About the beginning of November the Spanish armies made some judicious movements, and Bonaparte at the same time prepared to execute a grand manoeuvre, which was to interpose his whole force between the armies of Spain, and, if possible, to break in pieces the army of Blake. Within the short space of a fortnight General Blake was engaged eight times, nor did Bonaparte quit the attack, or give up the pursuit until his object was completely fulfilled. Bonaparte had also sent a strong division of his army against the troops of Estramadura, which, after thirteen hours hard fighting, was completely defeated. The capture of Burgos followed, where the emperor established his head-quarters. He now suddenly and unexpectedly directed his efforts against the forces under Castanos on the Ebro. At Tudela a battle took place. The Spaniards fought with great coolness and fortitude, and the French were repulsed at every point. But Castanos had chosen a bad position, which was commanded by heights he had neglected to occupy. The French perceived and profited by this error; the Spanish army was outflanked and completely broken. Thus within three weeks Bonaparte succeeded in defeating the three grand armies of Spain; while the British forces, consisting of near 40,000 highly disciplined troops, were too distant to be any progress of Bonaparte.

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The continued and unchecked successes of the French, and their consequent approach to the capital, at last alarmed the supreme junta, and induced them to address a proclamation of an encouraging nature to the Spaniards. Intelligence, or rather a rumour, had reached Madrid, that the enemy had advanced to the neighbourhood of Somosierra, one of the strong posts which defends the capital to the north. It was to support and animate the people under the natural impression of this alarming information, that the Supreme junta addressed them. In this address they assured the Spaniards, that their unremitted and anxious attention had been directed to the means of driving back and destroying those armies,

who, with continued temerity, had advanced to the neighbourhood of Somosierra. This circumstance, though undoubtedly alarming, ought not to excite despondency, or create confusion. The artifices of Bonaparte were conspicuous even in the rumours which were circulated with so much care and eagerness in the capital; his agents were employed in spreading these rumours; and in order to alarm the well-disposed but timid part of the inhabitants, they had greatly exaggerated the numbers of the enemy. The junta had taken particular pains and care to learn from the generals who had been previously sent to defend the passes to Madrid, the real number of the French troops who had audaciously advanced before their main army; and they could confidently and safely assure the people that they scarcely amounted to eight thousand.

But the danger which threatened the capital was great and alarming; and much more immediate than the junta, at the time when they issued their proclamation, seem to have apprehended. It was, however, expected and stated that the inhabitants would defend themselves to the last extremity: they were represented as rising in enthusiasm and determination, in proportion as the attack of the enemy became more near and certain. Vigorous preparations were resolved to be made for the defence of the city; the streets were barricaded; and deep trenches were ordered to be cut for the purpose of impeding and harassing the approach of the French. Madrid is accessible to an army only by two roads. from the north; one of these passes through Guadaramma, and the other through Somosierra: the natural position of the latter is of uncommon strength; it is said that ten thousand men are sufficient to maintain possession of it against the most numerous force that could be brought to act against them. Both these places were guarded by strong bodies of troops; and the natural strength of their situation was greatly increased by the erection of works provided 'with a numerous artillery. In order to protect the city, if the enemy, aware of

the difficulties of the passage by Guadaramma or Somosierra, should approach it from the eastward, the town of Guadalaxara, on the road, was fortified in such a manner as it was expected would effectually secure it from being carried by a coup-de-main. The defence of Madrid itself, and the preparations and works necessary to impede the advance of the French towards it, were entrusted to Don Thomas Morla, who had already distinguished himself at Cadiz. But unfortunately bere also, what was necessary was delayed till it was too late. The address of Morla, calling upon the inhabitants to defend the city, was not published till some days after the defeat of Castanos, when nothing intervened between the French army and Madrid, and when no other object occupied the attention of Bonaparte, but its immediate assault and capture.

On the 22d of November, Bonaparte removed his headquarters from Burgos to Aranda on the Douro. His progression in this direction seemed to intimate an intention of pushing on immediately towards Madrid; this, however, he did not do till his armies had defeated Castanos at the battle of Tudela. Soon after he learnt the result of that battle he advanced to the village of Bozeguillas; and on the last day of November the Duke of Bellune appeared at the fort of Somosierra. The passes of this mountain were defended by 13,000 men of the Spanish army of reserve, who had taken up a very strong position, being entrenched in the narrow pass called the Puerto, with 16 pieces of cannon. This pass was forced by the enemy, chiefly by means of the artillery under General Senarmont, and of a charge made by the Polish light horse under General Montbrun.

The day after Bonaparte had succeeded in forcing this important pass, he removed his head-quarters to St. Augustin; and on the 2d of December the cavalry of the Duke of Istria commanded the heights of Madrid. The city was immediately summoned. As the supreme junta had quitted it on the approach of the enemy, a military junta had been formed,

consisting of Don Morla the governor, the captain-general of Andalusia, the inspector-general of artillery, and the Marquis of Castelar, who acted as president. Sixty thousand men were in arms: of these 6000 were troops of the line; the rest were peasants. One hundred pieces of cannon were planted for the defence of the city. Every thing announced enthusi asm and determination, mixed with tumult and disorder. The summons of the Duke of Istria gave birth to such a general and strong feeling of indignation, that one of his aides-decamp, who was the bearer of it, was nearly torn to pieces by the people; the interference of the troops of the line alone saved his life. The first summons was rejected. As the French infantry were still three leagues from the city, Bonaparte employed the evening, after the rejection of the summons, in reconnoitring, and forming the plan of attack, which he proposed to follow, provided the city would not capitulate. He ordered the suburbs to be occupied that night, and the artillery to be placed in the posts designed for the attack.

On the night of the 3d, another summons was sent from the Prince of Neufchatel (General Berthier) by a Spanish lieutenant-colonel of artillery, who had been taken prisoner at Somosierra. In the letter containing this summons, Berthier calls upon the commandant of Madrid not to expose the city to all the horrors of a siege, nor to render so many innocent and peaceful inhabitants the victims of war. In order that the commandant might know the extent and nature of the preparations and force which the French had before the city, Berthier informs him that he had sent the summons by a Spanish officer, who had had an opportunity of ascertaining it. In reply to this summons the Marquis Castelar, captaingeneral of Castile, requested a suspension of hostilities, for the purpose of consulting the constituted authorities, and of ascertaining the dispositions and determination of the inhabitants. While these letters were passing, the French were engaged in placing 30 pieces of artillery in such a position

tha their fire soon made a breach in the walls of the Reteiro, which was entered and the place taken. The capture of this important and commanding place, was followed by the occupation of most of the other situations in the immediate vicinity of the capital which the Spaniards had fortified.

A third summons was now sent in, containing a peremptory demand of immediate submission. In consequence of this, Don Morla and another nobleman repaired to the tent of Berthier. They requested that the suspension of hostilities might be prolonged for another day, in order that they might endeavour to persuade the people to listen to the proposal of surrendering the city. Berthier presented them to Bonaparte, who abused them both, and particularly Morla, in the most outrageous and insulting manner. He upbraided him with his behaviour at Rousillon, in the war between France and Spain, at the beginning of the French revolution; and with his violation of the capitulation of Baylen. He finished his passionate invective with a declaration that, if the city did not surrender by six o'clock the next morning, the Spanish troops should all be put to the sword. During the night most of the troops and their leaders left the city; and in the morning of the 5th of December it was taken possession of by the French.

The loss sustained by the French on this occasion is stated to have been very trifling, nor did the Spaniards suffer considerably. The Reteiro was defended by one thousand men, who were killed when it was taken by assault; and this probably was nearly the whole amount of their loss. The French bulletins assert that 120,000 stand of English arms were found in the city that the number is exaggerated there can be little doubt; but it is probable that a great proportion of the arms sent from England were deposited at Madrid at the time that city fell into the hands of the enemy.

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