disaster he would have been disposed for peace: but neither his misfortunes in Russia, nor the defeats which his armies experienced in Spain, effected any beneficial alteration in his character or views. Peace was offered to him; that peace, which all other governments anxiously desired, and which was necessary for the establisment of his own power, and for the well-being of France; but he had indignantly rejected it.— 'Soldiers! it is to arms then we must have recourse, to conquer repose and independence. The same sentiments which guided the French in 1792, and which prompted them to assemble, and to combat the armies which entered their territory, ought now to animate your valour against those who, after having invaded the land which gave you birth, still hold in chains your brethren, your wives, and your children. Soldiers! what a noble prospect is opened unto you! The liberty of Europe; the re-establishment of its equilibrium; the end of that convulsive state which has had 20 years duration; finally, the peace of the world will be the result of our efforts. Render yourselves worthy, by your union, your disciplinė, and your courage, of the high destiny which awaits you!" Besides the Crown Prince of Sweden, another Frenchman entered the lists against Bonaparte. General Moreau, after he was liberated by him, had gone over to the United States of America, where, in peace, quiet, and retirement, he had spent some years of his life but whether he grew weary of his condition there, or whether he considered himself called upon by the voice of patriotism and the duty he owed to his fellow-creatures, or whether both these motives acted upon him, is not certain; but it appears that the Emperor Alexander, as soon as he found that war with Bonaparte was inevitable, sent over a confidential person to America, with whom General Moreau returned to Europe. He joined the allied army soon after the congress at Prague was dissolved. On two accounts his presence with the allies was deemed of importance in the first place, his military talents were undoubtedly of the first order; they had been proved such by : his conduct in every campaign in which he had been engaged, and most conspicuously so by his celebrated retreat out of Germany. His military talents were indeed of a different class and description from those of Bonaparte: perhaps there was in him less quickness of conception and combination; but, on the other hand, he possessed a cool and comprehensive judgment, which penetrated the most obscure and difficult parts of the most intricate plan. On him and on the crown prince the allies depended for the arrangement of the campaign; and as they each had great military talents and experience, and besides were well acquainted with the favourite plans of Bonaparte, and with the principles on which he conducted his campaigns, it was hoped that they would be able to oppose him with success. In the second place, some expectation seems to have been entertained that the presence of Moreau with the armies of the allies might induce the French troops to withdraw their allegiance from Bonaparte, or at least might render them discontented with the war in which they were engaged. Moreau had undoubtedly been a great favourite with the French soldjers but those who indulged this expectation do not appear to have been aware, or recollected, that soldiers of all nations soon lose any attachment which they may have formed to a general; and that, even if it did continue to exist, it could operate but feebly under the strict discipline of an army, and among men who have scarcely an opportunity either of knowing one another's sentiments, or of acting together. : It is foreign to our purpose to examine minutely or elaborately whether Moreau was justified in taking up arms against his country; we shall, however, offer one or two remarks on the subject. In the first place, those who contended that be was perfectly justified, grounded their argument on this consideration, that it was not against but for his country he was about to fight but by thus arguing they admitted virtually, though not directly, that the person himself was the proper judge of what was for the benefit of his country; or, in other words, they admitted that in some cases it was lawful to oppose the regal authority; for it will avail them little to contend that Bonaparte was a usurper and a tyrant: still the question recurs, If it be lawful to oppose an usurper and a tyrant, who can be the judge, whether the sovereign deserves those appellations, but the person who is about to oppose him? In the second place, those who exclaimed against the conduct of Moreau, for taking up arms against Bonaparte, and yet retained their doctrine, that resistance to tyrants was lawful, were equally inconsistent, unless they were prepared to assert that the rule of Bonaparte was beneficial to France.--But, perhaps, in no former wars was there observable such inconsistency of opinion as in the French revolutionary wars: very many who advocated the cause of the revolution at its commencement, because they conceived it to be advantageous or necessary to France, very strongly and absurdly transferred their admiration from it to the person who opposed the very principles on which it was brought about; while those who opposed it at first, and, in their mistaken and outrageous zeal against it, exclaimed against the doctrines of liberty, as soon as the people of the continent rose in arms against the tyranny of Bonaparte, became the warm and enthusiastic defenders of those doctrines. On the 17th of August hostilities recommenced: Bonaparte immediately, with a large force, made a push against the city of Prague; but when he had advanced within twelve leagues of it he received information that the positions of some of his corps at Goldberg, &c. in Silesia, were in imminent danger by the march of the Russians and Prussians from Breslau.He was therefore obliged suddenly and rapidly to leave Bohemia; and on the 21st of August he succeeded in driving his opponents from the line of the Bohr. Scarcely however had he accomplished this, when his presence was absolutely necessary in another quarter: the allied powers had formed a bold and comprehensive plan, by which, if they had succeeded in it, they would at once have placed Bonaparte in a most desperate situation. The united army of the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, amounting to about 150,000 men, under the command of Wittgenstein, Kleist, and Schwartzenberg, made a movement for the purpose of cutting him off from the line of the Elbe, by seizing Dresden. When Bonaparte received information of their design, he was 120 miles from that city: this distance he marched with a strong body of troops in four days, amidst torrents of rain, and in most tempestuous weather; and reached Dresden a few hours before the allies appeared in sight of the place. The allies entered Saxony from Bohemia by different routes, in order to act on the enemy's flank and rear; while the Prussian army under the command of Blucher was directed to move from Silesia, and to threaten Lusatia in front, but to avoid a general engagement, especially against superior numbers. At first the French advanced to the frontiers of Saxony; but they were beaten back towards Dresden, although they endeavoured to defend every inch of ground. The period was now arrived when the plan of the allies was to be put into complete execution: the different columns of their armies were to debouche from the mountains and passes at such periods as would have placed the enemy in a most critical situation; but some of the troops pushed on with so great eagerness that the right corps was brought into action before the other divisions had gained their proper stations. To this corps were opposed 15,000 men under General St. Cyr, supported by 6,000 men under General Bonnet: a sharp action. commenced, which lasted for some hours; after which the allied force drove the enemy from all points, and took some prisoners. The French now returned into their entrenched works in the front of Dresden, which placed the allied armies encircled. On the 27th they withdrew from their entrenchments into the city and suburbs. By this time Bonaparte had arrived there. The allies, having driven the French into the city and suburbs, resolved, if possible, to drive them thence also: this, however, they were sensible was an enterprise of considerable difficulty, as the natural defence round the town had been much improved by the skill of the French; and the extreme importance of the position led them to expect a very obstinate defence. At four o'clock in the evening the troops moved to the assault, the Prussians forming the centre attack. The operations were begun by a tremendous cannonade: the batteries being placed in a circular form round the town, the effect is described as magnificent: the troops moved forward with the utmost steadiness, and in perfect order to the assault. Already they were close to the town on all sides: an advanced redoubt with eight guns were taken by the Austrians in the most gallant manner; the French flying in all directions to shelter themselves behind new defences. It was soon perceived that it would be impossible to effect practicable breaches in the thick wall of the town; so that the Austrians could not proceed beyond the out-works. Night was approaching: the loss of the allies was great: the French to the amount of 30,000 made a sortie in order to separate the allied troops, and to take one wing in flank and rear. Their design was seen through and prevented; but at the same time it was necessary to draw off the troops from the assault. The French, having thus succeeded in repulsing the allies, came out to attack them on the morning of the 28th. They possessed great advantages in their position for attack; in their rear was Dresden lined with guns; their communications were not intersected: if they were unsuccessful, they could retire; if they made an impression, they could pursue it up; while the allies could not pursue them under the guns of the place. The weather was very bad on the day of attack; it rained almost incessantly. Bonaparte took advantage of all these circumstances, and brought out an immense number of pieces of artillery: the battle consisted on both sides chiefly in heavy cannonading, except where charges were made by the allied cavalry: the main bodies of infantry, in both armies, were not engaged. After several hours of cannonading, the French, |