persisted in retaining, notwithstanding the allies were gradually drawing round him in immense force, and notwithstanding that his own armies were greatly weakened both in numerical and in physical strength. On the side of Bohemia Prince Schwartzenberg continued to advance; while Blucher, by pressing forward on the side of Silesia, about the 7th of September effected a junction with the grand army: by this junction a powerful force was thrown on the right of the French in Lusatia; while several other Austrian divisions, together with the Russians and Prussians under the command of Barclay de Tolly and Wittgenstein (in all about 80,000 men), having re-entered Saxony, moved on to Pirna, within eight miles of Dresden. Thus threatened, Bonaparte was again compelled to leave that city; but as soon as he approached the main Austrian army, it gradually retired, drawing him towards the mountains of Bohemia. Taught, however, by the fate of Vandamme, he did not cross the frontier to any great distance, urging, in his official bulletin, as an excuse for not following them, that he could not get his cannon down the declivities. On the 11th of September he again returned to Dresden. By these movements of the allies, not only did Prince Schwartzenberg open a communication with General Blucher at Gobel, but the crown prince also communicated with the same general at Bautzen. At the former place Prince Poniatowski was posted; but he was compelled to retire within 15 miles of Dresden, while Macdonald was forced to take up a position on the Spree, within 30 miles of the same city. Marmont also, who had occupied the left bank of the Elbe with the 6th corps, was recalled, and sent, together with the cavalry under Murat, to Grossen Hayn, about 20 miles to the north of Dresden, to check the Swedes, who were advancing in that direction. Marshal Ney, after his defeat by the crown prince at Juterhoch, took shelter under the cannon at Torgau. Such were the positions of the armies, and the state of affairs, about the middle of September, to the northward and eastward of Dresden. On

the 14th the grand army of the allies again advanced from the valley of Toplitz in Bohemia, driving back the 1st, 2d, and 14th French corps, which, with the guards, were posted on the frontiers. Again was Bonaparte compelled to leave this city, in order to reinforce his advanced divisions, and to repair the blunders of his generals; the 15th and 16th he spent in driving the allies back to Bohemia; or, to speak more correctly, the allies, having succeeded in drawing him out of the city and in harassing his troops, retired those days into Bohemia.

Bonaparte could no longer conceal his critical situation from the people of France: he had, indeed, in his bulletin respecting the battle of Dresden, represented the allied army as utterly defeated on that occasion, exaggerating their loss as high as 60,000 men, and boasting that they would not be able to resume offensive operations: it was with a very bad grace, therefore, that he acknowledged his inability either to advance, or even to make head against an enemy, who, if his former accounts were correct, were so much weakened and disorganized. But the truth must be told: there was no possibility of escaping out of his perilous situation, unless large reinforcements were sent to him: and, besides, the real state of the case could not be so alarming as that which the Parisians apprehended; for the intercourse with France was so precarious and dangerous, that information respecting the army was obtained only at considerable intervals, and of a very meagre and unsatisfactory description.

On the 4th of October an extraordinary meeting of the French senate was held, at which Cambaceres, after laying before them the long-delayed report concerning the war with Austria and Sweden, distinctly avowed that Bonaparte's means were not adequate to the emergency of his situation, and called on them for a fresh conscription. But it was too late to be of much service to Bonaparte: the allies, long before it could possibly be raised, had carried into full execution their grand plan. By the 9th of October the head quarters

of Prince Schwartzenberg were established near Leipsic; the Prince Royal of Sweden and General Blucher, having crossed the Elbe at different points, were in communication with the main army: thus a complete chain was drawn across this part of Saxony, while General Benningsen advanced towards Dresden on the great road to Toplitz. The Cossacks under Platoff were in advance at Lutzen. Thus the communication of Bonaparte with France was completely destroyed; while his army was in great distress, his magazines were nearly exhausted, and the country which he occupied was utterly destitute of the means of replenishing them.

At length, on the 7th of October, Bonaparte left Dresden, taking with him the royal family of Saxony. It is absolutely impossible to assign any rational motive for his very long continuance in that city; nor can his conduct be accounted for, unless we suppose that he was under the same infatuation which seized him during the Russian campaign, and led him to advance, at the approach of winter, into a hostile and barren country, and to continue at Moscow till retreat was almost impossible. For his conduct in the Russian campaign, however, something like a rational motive may be assigned: he had often, by rapid and daring advances into the heart of his enemy's territory, and especially by occupying their capital, forced them to make peace: he had once already intimidated or cajoled the Emperor Alexander into a disgraceful treaty; and he might hope that he could again effect the same object. But what hope could he possibly have that, by his stay at Dresden, either the fortune of war would become favourable, or peace would be obtained? To every man of common sense, to every man not blinded by passion and obstinacy, it must have been apparent, that by staying at Dresden his own forces would be gradually reduced in numbers and strength, while those of the enemy would be accumulating; and that they would be enabled to cut off his communication with France.

The positions of the two armies, soon after Bonaparte left Dresden, were as follows:-The line of the French fortresses on the Elbe, including Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, and Magdeburg, extended about 120 miles, the course of that river being nearly north-west. Torgau is about 45 miles, and Wittemberg 70, from Dresden: 17 miles below Wittemberg, on the left, the Elbe receives the Mulda; and 18 miles further, the Saale: both these rivers in the higher part of their course flow nearly parallel with the Elbe; and Leipsic stands between them, being distant from the Saale 18 miles, from the Mulda 13, and from the Elbe 35. As therefore the united army of the crown prince and Blucher occupied a line along the left bank of the Saale, from its mouth nearly to opposite Leipsic, they cut off all communication between the force collected round Leipsic and the country westward of that line. At the same time, the communications of the enemy, on the same line further to the south, were cut off by the army which was marching from the neighbourhood of Dresden. On the 11th of October the advanced posts of these two armies were în communication, and they greatly outnumbered the army of Bonaparte..

Under these circumstances, the object of the allies was to force Bonaparte to a battle ;—his object, to weaken them by drawing off part of their troops. This he attempted to ac complish the Prussian capital had been left exposed by the march of the crown prince to join the grand army of the allies; and Bonaparte, taking advantage of this, pushed a corps across the Elbe at Wittemberg: but the allies, aware of this movement, had ordered General Tauenstein with 12,000 men to fall back and cover Berlin; so that the French force, having failed in their object, were recalled.

Hitherto the allies of Bonaparte had remained more faithful to him than might have been expected; but about this period the King of Bavaria deserted him, and concluded a treaty of alliance and concert with Austria, by which General Wrede with 35,000 Bavarian troops was immediately to co

operate with those of Austria, 25,000 of which were to be under his command. But though the sovereigns in alliance with Bonaparte remained in general faithful to him, yet their subjects were animated with a better spirit: the same means were employed, to keep it alive, and to spread it, to which we have already adverted.

On the 13th of October the head quarters of Bonaparte were at Duben on the Mulda: to this place he had advanced from Leipsic, probably with the hope of causing the allies to believe that he meant to threaten Berlin with his whole force; but finding that his manoeuvre did not succeed, on the 14th he collected his whole force in and round Leipsic. Ney, with the 4th, 6th, and 7th corps, under the respective commands of Bertrand, Marmont, and Regnier, occupied a line about four or five miles to that city, which protected the roads to Magdeburgh and Dessau. Opposite to him was posted the Silesian army, under General Blucher, whose head quarters on the 14th were on the road to Halle, about 14 miles from Leipsic. On the 15th Blucher attacked the French: the contest was most obstinate and sanguinary: it began at midday, and continued till night separated the combatants: the allies however completely succeeded in their object, compelling them to pass the Partha, a river which protects Leipsic to the northward and eastward. The loss of the allies was between 6,000 and 7,000; that of the French about 12,000: 1 eagle and 28 pieces of cannon were taken.

While this contest was going on to the north of Leipsic, a separate and still more furious conflict took place between the grand army of Bohemia, commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg, which advanced towards Leipsic by the converging roads of Lutzen, Zwenkau, Borna, and Colditz-and that part of the French army which was commanded by Bonaparte in person. The position of the centre of the allies was about six miles to the south of Leipsic: against it Bonaparte determined to make a furious attack, either in the hope of cutting his way through, or throwing the allies into confusion. Ac