the small island, and the small island with the south bank. By this destruction of the bridges, Bonaparte was rendered less able to repair the disasters and losses he had sustained; and in case the battle of the succeeding day should prove decidedly averse to him, his retreat, it was expected, would be completely cut off. In this point of view, the breaking down of the bridges might justly be considered as highly advantageous to the archduke but, on the other hand, it led him to expect a most obstinate defence from an army placed in a situation of such extreme peril.

The morning of the 22d witnessed Aspern again in possession of the French: an Austrian regiment endeavoured to drive them out, but without effect; another rushed in, and having gained possession of the church-yard, succeeded in maintaining themselves in the entrance to the village; being reinforced here by the troops under General Hiller, the Austrians at length obtained a final and unmolested possession of this long and dreadfully contested place.

The Archduke Charles was now enabled to act on the offensive the corps of Count Bellegarde, having its right wing resting on Aspern, and its centre and left towards Esling, by degrees gained the right flank of the enemy; while the artillery, stationed near the former village in such a manner as to command the whole space between it and the latter, was brought to bear on his left flank :-thus attacked and exposed, the French army was compelled to give way, and retire towards the Danube.

While the division of Count Bellegarde was thus employed, the French cavalry, by a desperate effort, endeavoured to break in between the Austrian cavalry commanded by Prince Lichtenstein, and the left wing of the Prince of Hohenzollern. Here the archduke particularly distinguished himself the battalion of Zach seeming disposed to give way, he seized its colours, placed himself at its head, and inspired it and the whole army with the same enthusiasm with which he himself was animated. In the midst of this attack

by the French cavalry, the Prince of Hohenzollern perceived on his left wing, near Esling, an opening in the French line, formed during the heat of the engagement: he immediately took advantage of this circumstance, by ordering thither a regiment in three divisions, which succeeded in gaining and maintaining their position in the opening, till, having been supported by the grenadiers of reserve, they were enabled to turn and attack the centre of the enemy.

The only post now which the French were able to maintain was the village of Esling: here they were repeatedly attacked by the fourth und fifth columns under the Prince of Rosenberg, but without success. This village, essentially necessary for covering the retreat of the French, already begun, was defended with most sanguinary obstinacy, and by reinforcements continually thrown into it.

In the night between the 22d and 23d, the enemy had effected his retreat from the south bank of the Danube, and taken up a position in the isle of Lobau. In this dreadful battle the Austrians took three pieces of cannon, and about 8000 prisoners. The loss of the French in killed, wounded, and prisoners, it is impossible to ascertain; it probably amounted to nearly 30,000. Five of their generals were killed on the field of battle, eight were wounded, one of whom, the Duke of Montebello, afterwards died; two were taken prisoners. The loss of the Austrians was also very great : they acknowledged the death of 87 superior officers, and of upwards of 4000 subalterns and privates. Twelve of their generals, 663 officers, and 15,651 subalterns and privates were wounded;-of these, one general, eight officers, and 829 men were taken prisoners.

The disadvantageous and alarming condition in which the French army was placed at the conclusion of this contest will lead us to estimate very highly the powers of Bonaparte as a general, exhibited in a new situation, and under circumstances to him unprecedented; and the discipline and steadiness of the French army. In some accounts, Bonaparte was repre

sented as acting the part of a madman and a savage ;—as forcing his soldiers up to battle after all was decidedly over;

and as foaming with rage and disappointment. That he actually brought off the whole of his army and artillery, in the face of a victorious enemy, when his retreat was necessarily directed to a single point ;-across a narrow bridge, and into a small island, cut off from that shore where his resources lay, and in which, consequently, his troops must necessarily be cooped up for some time, exposed to the fire of the Austrians, and liable to infectious sickness;-all these circumstances prove, not only that Bonaparte has extraordinary talents both as a conquering and as a defeated commander, but that no fit of passion, rage, or disappointment, materially deprived him of the use and application of these talents on this important occasion.

From the day on which the battle of Aspern was fought till the end of the first week in July, Bonaparte continued stationary on the south bank of the Danube; but though stationary, he was by no means inactive. That he was alarmed, both for his own situation and for the effects which his repulse might produce on the continent, and even in France, was abundantly evident from the number of bulletins which he issued. Scarcely a day passed on which one did not appear, though the sole object and purport of it was to register the height, and the rise and fall of the Danube ;-to enumerate and deplore the disasters his works had suffered from that river; to abuse the Austrians, and exaggerate their losses ;or to congratulate his army on the approach of the Russians, and the junction of the troops under the viceroy of Italy. But amidst all this seeming trifling and gasconade, Bonaparte was making the most formidable preparations, not merely to protect himself against an attack from the Archduke Charles, but also to enable him to resume offensive operations in such a manner as might secure success. Nothing, however, was done rashly or hastily; on the contrary, he was so slow and deliberate, and cautious in his operations, that many people

began to imagine that fear had at last seized him. It was indeed hardly to be expected that Bonaparte, so accustomed as he was to victory, so impetuous in his temper,-so impatient of restraint and resistance,-should have acted with so much cool and cautious prudence and circumspection as he did.

It has been well and justly remarked, that the French revolution has created, or brought into sight and action, talents and acquirements, which, but for this event, in all probability would have remained latent and useless. Perhaps never were these observations better illustrated than in the wonderful nature of the bridges which Bonaparte ordered to be constructed over the Danube. This arduous and important undertaking was entrusted to General Count Bertrand. In the short space of 14 days he raised a bridge of six arches, so broad that three carriages could pass abreast, over 400 fathoms of a very rapid river. A second bridge, eight feet broad, was constructed for infantry. Besides these two bridges founded on piles, a bridge of boats was constructed. In order to protect them against fire-ships, stoccadoes, raised on piles, were placed 250 fathoms from them higher up the river. Each of the bridges was covered and protected by a tete-du-pont, 160 fathoms long, formed of redoubts, and surrounded by palisades, frises, and ditches filled with water. Magazines of provisions, 100 pieces of cannon, and 80 mortars, were stationed in the island of Inderlobau. On the left bank of the Danube, near Esling, another bridge was formed, guarded in like manner by a tete-du-pont. At this time the Austrian army was strongly entrenched on the north bank of the Danube; the left wing stretching towards Enzendorf, and the right resting on the village of Great Aspern. The main body of the French army was collected in the island of Inderlobau, only at the distance of three or four hundred toises from its opponents.

While Bonaparte had been thus engaged in fortifying his position, and in preparing such stupendous means of crossing

the Danube, the Archduke Charles had not only raised works and planted cannon to secure himself against an attack, but he had drawn from Germany, Poland, and Hungary, immense reinforcements. It is not easy to estimate exactly the number of the troops in either army. At a fair estimation, each may be reckoned at nearly 150,000 men; but no small proportion of the Austrian army consisted of raw troops drawn from the Militia, or new-raised levies. In Bonaparte's army, too, were many soldiers newly raised and unaccustomed to war; but the French have learnt the method of making inexperienced soldiers fight with steadiness, discipline, and bravery, nearly equal to their veterans, so that they never are the cause of the loss of an engagement; while the Austrians and other opponents of the French have often been beaten solely by means of the bad behaviour of their new levies.

As the principal means of passing the Danube, and the principal works of the French, had been formed directly opposite to the Austrian redoubts at Esling, the particular attention of the Archduke Charles was directed to this point. But the plan of Bonaparte was not to attempt the hazardous experiment of crossing the river in the face of the strongest and best prepared part of the enemy's army. He made, indeed, a feint of crossing opposite Esling; and as soon as he perceived the attention and the force of the Austrians principally drawn to that part, he began his measures for crossing the river on the left flank of the Austrian army, where it was in a great measure unprotected, and where, if he succeeded in gaining a footing, they would be obliged to leave their entrenchments, and fight him to great disadvantage. But as all his bridges had been constructed opposite to Esling, it was necessary to throw over new ones, before he could cross at a different part of the river. During the night of the 4th of July these new bridges were completed. One bridge of a single piece, 80 toises long, was fixed in less than five minutes; three others of boats and rafts were also thrown over