of their countrymen. Before the arrival of these noblemen, vague and fleeting rumours had been afloat; but nothing certain was known, except that the usurpation of Bonaparte was detested in Spain, and that the people there were by no means disposed to submit quietly to it. It was not, however, imagined, and it was scarcely hoped, that any very formidable or general opposition would be made. But when deputies actually arrived from the north of Spain, stating that the inhabitants had proceeded so far as to arm themselves against their invaders, and that their confidence in their own strength and ultimate success was so strong as to have urged them on to the determination of trying their power against the power of Bonaparte, the British nation began seriously to look forward to this new and unexpected prospect of restoring the continent to independence, or at least of rescuing one portion of it from the grasp of the conqueror. The cause of Spain was one which fortunately united all parties.

The difference indeed between the war in which Spain was about to be engaged, and those wars by which Europe had suffered since the beginning of the French revolution, was calculated not only to inspire more hope, but also to produce a nearer approach to unanimity of sentiment in the British nation. Bonaparte was about to be opposed, not by regular armies, in a country where the great bulk of the people were indifferent to the issue of the contest, but by an armed nation roused to resistance and vengeance by the injustice and misery they had suffered, and who were convinced that their liberty and happiness would be deeply affected if they did not succeed. The prospect of such a contest no longer permitted the British ministry or nation to regard the Spaniards as enemies. They had taken up arms to oppose the common enemy, and therefore they were friends to Britain, as she was at war with France: they had taken up arms in defence of their liberties, and therefore they were friends to Britain, as the only remaining spot in Europe in which freedom could be found. The ministers gave assurances in parliament that

they would afford every assistance in their power to the Spanish patriots; and his majesty, in his speech at the close of the session, sanctioned the assurance in the most explicit and satisfactory manner. (s

The friendly disposition of the British court to Spain was thus openly declared to Europe. Swift sailing vessels were dispatched, with arms, money, and intelligent officers. Admiral Purvis opened a friendly intercourse with Don Morla, governor of Cadiz, who succeeded the Marquis de Solano, who was put to death by the populace for his attachment to the French, and concerted measures for capturing the French fleet, consisting of five sail of the line and a frigate, then in Cadiz harbour, The French, after a contest of three days, submitted to the Spaniards. Previous to this Murat had dispatched Dupont into the south in order to save this fleet from the danger with which it was threatened.

The most numerous, as well as the best disciplined part of the Spanish army, which Bonaparte had permitted to remain in Spain, were stationed, at the beginning of the insurrection, in the camp of St. Roche, before Gibraltar. As soon as the intelligence reached them, that their country was in axms against the French emperor, Castanos, their general, opened a friendly communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of Gibraltar. Every facility was afforded them for marching without delay, and in the best appointed manner, to the support of their fellow citizens. They stood in need of money, and money was instantly supplied them in the most liberal manner. Their general, with the true spirit of a Spaniard, and with that confidence in the honour of Britons which has always remained deeply fixed in the breast of his countrymen, notwithstanding the unwilling warfare to which they had been compelled by the intrigues, and influence of France, quitted the lines of St. Roche, and trusted to the garrison of Gibraltar, not taking any advantage of his absence. Having been reinforced by a considerable body of troops brought over from Ceuta, he found himself at the head of a

formidable army; but it was not alone on their numbers that he depended for success in the day of battle. He was convinced, from what he witnessed and heard, that the service on which he was about to lead his army, was recommended to their zeal and enthusiasm by the most powerful and inspiriting motives. They were about to march and fight, not merely because the general they were bound to obey issued his orders to that effect; they looked forward to the service in which they were going to be engaged, as peculiarly their own. That country which gave them birth, and with which were associated all their pleasures and hopes, called for their assistance; their relations and friends were either already in arms, or were exposed to the insults and tyranny of the soldiers of Bonaparte. Thus circumstanced, and with these impressions and feelings, it is not to be wondered if they almost anticipated the commands of their general. Castanos accordingly found himself at the head of an army, which promised to accomplish whatever could reasonably be expected from men animated with the love of their country, and with a determination to assist or avenge their fellow citizens.

But on many accounts it was necessary that the operations of such an army should be conducted with peculiar skill and caution. The junta of Seville had recommended, in their precautions, a steady and uniform adherence to prudence; and pointed out the advantages that would result from opposing the army rather by a continued and unceasing system of petty and harassing attacks, and the cutting off his supplies and reinforcements, than by an open and general engagement. Several considerations pointed out to Castanos the propriety of following up this system during the whole of the service in which he was about to engage. In the first place, the army of Dupont was in such a situation, so completely cut off from receiving any reinforcements, so entirely surrounded either by bodies of armed peasantry, or by defiles among which he durst not commit himself;-that there was little or no chance that he could ultimately escape, even though no direct

attacks were made upon him; nor could it be expected that he would be able to hold out long. His supplies of provision were known to be very inadequate to the maintenance of his army: the peasantry fled from him on every side, so that he would be compelled to employ his harassed soldiers to collect their daily food, even at the very time when their services might be wanting to repel the attack of the enemy. If the situation of Dupont's army enforced on the mind of Castanos the propriety of a cautious and prolonged mode of warfare, 'the state of his own troops pointed it out no less clearly.

After several petty and partial actions, in which the French were uniformly worsted, a severe action took place between General Riding and Dupont, in which the Spaniards evinced great gallantry, and defeated the enemy at every point. In consequence of this event General Dupont offered to capitulate: but during the suspension of hostilities General Wedel arrived with 6000 men, with whom he attacked the Spaniards. This scandalous behaviour was disclaimed by General Dupont, who immediately ordered him to retire.

The whole of the French army, comprising the division of Wedel, as well as the division of Dupont, were to deliver up their arms, till their arrival at Cadiz, where they were to be embarked and sent to Rochefort. Thus it would appear that the treacherous attack of Wedel, during the suspension of hostilities, had been the cause of his division being included in the capitulation: since it is highly probable, if he had kept his former position, and not interfered, a seperate capitulation, preceded perhaps by some delay or by a separate attack, would have been necessary. The French forces, by the official returns, was found to have consisted, before the battle of Baylen, of 14,000 men; of these nearly 3000 were killed and wounded. The Spanish army consisted of 15,000 men, one half of whom were peasantry: their loss amounted to about 1200 in killed and wounded.

The cause of the patriots in other parts of Spain proceeded in an equally favourable and successful manner. The prin

cipal armies which they had formed, were placed under the command of generals distinguished for their bravery, and their zealous and unquestionable attachment to the cause of their country. The defence of Arragon was committed to Palafox, whose bold and animating conduct has already been noticed. Saragossa, the principal city of Arragon, was considered by the French as a place of so much importance, that they made repeated attacks upon it with all the forces they could spare, and in a manner at once the most determined and ferocious. But. Palafox resisted, and defeated all their attacks. The* people of Valencia also drove off the French army sent against them with great slaughter. The patriot army under Cuesta was defeated in the north, but Blake covered the retreat in a masterly manner.

The conduct and occupation of Bonaparte, at a time when defeat was every where the fate of his armies in Spain, and when to all appearance the fruit of his duplicity and insolence towards the royal family was about to be snatched completely and for ever out of his grasp, was unexpected and singular. No doubt can be entertained, that when he had withdrawn the royal family from Spain, and secured his troops in the possession of the capital and the principal fortresses, he had regarded the object of his ambition as securely and permanently attained. It is probable, also, that the first intelligence of the insurrection of the Spaniards would either be partially concealed from him, or if he were made acquainted with it, as it actually appeared to his agents, that be regarded. it as by no means of a nature sufficiently decided and general to require his deliberation or to disturb his plans. But that he should continue unmoved, and apparently regardless of the successive defeats his armies sustained, cannot easily be accounted for, in any manner consistent with his known character and disposition. And yet, while the troops of Spain were every where successful, and were preparing themselves for new victories, while the insurrection was rapidly spreading and organizing itself in every province,-Bonaparte remained