others

on through a course of ages; "have given a small beginning to things "which, in fucceeding times, will be

brought to greater perfection. The be"ginning of a thing, though small, is the "chief part of it, and requires the great"est degree of invention; for it is eafy ત to make additions to inventions once

begun. Now with regard to the dia"lectical art, there was not fomething "done, and fomething remaining to be "done. There was abfolutely nothing "done: for those who profeffed the art "of difputation, had only a set of ora"tions compofed, and of arguments, and

of captious queftions, which might fuit 66 many occafions. These their scholars "foon learned, and fitted to the occafion. "This was not to teach you the art, but

to furnish you with the materials pro"duced by the art: as if a man profes"fing to teach you the art of making "fhoes, fhould bring you a parcel of "fhoes of various fizes and fhapes, from " which you may provide those who want.

This may have its ufe; but it is not to teach the art of making fhoes. And ❝ indeed, with regard to rhetorical decla

“mation,

"mation, there are many precepts handed down from ancient times; but with regard to the construction of fyllogifms,

"We have therefore employed much "time and labour upon this fubject; and "if our fyftem appear to you not to be "in the number of those things, which, "being before carried a certain length,

66

were left to be perfected; we hope for your favourable acceptance of what is "done, and your indulgence in what is " left imperfect."

CHA P. VI.

Reflections on the Utility of Logic, and the Means of its improvement.

SECT. I. Of the Utility of Logic.

MEN rarely leave one extreme without running into the contrary. It is no wonder, therefore, that the exceffive admiration of Ariftotle, which continued for 3 F 2

fo

fo many ages, fhould end in an undue contempt; and that the high esteem of logic as the grand engine of science, fhould at laft make way for too unfavourable an opinion, which feems now prevalent, of its being unworthy of a place in a liberal education. Those who think according to the fashion, as the greatest part of men do, will be as prone to go into this extreme, as their grandfathers were to go into the contrary.

Laying afide prejudice, whether fashionable or unfashionable, let us confider whether logic is, or may be made, fubfervient to any good purpose. Its profeffed end is, to teach men to think, to judge, and to reafon, with precision and accuracy. No man will fay that this is a matter of no importance; the only thing therefore that admits of doubt, is, whether it can be taught.

To refolve this doubt, it may be obferved, that our rational faculty is the gift of God, given to men in very different measure. Some have a large portion, fome a lefs; and where there is a remarkable defect of the natural power, it cannot be fupplied by any culture. But this natural

power,

power, even where it is the strongest, may lie dead for want of the means of improvement: a favage may have been born with as good faculties as a Bacon or a Newton: but his talent was buried, being never put to ufe; while theirs was cultivated to the best advantage.

It may likewise be observed, that the chief mean of improving our rational power, is the vigorous exercise of it, in various ways and in different fubjects, by which the habit is acquired of exercising it properly. Without fuch exercise, and good fenfe over and above, a man who has ftudied logic all his life, may after all be only a petulant wrangler, without true judgement or fkill of reafoning in any science.

I take this to be Locke's meaning, when in his Thoughts on Education he fays,

If you would have your fon to reafon "well, let him read Chillingworth." The ftate of things is much altered fince Locke wrote. Logic has been much improved, chiefly by his writings; and yet much lefs ftrefs is laid upon it, and less time confumed in it. His counfel, therefore, was judicious and feafonable; to wit,

That

That the improvement of our reafoning power is to be expected much more from an intimate acquaintance with the authors who reafon the best, than from studying voluminous fyftems of logic. But if he had meant, that the ftudy of logic was of no use nor deferved any attention, he furely would not have taken the pains to have made fo confiderable an addition to it, by his Essay on the Human Understanding, and by his Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding. Nor would he have remitted his pupil to Chillingworth, the acutest logician as well as the best reasoner of his age; and one who, in innumerable places of his excellent book, without pedantry even in that pedantic age, makes the happiest application of the rules of logic, for unravelling the fophiftical reasoning of his antagonist.

a tree.

Our reafoning power makes no appearance in infancy; but as we grow up, it unfolds itself by degrees, like the bud of When a child firft draws an inference, or perceives the force of an inference drawn by another, we may call this the birth of his reafon: but it is yet like a new-born babe, weak and tender; it must

be