreeable to the officers connected with both militias; and here I must notice a rumour which has gone abroad, that applications have been lately made to the privates of the West Kent militia without the knowledge of their officers, to volunteer their services for Ireland: this practice deserves to be strongly reprobated. What, to try to prevail on men to quit their own coast, within half a day's sail of the enemy, to proceed to the distance of Ireland!

The honourable mover of the proposition under debate has alluded, in the course of his speech, to the power which, in my opinion, belongs to the crown, to call out the population of the country in the event of an invasion as expressed in the preamble to the general defence act. I perceive, that the honourable gen

tleman's sentiment differs from mine. I do not mean to discuss this subject at present; but I must observe, that nothing appears clearer to me than this proposition,-that the state has a right to call on the people to defend it, and that in the crown, being the depositary of the power of the state, is vested the right of so calling out the people upon a great emergency. This right I ́think I could shew, from a series of precedents, to be recognized by the constitution and custom of this country; that it is a right inherent in the crown to exercise this power, according to the necessity of such case as may arise, and to be limited by that necessity. The crown, it must be admitted, possesses the power of putting any district of the kingdom under martial law, in case of invasion; subject, however, to that responsibility to which ministers would be liable for the abuse of any such power.

Upon the respective interchange of the services of the two militias of England and Ireland, I think, considering the peculiar principles on which they are officered, it would put the landed gentlemen of both countries to great and unexpected inconvenience; and therefore would operate injuriously on that constitu tional establishment. If, however, this interchange of service is right at all, it must be on general principles, or on account of particular and pressing urgency, that supersedes all regular establishment, such as arose from the situation of Ireland, when, during the former administration, the English militia volunteered their services to that country. If the present ministers do not advance any general principle to justify the measure, (and cer tainly no idea of urgency presents itself on either side of the water; that there is no necessity, is obvious, from the very arguments of ministers, for they say, "do not be afraid to vote with us on this subject, as it is not our intention to carry it into execution by a partial and discretionary measure,") it must of course be unjustifiable and wrong. On general principles they have not attempted to defend it. This last measure of his Majesty's ministers shews clearly that the regular army is not yet adequate to the necessity of the state, and implies that means should be taken to increase it. The method of so doing may be subject to some variety of

opinion; perhaps I may not see it exactly in the same light as the honourable gentleman*, yet I do not perceive any material practical difference between us. The general principle and outline of our national defence appears to me good, regarding as it does the regulars, army of reserve, militia, and volunteers. Were they less defensible in principle than they are, I should consider them as existing establishments, in the present moment, more agreeable to confirm and improve, than abolish and substitute by new.

Thus I declare my opinion on this subject, without at this time entering into a more particular defence of it. With respect to the power of the crown to call on every subject under its dominion, in case of absolute need, this, I take, under some form or other, to be incident to the very establishment of civil society, and, in fact, whenever occasion required, has been exercised. The principle is, however, limited by its necessity, which scarcely can arise but when the state of things would authorise the crown of itself to proclaim martial law; and if the constitution should survive that urgent state of things, the counsellors of his Majesty would, doubtless, be as amenable to constitutional responsibility for that, as any other act of their administration. As such is the undoubted right and prerogative of the crown, I should think, with a view to possible emergencies, that legislative provision should, in the present juncture, a little anticipate the justifiable necessity to which I have referred, at least so far as to put every man in the maritime counties, likely to be the seat of the enemy's attempt, under the immediate power of the crown, in case of actual or imminent danger of invasion. In those counties most likely to be the seat of war, such as Kent, Essex, Sussex, Suffolk, Devonshire, Cornwall, and the vicinity of Newcastle, I also think a greater proportion of volunteers should be allowed than in others, at least so far as the convenience and voluntary offers of individuals will allow. But I shall not stop here. I must say, that our naval means are insufficient for our defence; and that there is a great deficiency of the means for keeping up

* Mr. Fox.

our navy. Into these points I shall enter minutely, upon some future occasion. At present I shall only say, in vindication of myself from all the obloquy thrown upon me by officers, brought from distant stations to support the present system, that, as to the specific force which I recommended, I did not recommend barges, and lighters, and such sort of trash as they reproached me with advising. I recommended good stout gun-brigs, and I have had the pleasure of seeing great activity of late to increase that very species of force.

Another objection has been made to my system. I recommended fortifications, and I have on this account been reproached with an attempt to lessen the spirit of the country, and to involve a great and unnecessary expense. What I recommended was, not a general system of fortification, but that, where there were great districts possessing great local bulwarks, there a judicious mixture of art and nature, which, at a small expense in money, might spare many thousands of men, would be the best and wisest policy. I know many places in which a few thousand pounds expended, would give more security than as many thousand men could afford. This is obvious to all military men, and the system is beginning to be acted upon; but at the same time it must be admitted, that it was as obvious last summer as it is now. I do not wish, by these observations, to interfere with the department to which this system may seem to belong. I believe, however, that it does not rest with the department of the commander-inchief, or any other, but with the cabinet. I have discharged my duty by delivering this my sincere and undisguised opinion. I hope it is not hastily or inconsiderately entertained; but sure I am that I should consider it treason to the best interests of my country, if, such as it is, I did not openly declare it.

April 25, 1804.

MR. Secretary Yorke having moved the order of the day for the House to go into a Committee on the bill for the Suspension of the Army of Reserve act,

Mr. PITT rose, and addressed the House as follows:

In rising, Sir, to oppose the motion for your leaving the chair, it is not my wish to occupy the attention of the house longer than appears to nie absolutely necessary; and therefore I have no desire to enlarge on topics connected with the general subject, which have, in the course of late debates, undergone the most ample discussion. Before I proceed to the description of the plan of which I have given notice to the house on a former day, it is my wish to say a few words on the nature and complexion of the bill which it is the object of the right honourable gentleman's motion to bring under our consideration in a committee. As far as I am able to understand it, the only effect of its adoption would be to relinquish all chance of the benefit of that augmentation of our disposable force, which, in the unanimous opinion of all persons in this house, ought to be the principal object of attention with his Majesty's government. It would be to relinquish all chance of the continuance of future benefit, arising from a measure which, though in many points of view impeded and retarded, has had the effect of procuring, within the space of twelve months, a more considerable augmentation of our regular force, than could perhaps have been obtained in any other way, at the time and under the circumstances in which the measure was carried into activity. It appears to me that all these chances of benefit are given up, without substituting in their room any system by which the great object of the augmentation of the regular army is to be obtained.

If I understood the statement of the right honourable secretary of state below me, there were three measures, by the adoption of which his Majesty's ministers flattered themselves that they would