fully accept the rule laid down in McCaffrey's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 253. "A person who resides in the center of a large city must not expect to be surrounded by the stillness which prevails in a rural district. He must necessarily hear some of the noise, and occasionally feel slight vibrations produced by the movement and labor of its people and by the hum of its mechanical industries." And if we should adopt the distinction laid down by Lord Chancellor Westbury in St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas. 650, cited by the defendants, between a nuisance producing a material injury to property, where the right of action is absolute, and an alleged nuisance which produces merely personal annoyance and discomfort, where the right of action depends "greatly on the circumstances of the place where the thing complained of occurs," we still think there is no authority that would deny a right of action under the facts and circumstances of this case as described in the finding. The vivid language of Thompson, J., in delivering the opinion in Dennis v. Eckhardt, 3 Grant Cas. 390, with slight changes, would seem to describe this case. "Some discomforts must be endured as compensation for the conveniences of city life; . . . . but I cannot find authority in law for saying that a thing which fills the atmosphere that others have a right to live in with offensive smoke and odors, stifles the breath, produces nausea and headache, . . . prevents the drying of clothes and ventilation of houses, darkens the sunlight, and converts pleasant residences into prison-houses in dog-days, and defiles carpets, curtains, and dinner-plates with deposits of soot and dirt, is not a nuisance, even though the results are only occasional." The claim of the defendants, that the locality is one "given over to mechanical industries," is not in full accord with the finding. The plaintiff's house is on Governor Street, and on this street there is no claim that there are any manufacturing establishments. There are such on Sheldon Street, and it is found that "within one thousand or fifteen hundred feet of the defendants' premises there are a number of other manufacturing establishments, and the neighborhood within the distance above stated is largely occupied by mechanics and by tenement-houses." All these manufacturing establishments are of course still more remote from the plaintiff's house, and the distance obviously is so great as to preclude any annoyance from smoke, cinders, or the jar of machinery, and the noise must be so softened that it could not well be a nuisance. All the discomfort which the plaintiff can suffer, therefore, of the kind referred to, must come from the establishment of the defendants, only twenty-one feet distant from his house. It is probably in the power of the defendants, without great expense, to avoid all just ground for complaint. The court finds they have already done so, mostly in respect to smoke and cinders. In regard to the suggestion that the plaintiff elected to reside in this locality, there is nothing to show that the objectionable business of the defendants had ever been carried on before the plaintiff took possession, but rather the contrary, for they did not build till 1884. If, however, it were otherwise, and the plaintiff knew of the nuisance, and then went and took up his abode near it, he would not thereby be precluded from maintaining his action. A man is not to be precluded from building and living on his own land because the adjoining proprietor first erected a nuisance, which indeed was no nuisance till somebody went there to live: Hole v. Barlow, 27 L. J. Com. P. 208; Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray, 473; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659. In regard to any suggestion arising from the fact that the dwelling-houses in the vicinity are largely occupied by mechanics and tenants, we fully approve and adopt the language of Chancellor Zabriskie in delivering the opinion in Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294, 97 Am. Dec. 654: "I find no authority that will warrant the position that the part of a town which is occupied by tradesmen and mechanics for residences and carrying on trades and business, and which contains no elegant or costly dwellings, and is not inhabited by the wealthy and luxurious, is a proper or convenient place for carrying on business which renders the dwellings there uncomfortable to the owners and their families, by offensive smells, smoke, cinders, or intolerable noises, even if the inhabitants themselves work at trades occasioning some degree of noise, smoke, and cinders. There is no principle in law or reason which would give protection to the large comforts and enjoyments with which the wealthy and luxurious are surrounded, and fail to secure to the artisan and laborer and their families the fewer and more restricted comforts which they enjoy." 2. The remaining question is, whether there entered into the judgment any improper elements of damage. The defendants say, in substance, that the court assessed damages for injuries not actionable, but what injuries are referred to the assignments of error do not mention at all. This amounts to no more than a general assignment of error, which is contrary to the rule on this subject, and might be disregarded, but as the defendants were heard in argument upon the question, it may be more satisfactory to dispose of it upon its merits. Resorting, then, to the oral argument before this court to supply the omission referred to, we find that after a critical analysis of the finding the counsel for the defendants are able to specify a few particulars wherein the court, in describing the effects of the nuisance, went beyond the allegations in the complaint; for instance, the complaint, in referring to the effect upon the health of the plaintiff and his family, says simply that it was endangered, whereas the finding is that it was injured; also, where the complaint only speaks of the effect of the running of the defendants' machinery as causing an intolerable noise, making it impossible to hear conversation, the finding states, in addition, that it caused the house to jar, and made the windows rattle and the dishes jolt together. Now, without stopping to show how far these facts might come in under the general allegations of the complaint in respect to being harassed, annoyed, and made uncomfortable, and the house being made unfit for habitation, we may concede, for the purposes of discussion, that in the two particulars mentioned, the finding specifies injuries not specifically alleged, and our answer is, that the inference attempted to be drawn therefrom, that the court gave damages for those additional injuries, is unwarrantable. It should be borne in mind that the suit was for an injunction, and also for damages, and the evidence to be received and the facts to be found and made part of the record had reference necessarily to both remedies. All the necessary effects of running the defendants' machinery in close proximity to the plaintiff's house were to be inquired into upon the trial, in order to determine whether it was a nuisance, and whether it was such a one as to demand the extraordinary remedy of an injunction. The facts referred to, therefore, had a proper office to perform. "Health endangered" was perfectly established when the court found health actually injured, for the greater must include the less, and health injured was a much stronger reason for an injunction, as the nuisance if continued might result in the permanent impairment of health. So as to the other fact, if the machinery operated with such tremendous power as to jar the house itself, the court not only would see how intense and intolerable the noise must have been, and that the allegation in that respect was true, but that the necessity for an injunction was more urgent on that account. Now, our conclusion is, that as all the facts referred to had a perfectly legitimate office to perform in the mind of the trial judge, it is to be conclusively persumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary shown by the record, that they were so applied. This principle has often been invoked to prevent a new trial for an alleged improper admission of evidence, where there was a general objection at the time, and the court received the evidence but gave no indication as to the use to be made of it, and where for one purpose it would have been proper, but for another very improper. The party in such cases is never allowed to say it was used for the improper purpose. The analogy is perfect, only in the case at bar there is stronger reason to apply the principle, because there was no objection at all to the facts in the court below, and yet, in effect, we are asked to reverse the presumption, and hold that where facts had a legitimate and an illegitimate purpose it must be conclusively presumed in favor of the latter. We cannot accede to such an extraordinary demand. There was no error in the judgment complained of. BUSINESS MUST BE SO CONDUCTED AS NOT TO CONSTITUTE NUISANCE. Otherwise it will be enjoined: Sullivan v. Royer, 1 Am. St. Rep. 51, and note 54; Rhodes v. Dunbar, 98 Am. Dec. 221, and note 229; Seifried v. Hays, 50 Am. Rep. 167, and note 171; Appeal of Pennsylvania Lead Co., 42 Id. 534; Pruner v. Pendleton, 40 Id. 738; Minke v. Hofeman, 29 Id. 63; Dittman v. Repp, 33 Id. 325; McKeon v. See, 10 Id. 659; Adams v. Michael, 17 Id. 516. STATE V. GLidden. [55 CONNECTICUT, 46.] IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT INTENTION WAS TO CHARGE BUT ONE OF FENSE, where all the counts in an information are manifestly based upon one and the same transaction. COMBINATION OF TWO OR MORE PERSONS TO COMMIT CRIME OR MISDEMEANOR, or to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means, is itself an offense. IT IS CRIMINAL OFFENSE for two or more persons, corruptly or maliciously, to confederate and agree together to deprive another of his liberty or property. ACTS OF PERSONS IN COMBINING TOGETHER TO INTIMIDATE EMPLOYER, and to compel him against his will to discharge his workmen, and em. ploy such other persons as the conspirators should name, fall within the prohibition of the Connecticut act of 1878, chapter 92, which subjects to a fine or imprisonment "every person who shall threaten or use any means to intimidate any person, to compel such person, against his will, to do or abstain from doing any act which such person has a legal right to do, or shall persistently follow such person in a disorderly manner, or injure or threaten to injure his property, with intent to intimidate him." CONSPIRACY - Corrupt and MALICIOUS CONDUCT. — An information alleged that the defendants conspired to threaten and use means (the boycott) to intimidate the Carrington Publishing Company, to compel it, against its will, to abstain from doing an act (to keep in its employ workmen of its own choice) which it had a legal right to do, and to do an act (employ the defendants and such persons as they should name) which it had a legal right to abstain from doing: held, that, looking at the transaction as it appeared on the face of the information, the defendants' purpose was to deprive the publishing company of its liberty to carry on its business in its own way, although in doing so it interfered with no right of the defendants; the motive was to gain an advantage unjustly and at the expense of others, and therefore the act was legally corrupt; and as a means of accomplishing the purpose, the parties intended to harm the publishing company, and therefore it was malicious. ID. - CRIME IN OPPRESSING WORKMEN. -The information further alleged that another purpose of the defendants was to injure and oppress certain workmen of the publishing company: held, that a crime was charged, within the contemplation of the statute. ID. CRIME IN EXTORTING MONEY. - The information also alleged that one object of the defendants was to extort money from the publishing company by unlawful means: held, that a crime was charged. ID. WHOLESALE BOYCOTTING. -It was charged that the defendants not only attempted to injure the publishing company, but also contemplated the "wholesale boycotting" of all the patrons of that company: held, that such conduct must be regarded as prima facie malicious and corrupt. ID.-TERM "BOYCOTT" DEFINED. -The means by which it is generally sought to accomplish a boycott are not only unlawful, but are in some degree criminal. ID. -- ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF DECLARATIONS OF CO-CONSPIRator. One of the conspirators, not a defendant, made declarations to a workman in the employ of the publishing company, that if they, the conspirators, had another battle, the publishing company would have to pay the expenses of the boycott. The purpose was to induce the workman to join the conspiracy. Held, that the declarations might be regarded as acts in the prosecution of the object of the conspiracy, and as such they were admissible. ID. EVIDENCE, RELEVANCY OF. - After the introduction of evidence to prove that the defendant Glidden had been active in attempting to induce the public not to patronize the publishing company, a witness testified that he saw two persons, one of whom was Glidden, walking up and down one of the most frequented streets, in company and close together, and that from between them copies of a circular urging |