PowerU of Minnesota Press, 1996 - 102 Seiten What is the nature of power in society and how can we study it? How do some lose and others benefit from the distribution of power? Why do some groups always seem to be at an advantage in disputes? In this useful and compact treatment, Keith Dowding provides an introduction to the study of political power that overcomes many of the old disputes about the nature and structure of power in society. Making the important distinction between power and luck, Dowding develops the concept of systematic luck and explains how some groups get what they want without trying, while the efforts of others are little rewarded. He discusses the "who benefits?" test, arguing that it cannot reveal who has power because many benefit through luck and others are systematically lucky. Power does not simply put forward theoretical arguments, however; relevant concepts are used to illustrate and explain the debates on power at both the national and local level. Clearly and accessibly written, this volume is a valuable resource for anyone interested in the structure of society as it is, and as it should be. |
Inhalt
Games of conflict and cooperation | 11 |
Power and game theory | 17 |
Luck and Power | 44 |
Systematic Luck | 73 |
| 91 | |
| 99 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
actors analysis anti-growth coalitions behaviour benefits bloc Brian Barry bureaucracy Cambridge University Press capital capitalists Chicken game choice situation choose City Challenge Clarendon Press collective action problem conflict constraints cooperation coordination coordination game costs council course of action decision Democracy demonstrates Dilemma dominant Dowding Dunleavy economic Elite theory empirical example Figure free-rider gain Game Theory groups growth machine growth-machine model important incentive structure individuals Jonathan Dancy Laffer curve lobbying London lucky major Mancur Olson mobilization Molotch nature non-excludability Olson one's organizations outcome power party payoff Player pluralist Policy Networks political power Political Science power in society power resource power structure preference ordering Prisoners rational Regime theory relationship reputation Sage self-interest Shapley-Shubik Shapley-Shubik power index simply social power Stone strategy structurally suggested studying power systematic luck threats unconditional incentives understand University of Kansas urban politics Urban regimes want without trying
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 91 - Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Barry, B.
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