hand to hand, within the crowded and narrow streets of a village. There was also a sustained cannonade on both sides through the whole of the afternoon. But in this species of warfare, the Prussians sustained a much heavier loss than their antagonists, their masses. being drawn up in an exposed situation, while those of the French were sheltered by the winding hollows of the lower grounds.

While this desperate contest continued, Bonaparte apparently began to doubt of its ultimate success. To ensure the storming of St. Amand, he ordered the first corps of infantry, which was stationed near Frasnes, with a division of the second corps commanded by Girard, and designed to be a reserve either to his own army, or to that of Marshal Ney, to move to the right to assist in the attack. But this reinforcement happened to be unnecessary; for about seven o'clock, Vandamme had, after reiterated efforts, surmounted the resistance of the Prussians at St. Amand, and Girard had obtained possession of Ligny. Sombref upon the left of the Prussian line, was still successfully defended by the Saxon general, Thielman, against Marshal Grouchy, and the Prussians, though driven from the villages in front of the amphitheatre of hills, still maintained their alignement upon the heights, impatiently waiting to be succoured either by the English, or by their own fourth division under Bulow. But the Duke of Wellington was actively engaged at Quatre Bras; and Bulow was struggling with the difficulties of a long march through very bad roads. In the meantime, Bonaparte brought this dreadful engagement to a decision, by one of those skilful and daring manœuvres, which characterize his tactics.

Being now in possession of the village of Ligny, which fronted the centre of the Prussian line, he concentrated upon that point the imperial guards, whom he had hitherto kept in reserve. Eight battalions of this veteran and distinguish ed infantry, formed into one formidable column, supported

by four squadrons of cavalry, two regiments of Cuirassiers, and the horse grenadiers of the guard, traversed the village of Ligny at the pas de charge, threw themselves into the ravine which separates the village from the heights, and began to ascend them under a dreadful fire of grape and mus ketry from the Prussians. They sustained this murderous discharge with great gallantry, and advancing against the Prussian line, made such an impression upon the masses of which it consisted, as threatened to break through the centre of their army, and thus cut off the communication between the two wings; the French cavalry at the same time charged and drove back that of the Prussians.

In this moment of consternation, Blucher having headed an unsuccessful charge against the French cavalry, and his horse being shot under him in the retreat, both the fliers and pursuers passed over him as he lay on the ground; an

The Cuirassiers of the French Imperial Guard are all arrayed in armour, the front cuirass is in the form of a pigeon's breast, so as effectually to turn off a musket shot, unless fired very near, owing to its brightness; the back cuirass is made to fit the back; they weigh from nine to eleven pounds each, according to the size of the man, and are stuffed inside with a pad: they fit on by a kind of fish-scaled clasp, and are put off and on in an instant. They have helmets the same as our Horse Guards, and straight long swords and pistols, but no carbines. All the accounts agree in the great advantage that the French cuirassiers derived from their armour. Their swords were three inches longer than any used by the Allies, and in close action the cuts, of our sabres did no execution, except they fortunately came. across the neck of the enemy. The latter also feeling themselves. secure in their armour, advanced deliberately and steadily, until they came within about twenty yards of our ranks, as a musket ball could not penetrate the cuirasses at a greater distance. The cuirass, however, was attended with one disadvantage; the wearer, in close action, cannot use his arm with perfect facility in all directions; he chiefly thrusts, but cannot cut with ease.* They are all chosen men, must be above six feet high, have served in three campaigns, twelve years in the service, and of a good character; and if there is a good horse to be found, they have it. It is to be observed, that a wound through a cuirass mostly proves mortal.

H

adjutant threw himself down beside his general to share his fate, and the first use the Prince Marshal made of his recovered recollection, was, to conjure his faithful attendant rather to shoot him than to permit him to fall alive into the hands of the French. Meantime the Prussian cavalry had rallied, charged, and in their turn repulsed the French, who again galloped past the Prussian general as he lay on the ground, covered with the cloak of the adjutant, with the same precipitation as in their advance. The general was then disengaged and remounted, and proceeded to organize the retreat, which was now become a measure of indispensible necessity..

The Prussians in their retreat upon Tilly, preserved their high character for discipline, and presented masses impenetrable to the cavalry of the pursuers. General Thielman formed the rear guard; and being joined by the fourth corps under General Bulow, the Prussian army was once more concentrated in the neighbourhood of the village of Wavre, ten miles beyond the scene of their former defeat; and the utmost exertions were used to place it in a condition for renewing the combat.

The carnage of the Prussians in this unsuccessful battle was very great. It has been estimated at twenty thousand men; but Bonaparte only rates it at fifteen thousand hors de combat. He also stated the cannon taken at fifty; but the Prussians limit the number to fifteen. In the retreat there were hardly any prisoners taken.

Bonaparte had it now in his option to pursue the Prussians with his whole army, excepting those troops under Ney, who were in front of the Duke of Wellington. But this would have been to abandon Ney to almost certain destruction; since, if he was unable, on the preceding day, to make any impression on the van of the British army alone, it was scarce possible he could withstand them, when supported by their main body, and joined by reinforcements of every kind. In the supposed event of Ney's defeat, Bonaparte's rear would

have been exposed to a victorious English army, while he knew, by repeated experience, how speedily and effectually Blucher would rally his Prussians, even after a severe defeat, He made his choice, therefore, to turn his whole force against the English, leaving only Grouchy and Vandamme with about 25,000 men, to hang upon the rear of Blucher; and, by pursuing his retreat from Sombref to Wavre, to occupy his attention, and prevent his attempting to take a share in the expected action with the British.*

Napoleon probably expected to find the English army upon the ground it had occupied during the 16th. But the movement of his own forces from St. Amand and Ligny to Frasnes, had occupied a space of time which was not left unemployed by the Duke of Wellington, who, in consequence of Blucher's defeat, had determined to fall back so as to maintain his la teral communication with the Prussian right wing. The re treat had already commenced, and the position at Quatre Bras

Bonaparte has been arraigned by Marshal Ney for want of foresight and military skill in this short campaign. But certainly Bonaparte acted wisely in attacking the Prussian army that was first concentrated; and he might reasonably calculate that Ney could dispose of the British troops as they came up to the field wearied and in detail. In fact, Bonaparte's scheme had in its material points complete success, for he did defeat the Prussians; and, by this success against them, compelled the English to retreat, and gained an opportunity of attacking them with his whole force in a battle, where the scale more than once inclined to his side. As to Ney's complaint against Bonaparte for depriving him of the first division, it is evident, that these troops were not sent for until their aid appeared essentially necessary to carry the village of St Amand, and thereby to turn the right flank of the Prussians; and they were returned to their original position the moment it was perceived the point could be carried without them. Surely more could not have been expected in the circumstances. Of the tone the Marshal assumed to his fallen master; and the reproaches he cast upon him, it may be observed in the words of Wolsey,

Within these forty hours Surrey had better
Have burnt his tongue than said so.

was, about eleven in the forenoon, only occupied by a strong rear guard, destined to protect the retrogade movement of the British general. Bonaparte put his troops in motion to pursue his retiring enemy. The day was stormy and rainy in the extreme; and the roads, already broken up by the English artillery in their advance and retreat, were nearly impassible. The cavalry, whose duty it was to press upon the rear of the English, were obliged to march through fields of standing corn, which being reduced to swamps by the wetness of the season, rendered rapid movements impossible. This state of the weather and roads was of no small advantage to the British army, who had to defile through the narrow streets of the village of Genappe, and over the bridge which there crosses a small river, in the very face of the pursuing enemy. Their cavalry once or twice attacked the rearguard, but received so severe a check from the Life-Guards and Oxford-Blues, that they afterwards left the march undisturbed. Had the stormy state of the weather, and the difficulties of the road not intervened to impede the advance of the French, the Duke of Wellington's army might have experienced a serious loss in the narrow defile of Genappe.

With little further interruption the British army retired upon the ever-memorable field of Waterloo, and there took up a position on the road to Brussels. The Duke had caused a plan of this, and some other military positions in the neighbourhood of Brussels, to be made some time before by Colonel Carmichael Smyth, the chief engineer; when he had declared that if he had to defend Brussels he would make his stand at Waterloo. He now called for that sketch, and with the assistance of Sir William de Lancy and Colonel Smyth, made his dispositions for the momentous events of next day. The plan itself, a relique so precious, was rendered yet more so by being found in the breast of Sir William de Lancy's coat when he fell, and stained with the blood of that gallant officer. It is now in the careful preservation of Colonel Smyth, by whom it was originally sketched.