by equivocal, and what by denominative. Then it is obferved, that what we fay is either fimple, without compofition or structure, as man, horfe; or, it has compofition and structure, as, a man fights, the borse runs. Next comes a diftinction between a subject of predication; that is, a fubject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a fubject of inhefion. These things are faid to be inherent in a fubject, which although they are not a part of the fubject, cannot poffibly exist without it, as figure in the thing figured. Of things that are, fays Ariftotle, fome may be predicated of a fubject, but are in no fubject; as man may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any fubject. Some again are in a fubject, but can be predicated of no fubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its fubject, but it can be predicated of no fubject; because it is an individual thing. Some are both in a subject, and may be predicated of a fubject, as fcience; which is in the mind as its fubject, and may be predicated of geometry. Laftly, Some things can neither be in a fubject, nor be predicated of any fubject. Such are all individual sub

ftances, which cannot be predicated, because they are individuals; and cannot be in a fubject, because they are substances. After fome other fubtilties about predicates and fubjects, we come to the categories themselves; the things above mentioned being called by the schoolmen the antepredicamenta. It may be observed, however, that notwithstanding the diftinction now explained, the being in a fubject, and the being predicated truly of a fubject, are in the Analytics used as fynonymous phrases; and this variation of ftyle has led fome perfons to think that the Categories were not written by Aristotle,

Things that may be expreffed without compofition or ftructure, are, fays the author, reducible to the following heads. They are either fubftance, or quantity, or quality, or relatives, or place, or time, or having, or doing, or fuffering. These are the predicaments or categories. The first four are largely treated of in four chapters; the others are flightly paffed over, as fufficiently clear of themfelves. As a fpecimen, I fhall give a fummary of what he fays on the category of fubftance.

Substances are either primary, to wit, individual

individual substances, or fecondary, to wit, the genera and fpecies of fubstances. Primary fubftances neither are in a subject, nor can be predicated of a subject; but all other things that exist, either are in primary substances, or may be predicated of them. For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a fubject, may alfo be predicated of the fubject itself. Primary fubftances are more fubstances than the secondary; and of the fecondary, the fpecies is more a fubftance than the genus. If there were no primary, there could be no fecondary fubftances.

The properties of fubftance are these: 1. No substance is capable of intension or remiffion. 2. No substance can be in any other thing as its fubject of inhefion. 3. No fubftance has a contrary; for one substance cannot be contrary to another; nor can there be contrariety between a subftance and that which is no fubftance. 4. The most remarkable property of fubstance, is, that one and the fame fubstance may, by fome change in itself, become the fubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the fame body may be at one time hot, at another cold.

Let this ferve as a specimen of Aristotle's manner of treating the categories. After them, we have fome chapters, which the schoolmen call poftprædicamenta; wherein first, the four kinds of oppofition of terms are explained; to wit, relative, privative, of contrariety, and of contradiction. This is repeated in all fyftems of logic. Laft of all we have diftinctions of the four Greek words which answer to the Latin ones, prius, fimul, motus, and habere.

SECT. 4. Of the book concerning Interpretation.

We are to confider, fays Ariftotle, what a noun is, what a verb, what affirmation, what negation, what fpeech. Words are the figns of what paffeth in the mind; writing is the fign of words. The figns both of writing and of words are different in different nations, but the operations of mind fignified by them are the fame. There are fome operations of thought which are neither true nor falfe. These are expreffed by nouns or verbs fingly, and without compofition.

A

A noun is a found which by compact fignifies fomething without refpect to time, and of which no part has fignification by itself. The cries of beafts may have a natural fignification, but they are not noups: we give that name only to founds which have their fignification by compact. The cafes of a noun, as the genitive, dative, Non homo is not a noun, but, for diftinction's fake, may be called a nomen infinitum.

are not nouns,

A verb fignifies fomething by compact with relation to time. Thus valet is a verb; but valetudo is a noun, because its fignification has no relation to time. It is only the present tenfe of the indicative that is properly called a verb; the other tenfes and moods are variations of the verb. Non valet may be called a verbum infinitum.

Speech is found fignificant by compact, of which fome part is alfo fignificant. And it is either enunciative, or not enunciative. Enunciative fpeech is that which affirms or denies. As to fpeech which is not enunciative, fuch as a prayer or wifh, the confideration of it belongs to oratory, or poetry. Every enunciative speech must have