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and he resolved to submit to that sacrifice,-which was the greatest he could make as a sovereign-and as a father, the sacrifice of his own daughter-and the junction of his troops with those of Bonaparte in his war against the Emperor Alexander. How reluctantly he agreed to either of these measures, all who knew him must be convinced; and how deeply he repented having agreed to them, when he saw that even they were unavailing towards satisfying Bonaparte, or securing the peace of the continent, might easily be conceived. After the reverses of the Russian campaign, he hoped that Bonaparte would be disposed to peace: he had offered his mediation; he had proposed such terms as he thought fair and equitable for both parties; and which, if they had been acceded to, might have given to Europe that repose which she so dreadfully needed, after having been exhausted by such long and sanguinary wars. But his mediation was of no avail; his terms were rejected by the French emperor. No alternative, therefore, now remained for him to adopt, but to unite his forces with those of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. Still, however, he as well as they were going to fight, not for the purposes of ambition or of conquest, but solely for the attainment of a just, honourable, and lasting peace. As soon as ever this could be brought about, they would most cheerfully lay down their arms: till it was brought about, they would continue united in hostilities, and exert themselves to the utmost. Compelled from such causes to go to war; going to war with such an object in view, the Emperor of Austria confidently expected the approbation and the good wishes of Europe: his cause was just, and he doubted not it would prosper.

It would appear that Bonaparte did not expect that Austria would actually join the allies; and the fact was carefully kept out of the French official papers for a considerable length of time, till at last, having occasion for a new conscription, the junction of Austria to the cause of the allies was stated as a reason for this demand of reinforcements. At the same time,

the correspondence between the Austrian and French ministers was laid before the legislative body: it is very long, and a great part of it very uninteresting; but some important facts may be collected from it.

In the first place, it is evident from this correspondence, as well as from the declaration of the emperor, that Austria very reluctantly consented to enter at all in the war against Russia; and that she at last consented to send an auxiliary army, only in order to avert the displeasure of Bonaparte. This reluctance accounts for the circumstance of the command of this army having been given to Prince Schwartzenburg, and for the comparative inactivity with which its movements and operations were conducted. In fact, it merely appeared hostile; and perhaps, on the whole, it was of more disadvantage than service to Bonaparte; for, reckoning on its co-operation, he neglected, in a great measure, to send French troops to that part where it was stationed: and we know that, when he was compelled to retreat, he complained that the Austrian general had not kept open the communication.

In the second place, it appears from this correspondence that the Austrian court, when Bonaparte's reverses occurred in Russia, so far from offering or agreeing to assist him, could scarcely conceal their satisfaction. The Austrian minister, indeed, affects to condole with the French minister on the misfortunes of his master; but his condolence is evidently feigned.

Lastly, throughout the whole of this correspondence the French minister appears to have been the dupe of the Austrian minister: we shall not here inquire whether he was justified in deceiving him; we barely state the fact. The former entertained no suspicion of the hostile intentions of the Austrian cabinet, till they were as clear as noon day; while he gave implicit credence to the pacific professions of the Austrian minister, even after those professions were belied by the conduct of the Austrian court.

We remarked, in our accounts of the Russian campaign, that Bonaparte's generals seemed to have lost a portion of their military talents: the same fact will appear in the subsequent part of the German campaign; and this falling off seems not to have been confined to his generals; his statesmen also experienced it. It is a well ascertained fact, that Lord Walpole was in the neighbourhood of Vienna for several weeks before Otto, the French ambassador there, knew the circumstance. On the other hand, the generals and the diplomatists of the allied powers displayed increased talent, activity, and zeal; so that it seemed as if the French public men had sunk into that state of mediocrity in which the public men of most of the old governments of Europe were at the commencement of the revolution; while the public men of the allies, excited by the same causes which had brought into action or generated talent at that period, assumed the original character of their opponents.

Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, were now to try their strength against France; and had the result of this mo mentous contest been anticipated and predicted solely or principally from the issue of all the preceding coalitions against that power, it must have been looked forward to with gloom and apprehension by every friend to the independence and repose of Europe. But the cases were widely different: the former jealousies and selfishness of the allied sovereigns, which rendered impotent their coalition, were absorbed in the deep and awful conviction that now they were fighting for their own existence: besides, in the former contests, the people were averse or indifferent to the cause of their sovereigns; now they were cordial and zealous in their co-operation. The allied powers also very wisely made use of other weapons besides those of war: the most eloquent and popular writers in Germany were employed to rouse the people; to hold out Bonaparte as no longer formidable; as having been conquered; but still as the implacable enemy of the happiness and peace of Germany; as the destroyer alike of the liberty of the

sovereign and the peasant. These writers particularly dwelt on the contrast between Bonaparte before he crossed the Nieman and invaded Russia, and Bonaparte at the period when Austria joined the coalition against him.

CHAP. XLIV.

THE CROWN PRINCE TAKES THE FIELD AGAINST BONAPARTE -MOREAU ALSO JOINS THE ALLIES-THE BATTLE OF DRESDEN-DEATH OF MOREAU-POSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE CONTENDING ARMIES--CAMPAIGN IN SILESIABATTLE OF KATZBACH-FRENCH COMPLETELY DEFEATED -BLUCHER'S ADDRESS 10 HIS SOLDIERS ON THEIR VICTORY-BATTLE BETWEEN THE CROWN PRINCE AND OUDINOT THE LATTER COMPLETELY DEFEATED-NEY SENT TO TAKE THE COMMAND-ATTACKS THE PRUSSIANS THE CROWN PRINCE COMES UP TO THEIR ASSISTANCENEY DEFEATED AT THE BATTLE OF JUTERBOCH.

WE have already stated that Bonaparte preserved a profound silence as long as he possibly could respecting the Austrian declaration of war: he was equally silent respecting the Crown Prince of Sweden: but equally from this silence, and from his invectives against him when he could no longer pass him over unnoticed, it might be inferred that he dreaded his talents. Hitherto indeed the crown prince had done little or nothing for the common cause: while the Austrians and Prussians were combating Bonaparte at the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, the Swedish army was stationed at a great distance from the scene of action, in Pomerania: even here, however, they were of some service, for they kept in check the army of Davoust. But as soon as it was determined to recommence

hostilities, the crown prince prepared to take a more active part and much was anticipated from his talents; from the excellent state of discipline into which he had brought the troops under his command; and from the confidence with which his junction would inspire the allies. According to the plan laid down by the allies, the protection of Berlin was assigned to him; and for that purpose, about the middle of August he removed his head-quarters to Potsdam: at the same time he issued a most energetic and animating proclamation to the troops under his command. He told them, that the extraordinary events of the last twelve years, of that period during which Bonaparte had ruled over France, had rendered it necessary for him to conduct them into Germany: had it not been for those events, Europe would still have remained as one great family, convinced of their mutual dependence, and anxious for their mutual welfare. But those events had rendered it necessary for Sweden to cross the sea that divided her from Germany: the cause of Europe was intrusted to the protection of soldiers from the banks of the Wolga and the Don; from the shores of Britain, and the mountains of the north. At such a time, when the happiness of a large portion of the civilized world was at stake, rivalry, national prejudices, and antipathies ought to disappear before the grand object of the independence of nations. Why were they called to arms? Not to gratify ambition, or to achieve conquest; but for a more justifiable, a nobler object. The Emperor Napoleon could not live in peace with Europe unless Europe was his slave; but to prevent this, to oppose the restless and unsatisfied desire of conquest which dwelt in his bosom, they were called to arms. Did they doubt that such was the character of Napoleon? were they afraid to combat with him? He had proved that this was his character, and that he was not unconquerable, by the 400,000 men whom he carried 700 miles from their country, and the greatest part of whom fell victims to his mad ambition. Had he been a man of common humanity, or even of common policy, after this signal

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