When the Duke of Wellington had made his arrangements for the night, he established his head quarters at a petty inn in the small village of Waterloo, about a mile in the rear of the position. The army slept upon their arms upon the ridge of a gentle declivity, chiefly covered with standing corn.

The forces of Bonaparte were gradually coming up during the evening, and occupied a ridge nearly opposite to the position of the English army. The villages in the rear were also occupied by his army. The emperor established his head quarters at Planchenoit, a small village in the rear of the position.

Here it may be proper to give as accurate a statement as possible of the strength of the hostile armies. The army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, amounted to 38,000 British, 8000 King's German Legion, 14,000 Hanoverians, and 22,000 Belgian, Nassau, and Brunswick troops, forming a total of 82,000 men, of which 62,000 were infantry, 15,000 cavalry, and 5000 artillery, engineers, &c. When from this we deduct 15,000 men employed in garrisons, with the killed and wounded at Quatre Bras, detachments, &c. the whole effective force of the British and Belgic armies in the field of Waterloo, could scarcely exceed 55,000 men, who were divided into two corps d'Armée, under the orders of the Prince of Orange, and Lieut. Gen. Lord Hill. The cavalry were commanded by Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Uxbridge; the artillery by Col. Sir George Adam Wood; and the engineers by Col. Smyth. Nearly the whole was a green army. The allies were chiefly young soldiers; and even the ranks of the British veteran regiments were filled by inexperienced recruits and volunteers from the militia. The order of battle was very compact, as from the extremity of the left to that of the right wings of the contending armies, was scarcely a mile and a half in extent.

The French army, commanded by the Emperor Napoleon, after deducting the losses of the 15th and 16th, and the two corps under Marshal Grouchy, must at least have amounted to 85,000 men, mostly veteran troops of one nation, and possessing every requisite to give effect to their operations.

Thus arranged, both generals and their respective armies waited the arrival of morning, and the events it was to bring. The night, as if the elements meant to match their fury with that which was preparing for the morning, was stormy in the extreme, accompanied by furious gusts of wind, heavy bursts of rain, continued and vivid flashes of lightning, and the loudest thunder our officers ever heard. Both armies had to sustain this tempest in the exposed situation of an open bivouac, without means either of protection or refreshment. But though these hardships were common to both armies, yet, (as was the cause previous to the battle of Agincourt) the moral feelings of the English army were depressed below their ordinary tone, and those of the French exalted to a degree of confidence and presumption, unusual even to the soldiers of that nation.

The British could not help reflecting that the dear-bought success at Quatre Bras, had produced in appearance at least no corresponding result: a toilsome advance and bloody action, had been followed by a retreat equally laborious to the soldier; and the defeat of the Prussians, which was now rumoured with the usual allowance of exaggeration, had left Bonaparte at liberty to assail them separately, and with almost his whole force. If to this it was added, that their ranks contained many thousand foreigners, on whose faith they could not implicitly depend, it must be owned there was sufficient scope for melancholy reflections. To balance these, there remained their confidence in their commander, their native undaunted courage, and a stern resolution to discharge their duty.

The French on the other hand, had forgotten in their success at Ligny, their failure at Quatre Bras; or, if they

remembered it, their miscarriage was ascribed to treachery; and it was said that Bourmont and other officers, had been tried by a military commission and shot, for having by their misconduct occasioned the disaster. This rumour, which had no foundation but in the address with which Bonaparte could apply a salve to the wounded vanity of his soldiers, was joined to other exulting considerations. Admitting the partial success of Wellington, the English Duke, they said, commanded but the right wing of the Prussian army, and had in fact shared in Blucher's defeat, as he himself virtually acknowledged by imitating his retreat. All was glow and triumph. No one supposed the English would halt or make head, until they reached their vessels; no one doubted that the Belgian troops would join Bonaparte in a mass; it would have been disaffection to have supposed there lay any impediment to their next day's march to Brussels: and all affected chiefly to regret the tempestuous night, as it afforded the despairing English the means of retiring unmolested. Bonaparte himself shared, or rather affected to share, these sentiments; and when the slow and gloomy dawning of the 18th of June shewed him his enemies, still in the possession of the heights which they occupied over night, and apparently determined to maintain them, he could not suppress his satisfaction, but exclaimed, while he stretched his arm towards their position with a motion as if to grasp his prey; These English, I have them now."

The field of battle at Waterloo is easily described. The forest of Soignies, a wood composed of beech trees growing uncommonly close together, is traversed by the road from Brussels, a long broad causeway, which, upon issuing from the wood, reaches the small village of Waterloo. Beyond this point the forest assumes a more straggling and dispersed appearance, until about a mile further, where at one extended ridge called the heights of Mount St. John, from a farm house on the Brussels road, the trees almost entirely disappear, and the country becomes quite open. Along this

eminence the British forces were disposed in two lines. The second, which lay behind the brow of the hill, was in some degree sheltered from the enemy's fire. The first line, consisting of the clite of the infantry, occupied the crest of the ridge, and were on the left partly defended by a long hedge and ditch, which running in a straight line from the hamlet of Mount St. John towards the village of Ohain, gives name to two farm houses. The first, which is situated in advance of the hedge, and at the bottom of the declivity, is called La Haye Sainte, (the holy hedge,) the other placed at the extremity of the fence is called Fer la Haye. The ground at Fer la Haye becomes woody and broken, so that it afforded a strong point, at which, to terminate the British line upon the left. A road runs from Fer la Haye to Ohain, and the woody passes of St. Lambert, through which the Duke of Wellington kept up a communication by his left with the Prussian army. The centre of the English army occupied the village of Mount St. John, on the middle of the ridge just where the great causeway from Brussels divides into two roads, one of which branches off to Nivelles, and the other continues the straight line to Charleroi. A strong advanced post of Hanoverian sharp-shooters occupied the house and farm yard of La Haye Sainte, situated in advance upon the Charleroi road, and just at the bottom of the hill. The right of the British army, extending along the same eminence, occupied and protected the Nivelles road as far as the inclosures of Hougoumont, and turning rather backwards, rested its extreme right upon a deep ravine. Advanced posts from thence occupied the village called Braine la Leude, on which point there was no engagement. The ground in front of the British position sloped easily down into lower ground, forming a sort of valley, not a level plain, but a declivity varied by many gentle sweeps and hollows, as if formed by the course of a river. The ground then ascends in the same manner to a ridge opposite to that of Mount Saint John, and running parallel to it at

the distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards. This was the position of the French. It is in some points nearer, and in others more distant from the heights or ridge of Mount St. John, according as the valley between them is of greater or less breadth.

The valley between the two ridges is entirely open and uninclosed, and on that memorable day bore a tall and strong crop of corn. But in the centre of the valley, about half way betwixt the two ridges, and situated considerably to the right of the English centre, was the Chateau de Goumont, or Hougoumont. This is (or rather was) a gentleman's house of the old Flemish architecture, having a tower and a species of battlement. It was surrounded on one side by a large farm yard, and on the other, opened to a garden fenced with a brick wall. The whole was encircled by an open grove of tall trees, covering a space of about three or four acres without any under-wood. This chateau, with the advantages afforded by its wood and gardens, formed a strong point d'appui to the British right wing. In fact, while this point was maintained, it must have been difficult for the French to have made a serious attack upon the extremity of our right wing.

Such was the position of the British army on this memo rable morning. The dawn was attended by the same broken and tempestous weather, by which the night had been distinguished. But the interval of rest, such as it was, had not been neglected by the British, who had gained time to clean their arms, distribute ammunition, and prepare every thing for the final shock of battle. Provisions had also been distributed to the troops, most of whom had thus the means of breakfasting with some comfort.*

Extract of a Letter from an Officer to a Friend.

After having tried the right, and found it strong, Bonaparte manœuvred until he got 40 pieces of artillery to play on the left, where the 5th division, a brigade of heavy dragoons, and two companies of artillery, were posted. Our lines were formed