consul might very well have been such as to give an idea that there were no armaments, or uone that were considerable, going forward, at the time when he was drawing up that information. For myself, I have no doubt in my mind of the existence of the armaments in question. In order to demonstrate to us the hostile dispositions of the court of Madrid, one circumstance, which though minute, was important.-I allude, to the arming of the packets. To dispose of all this, I contend, that the evidence, so distinct, clear, and positive of admiral Cochrane, is supported by the very excuses and arguments of the Spanish government. Besides, had we not the evidence of their being armed, in the information of the governor of Gallicia of a subsequent disarmament? This gentleman's information was material in another view; he told us, that they were not any longer armed ships of war, yet that the packets would remain armed. Thus, however real her armament, her disarmament was nominal. Now it cannot be said, that the condition of our neutrality or forbearance was, that she should not arm, nor make any armaments in her ports. How is the fact? Why, Sir, an armament took place in a quarter most material for us to insist on her being disarmed, and that was in the port of Ferrol, where the gallantry of our seamen detained, in a state of blockade, a squadron of France. The acquisition to this squadron, of a considerable Spanish force, might have occasioned not a little inconvenience. Certainly it would have obliged us to reinforce our blockading squadron; and possibly it would have been, in some respect, the means of causing a disadvantageous change of the positions of our general naval forces. All this, surely, was evidence of a hostile mind. That armament took place after a positive engagement with us not to make any armaments whatever. In these circumstances, what was the conduct of the court of Spain? Days and weeks elapse without one order, account, or explanation from that court to its minister M. d'Anduaga, to remove, at the court of England, those just apprehensions, jealousies, and unavoidable inquietudes, which the known proceedings at Ferrol were, of necessity, to create.

1

The same with respect to Mr. Frere, at Madrid.

Not one

word of explanation was given to our chargé d'affaires, of the nature or object of these armaments; but he was told, generally, but most evasively, that they were not intended to hurt Great Britain. This idle jargon continued to be the language of the Spanish minister, until they received the intelligence from the governor of Gallicia of the dextrous attempt of M. d'Anduaga, to persuade our court that the armaments were for quelling the rebellion of Biscay. M. d'Anduaga's own dispatches arriving, informed the ministers of Spain more particularly of the colour their ambassador had given to the transaction. Yet, when we know, Sir, that the same governor of Biscay did at the outset, when not furnished with the ingenious but unavailing excuses of M. d'Anduaga, inform us, that the expedition was a secret one, shall we be amused out of the conviction of our understanding? If any man should believe M. d'Anduaga, with the evidence now before us, it will exceed my imagination of puerile credulity.

But, Sir, I do not believe that it will be advanced by any man in this house, that there were not armaments in the ports of Spain; nor can I see how those armaments can be accounted for, but on the principle of a hostile disposition. As to the armaments in other respects, I have only stated what was done. The simple question in reference to our moderation towards Spain, is not whether we did not do enough, but whether we did not do too much; whether we did not remit our due vigour and decision in not declaring war on the instant? If we had at once declared war, it would have been consistent with substantial justice. As it was, our reservation amounted to a pointed and conditional declaration of war. A breach of neutrality was declared actual hostility. By this conditional declaration of war, if circumstances should arise, we were entitled to act at once; so that when we knew of the hostile preparations and armaments in the ports of Spain, we were justified instantly to declare war; because, if we could prevent the treasures of that power from reaching in safety her ports, we should be preventing

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a junction of the forces of the three powers, of Spain France, and Holland, the succouring of an inveterate enemy, the replenishing of his coffers, or the recruiting of his armies: for, assuredly, these treasures were not destined for the coffers of Spain, but for those of France. Even in this proceeding, the moderation and friendly dispositions of his Majesty's government were as obvious as unequivocal. We detained the frigates of Spain, indeed, but, by the mode of that detention, we left a door open to Spain to return to her ancient friendships, to the line of her generous and magnanimous policy in better days, to the course of her high-minded, honourable propensities and feelings, to her true interests, to the paths of her renown and her glory.

Now, if we did not at once declare war against Spain, knowing the motives of our unparalleled forbearance, I think it too hard, Sir, for gentlemen to charge us with the contravention of the law of nations, with want of good faith, or the violation of the most liberal, enlightened principles of a just and prudent policy. It will be found that we have treated Spain with a kindness, of which, perhaps, no epoch of history can furnish an instance. We carried our indulgence to the utmost extent. We were not, to the last moment, hostile, but to an extent singularly limited; and although Spain was giving every kind of assistance to her ally; although, joined with naval force, she was pouring her treasures into her coffers,-still we were willing to listen to her ministry, and, if possible, to avert from her the evils of war. Has Spain requited our friendship? With the

two conditions on which our forbearance could be continued, on which she could be permitted to maintain her neutrality, she refused to comply. These were, first, the cessations of all armaments; and, secondly, the communications of the terms of the treaty of St. Ildefonso. We did not demand more than was necessary to our safety. We demanded nothing but our confirmed right. If we had not insisted on this promptly, and made it a sine qua non, we might, indee, have been accused of weakness, of pusillanimity, and imbecility. Af er long concealing her ar

maments in other ports, Spain evinced, besides, a determination to refuse an explanation of those, and of what we alike required, the treaty of 1795. From these circumstances war had become inevitable. This was the case long before the affair of the frigates. In fact, their seizure was not known at the time of the discussion at Madrid, or of the notification of the 7th of November. As to the detention of the frigates, the irrefragable justice of that measure must be obvious to the world. That circumstance, however, makes no part of the case, and we should equally have been at war, had it never taken place. I do not say this to extenuate that proceeding, of which I trust I have already said enough completely to justify it. Deplorable as some of the circumstances were with which it was attended, as indeed bloodshed, though shed even in lawful war, must always be regretted, yet that occurrence certainly had no influence on the final decision of the question of peace or war.

I trust, Sir, that I have sufficiently proved that, even in the commencement of the négociations, we had a just cause of war, which never was abandoned; that, during the second period, our forbearance, while Spain became bound, and actually paid a war subsidy of three millions sterling to France, was conditional; and that the condition being violated, we again were possessed of the right of war provisionally declared; and all our demands of satisfaction and security being rejected, we are in consequence at open war. Under these circumstances, I entertain a full confidence that the vote of this house will recognise the justice of our cause, and sanction the conduct of the govern ment, and that we shall lay at the foot of the throne the professions of a dutiful and loyal people, determined to make every sacrifice in the vindication of their rights, and in the defence of their country.

I shall conclude, Sir, with moving, "That an humble address be presented to his Majesty, to acquaint his Majesty, that we have taken into our most serious consideration the papers which have been laid before us by his Majesty's command, relative to the discussions which have taken place with the court of Spain:

That we observe with the greatest satisfaction, that, through the whole of the transaction, his Majesty has carried his moderation and forbearance to the utmost extent which was consistent with a due regard to the honour of his crown, and the interests of his dominions: That, while we fully concur in the propriety and necessity of those prompt and vigorous measures of precaution which his Majesty found himself compelled to adopt, in conse quence of the naval armaments fitted out by Spain, we see at the same time a fresh proof of his Majesty's earnest desire to avoid, if possible, the extremity of war, in the first opportunity which he even then offered to the court of Spain, to enter on pacific negociation: And that, impressed with these sentiments, and fully convinced of the justice of the war, which the conduct of the court of Spain (evidently under the influence and controul of France) has rendered unavoidable, we shall not fail to afford his Majesty our most zealous and cordial support in every measure which may be necessary for prosecuting the war with vigour, and bringing it to a safe and honourable termination.

A very long discussion succeeded; in the course of which Mr. Grey moved an amendment upon the address, to the effect of censuring the conduct of ministers throughout the negociation.

At a late hour the debate was adjourned to the following day, when the original motion was carried,

April 8, 1805.

MR. Whitbread this day brought forward his promised motion founded on the tenth report of the Commissioners of Naval Inquiry; concluding a speech of great length with moving the following resolutions:

1. "That it appears to this committee, that on the 18th of June, 1782, the House of Commons in a committee of the whole house came, amongst others, to the following resolutions :

'That it is the opinion of this committee, that some regulations ought to 'be adopted for the purpose of lessening and keeping down the balances of 'public money, which appear to have usually been in the hands of the trea